concurring.
I concur in the Court’s opinion. I write to provide additional review of the appropriateness of the death sentence imposed here. Cooper v. State, 540 N.E.2d 1216, 1218 (Ind.1989) (“In contrast to appellate review of prison terms and its accompanying strong presumption that the trial court’s sentence is appropriate, this Court’s review of capital cases under arti*23cle 7 is part and parcel of the sentencing process. Rather than relying on the judgment of the trial court, this Court conducts its own review of the mitigating and aggravating circumstances ‘to examine whether the sentence of death is appropriate.’ ... The thoroughness and relative independence of this Court’s review is a part of what makes Indiana’s capital punishment statute constitutional.”) (citations omitted).
As to the appropriateness of the death penalty in this case, the statute guides this Court’s review by setting forth standards governing imposition of death sentences. Following completion of the guilt phase of the trial and the rendering of the jury’s verdict, the trial court reconvenes for the penalty phase. Before a death sentence can be imposed, our death penalty statute requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt at least one aggravating circumstance listed in subsections (b)(1) through (b)(12) of the statute. Ind.Code § 35-50-2-9 (Supp.1996). Here the State supported its request for the death penalty with the aggravating circumstance that Dye committed multiple murders (those of Hannah Clay and Celeste Jones), id. § 35-50-2-9(b)(8).
To prove the existence of this aggravating circumstance at the penalty phase of the trial, the State relied upon the evidence from the earlier guilt phase of the trial (with respect to which the jury had found Dye guilty of the two murders, as well as the murder of Lawrence Cowherd). The death penalty statute requires that any mitigating circumstances be weighed against any properly proven aggravating circumstances. The Court’s opinion accurately describes Dye’s argument in favor of mitigating circumstances. The jury returned a unanimous recommendation that a sentence of death be imposed.
Once the jury has made its recommendation, the jury is dismissed, and the trial court has the duty of making the final sentencing determination. First, the trial court must find that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one of the aggravating circumstances listed in the death penalty statute exists. Ind.Code § 35-50-2-9(k)(l) (Supp.1996). Second, the trial court must find that any mitigating circumstances that exist are outweighed by the aggravating circumstance or circumstances. Id. § 35-50-2-9(k)(2). Third, before making the final determination of the sentence, the trial court must consider the jury’s recommendation. Id. § 35-50-2-9(e). The trial court must make a record of its reasons for selecting the sentence that it imposes. Id. § 35-38-1-3 (1988).
In imposing the death sentence, the trial court found that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt a charged aggravating circumstance listed in the death penalty statute — -that Dye had committed multiple murders. The record and the law supports this finding.
The trial court found little in the way of mitigating circumstances to exist. The court found only that Dye’s history of prior criminal conduct was not significant (he had been convicted of two Class A misdemeanors — Driving While License Suspended in 1989 and Battery in 1992). However, the court did note that the circumstances surrounding the battery were significant because the victim of the battery was Myrna Dye. The court also considered, but did not find to exist, additional statutory mitigating circumstances and other purported mitigating circumstances offered by Dye. I agree with the trial court’s and this Court’s analyses of the mitigation in this case and find the mitigating weight to be in the low range.
As required by our death penalty statute, the trial court specifically found that the aggravating circumstance outweighed the mitigating circumstances. The trial court also gave consideration to the jury’s recommendation. The trial court imposed the sentence of death.
Based on my review of the record and the law, I agree that the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt an aggravating *24circumstance authorized by our death penalty statute and that the mitigating circumstances that exist are outweighed by that aggravating circumstance. I conclude that the death penalty is appropriate for Dye’s murder of Hannah Clay, Celeste Jones and Lawrence Cowherd III.