specially concurring:
I would hold that Chavez is not entitled to a dismissal on the speedy trial issue, but not for the reasons cited by the majority.
Because of his other problems with the courts, I am not persuaded that Chavez really wished for a speedy trial. This was a compelling factor to the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo (1972), 407 U.S. 514. In Barker we were warned against mechanically ticking off the factors there enumerated and boiling the issue down to the simple question of prejudice. Prejudice should always be presumed, and for good reasons, outlined in U.S. v. Marion (1971), 404 U.S. 307, 320, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468.
MR. JUSTICES SHEA and MORRISON dissent and will file a written dissent later.