dissenting.
[¶ 34] I respectfully dissent. Rydberg affirmatively situated himself into the life of the child as her father. He signed an acknowledgment of paternity the day after she was born. He accepted the child into his home and held her out as his own for the first ten years of her life. He married the child’s mother. If this child has a different biological father, Rydberg has effectively supplanted any relationship she might have had with that father for a decade of her life. Rydberg did not deny paternity until after it became clear he would be responsible for child support. In an effort to ■ dodge a child support obligation, Rydberg requested genetic tests. The district court erred when it permitted Rydberg to contest paternity because the statute of limitations had passed. Even if the statute of limitations did not absolutely bar the defense, the district court erred when it ordered genetic tests and determined paternity without providing the child with the protections of the Uniform Parentage Act, N.D.C.C. ch. 14-17, and without considering whether Rydberg was equitably estopped from asserting nonpa-ternity.
I.
[¶ 35] As the majority explains, Rydberg is the presumed father under three subsections of N.D.C.C. § 14-17-04. The majority relies upon In re K.B., 490 *542N.W.2d 715, 717 (N.D.1992), to conclude the “[UPA] does not preclude an assertion of nonpaternity as a defense to the presumptive father in another action.” The majority applies KB. in a manner inconsistent with the legislative intent expressed in N.D.C.C. ch. 14-17.
[¶ 36] I believe this Court failed to follow legislative intent in KB. when it stated nonpaternity could be raised as a defense in an action “presumably to collect child support.” K.B., 490 N.W.2d at 716. Technically, that part of KB. is dictum since the judgment determining the nonpaternity of the presumed father was not on appeal in KB. Rather, another man, alleged to be the biological father of K.B., was attempting to use the statute of limitations applicable to actions to determine “the nonexistence of the father and child relationship” as a shield in an action to determine the existence of a biological relationship between him and K.B. N.D.C.C. § 14 — 17—05(l)(b). This Court did not permit the alleged biological father to use a non-applicable statute of limitations to avoid support. See P.E. v. W.C., 552 N.W.2d 375, 378-79 (N.D.1996) (distinguishing between statutes of limitations applying to actions to determine the existence of a father-child relationship and those applying to actions to determine the nonexistence of a father-child relationship and holding the latter does not shield a putative father in an action for support).
[¶ 37] In this case, the statute of limitations in N.D.C.C. § 14 — 17—05(l)(b) is directly applicable and the legislature has determined that “in no event” should Rydberg be permitted to declare the nonexistence of the father-child relationship because the limitations period has long passed. Rydberg’s voluntary acknowledgment of paternity and his failure to take any action to disavow his paternity within the statutory time period should conclusively prohibit him from disowning this child merely by raising a defense to a child support action.1
[¶ 38] In K.B., the Court stated, “the overriding public policy of the Uniform Parentage Act is to protect the interests of the child.” K.B., 490 N.W.2d at 718. The Court further recognized its ruling in KB. was to prevent putative biological fathers from using the statute of limitations as a shield to avoid their duty to support their children. Id. The Court explained, “[w]e cannot condone a result that would leave the child without a legally established father and effectively preclude any possibility of establishing paternity in the future.” Id. Ironically, the majority in this case relies on KB. to achieve the result the Court in KB. specifically sought to avoid. Unlike the child in K.B., the child in this case is left without either a presumed father or a putative father to step in and fulfill the parenting role, either psychologically or financially. The trial court, and a majority of this Court, have done a great disservice to this child to allow the presumed father, who had acted in that role for over ten years, to abandon his role without another to fill the void.
*543[¶ 39] This result subverts legislative intent as well as previous case law. Legislative intent fixing a five-year period in which to disestablish paternity is not given effect when a man who is the presumed father is permitted to shield himself from the normal obligations of parenthood by asserting nonpaternity as a defense in a support .action when he could no longer initiate an action to establish nonpaternity. See K.B., 490 N.W.2d at 718-719 (Levine, J., concurring specially). The majority rewards an individual who 'Sat on his rights and is now precluded from initiating an action to achieve the result of the decision now being affirmed.
