dissenting.
Because the trial court failed to make a specific finding on the issue of domestic violence by Diane Hendrickson, I would reverse and remand. Because the majority weighs evidence and makes findings which are the exclusive province of the trial court, I dissent.
As reflected in the majority opinion, evidence of domestic violence by Diane Hen-drickson was before the trial court. N.D.C.C. § 14-07.1-01(2) defines domestic violence as “physical harm, bodily injury, sexual activity compelled by physical force, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, sexual activity compelled by physical force, or assault, not committed in self-defense, on the complaining family or household members.” “Subsection (j) [of N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1) ] applies equally to men and women.” Bruner v. Hager, 534 N.W.2d 825, 829 (N.D.1995) (Sandstrom, J., concurring in the result). Institu*221tional paternalism toward women is itself sexism and gender bias.
“Even if the violent conduct did not harm anyone, if it threatened imminent harm to someone in the household, the presumption arises, must be addressed by specific findings, and can be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence that ‘the best interests of the child require [the violent] parent’s participation as a custodial parent.’ NDCC 14-09-06.2(1)(j). Under NDREv 301(a), ‘the presumption substitutes for evidence of the existence of the fact presumed until the trier of fact finds from credible evidence that the fact presumed does not exist.’ ”
Ryan v. Flemming, 533 N.W.2d 920, 923 (N.D.1995).
“A trial court must make detailed and specific findings about the degree of family violence whenever the subject comes up in a child-custody case.” Krank v. Krank, 529 N.W.2d 844, 850-51 (N.D.1995) (Meschke, J., concurring).
“When domestic violence is a factor in a custody decision, the court ‘shall cite specific findings of fact.’ NDCC § 14-09-06.2(l)(j). Rule 52(a), NDRCivP, also requires trial courts to ‘find the facts specially.’ Findings are especially important in cases involving domestic violence, because the presence of findings on the issue shows that the trial court did not ignore the issue in reaching its conclusion. Helbling, 532 N.W.2d at 653.”
Krank v. Krank, 541 N.W.2d 714, 716 (N.D.1996).
Recognizing the lack of an essential finding of fact by the trial court, the majority writes: “While more detailed findings on this one incident might have facilitated our review, we see insufficient evidence tending to credibly show ‘infliction of fear of imminent physical harm’ or domestic violence by Diane to reverse and remand for specific findings.”
The majority, however, ignores that the “trial judge is the proper arbiter of credibility,” Ryan, 533 N.W.2d at 925 (Levine, J., concurring specially), not the Supreme Court. Buzick v. Buzick, 542 N.W.2d 756, 758 (N.D.1996). It is the province of the fact finder “to weigh the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses.” State v. Syring, 524 N.W.2d 97, 98 (N.D.1994) (citing State v. Pollack, 462 N.W.2d 119, 121 (N.D.1990)).
“In bench trials, the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony are both exclusively functions of the trial court. Schmidt v. Schmidt, 325 N.W.2d 230, 233 (N.D.1982); N.D.R.Civ.P. Rule 52(a); see also Johnson v. Johnson, 480 N.W.2d 433, 437-38 (N.D.1992) (recognizing trial court’s ability to ascertain the demeanor and credibility of expert witness).”
Weber v. Weber, 512 N.W.2d 723, 727 (N.D.1994).
“The trial judge was the trier of fact, and, as a corollary, the judge of the credibility of the witnesses. The trial judge is uniquely qualified to determine the credibility of a witness with regard to the truthfulness of the various facts to which the witness testified.”
Urlaub v. Urlaub, 325 N.W.2d 234, 236 (N.D.1982). “It is the trial judge’s obligation to view the witnesses, weigh their credibility and determine the facts.” Wolf v. Wolf, 474 N.W.2d 257, 260 (N.D.1991).
“Rule 52(a), N.D.R.Civ.P., states: ‘In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury ... the court shall find the facts specially ... ’ In this instance the trial judge in his oral opinion did not make detailed findings of fact. But in Gross v. Gross, 287 N.W.2d 457, 460 (N.D.1979), after emphasizing the need for specific findings of fact, this court recognized that the trial judge determines the credibility of the witnesses and that ‘[p]resent sense impressions of that nature are not instilled by an appellate perusal of the trial transcript.’ ”
Ebertz v. Ebertz, 338 N.W.2d 651, 654 (N.D.1983).
“[T]he dispositive aspect of this appeal is the lack of adequate attention to the statutory presumption against placing custody with a parent who has committed domestic violence.” Owan v. Owan, 541 N.W.2d 719, 720 (N.D.1996).
*222Because all of the remaining issues are affected by the award of child custody, I would reverse and remand on all issues.