II.
[¶ 40] The K.B. Court suggested that allowing a party to assert as a defense what the party could not bring as a separate cause of action is no different in a child support case than it would be in any other case. K.B., 490 N.W.2d at 717. What that analysis fails to consider is the obligation to support a child is part of the bundle of continuing obligations of being a parent. N.D.C.C. § 14-09-08. The parent-child relationship is unlike the normal situation in which a party is permitted to raise, as a defense, what the party could not assert as a cause of action. In normal situations, the defending party has reason to believe that the passage of time has dissolved the legal consequences of an event or a prior relationship. The passage of time has quite the opposite effect for a presumed father. N.D.C.C. § 14-17-05 makes the passage of time significant to affirm, the relationship. If a presumed father wishes to avoid the bundle of obligations that go with being a parent, including support, N.D.C.C. § 14-17-05 requires that he take action within five years.2 N.D.C.C. ch. 14-17 was singular advice to Rydberg that five years from acknowledging paternity of this child, he could expect that his obligations as a parent continued during the remainder of her minority. Both the child and society have an interest in seeing that a parent fulfill the continuous obligation to support a child. Both the child and society have a right to rely upon the presumed father, who takes no action to disavow the relationship, to continue to meet his obligations to the child.
[¶ 41] When the legislature creates a statute of limitations specifically establishing a time frame to deny the presumed parent and child relationship, it defies logic to say despite the passage of the limitations period, an essential element of the relationship, the obligation to support, can be defeated by simply asserting nonpater-nity as a defense. The majority recognizes there is a split among jurisdictions on whether nonpaternity can be raised as a defense. I believe, however, that the better reasoning recognizes the clear signal in N.D.C.C. ch. 14-17 that nonpaternity cannot be asserted by a presumed father under these circumstances after five years. N.D.C.C. ch. 14-17 provides significant protection for a child who has been acknowledged by a father in not permitting such a defense; this decision eliminates the protection provided by the legislature. *544What was mere dictum in K.B. becomes settled law under this decision and I cannot agree.
III.
[¶ 42] Even if this Court were to hold that the statute of limitations does not bar the assertion of nonpaternity, it should not follow that the child also loses the further protections built into N.D.C.C. ch. 14-17 for a determination of existence or nonexistence of the parent-child relationship. Although the district court ordered genetic tests, citing N.D.C.C. § 14-17-10 as authority for the tests, the district court did so without otherwise following the procedures of the chapter. The majority acknowledges the decision in this case has the effect of a determination of nonpaternity; yet this child had no representative for her interests. The district court erred when it allowed the case to proceed to a determination of nonpaternity without appointing a guardian ad litem for the child. North Dakota law requires that a child involved in a paternity dispute be made a party to the action and be represented by a natural parent or a guardian ad litem. N.D.C.C. § 14-17-08 provides:
The child must be made a party to the action. A child who is a minor must be represented by the child’s parent whose parentage has been established under section 14-17-03 or a guardian ad litem appointed by the court. The court may appoint the director of the county social service board as guardian ad litem for the child. The biological mother, each man presumed to be the father under section 14-17-04, and each man alleged to be the biological father, must be made parties or, if not subject to the jurisdiction of the court, must be given notice of the action in a manner prescribed by the court and an opportunity to be heard. The court may align the parties.
[¶ 43] This Court has previously held the language of this section is mandatory, even when neither party has requested representation for the child. Hadland v. Schroeder, 326 N.W.2d 709, 715 (N.D.1982). The majority states Ward County Social Service Board sufficiently represents the interests of the child. However, in the hearing held September 23, 2002, the attorney appearing for Daniel Richter, Director of Ward County Social Service Board, indicated she represented the interests of the people of North Dakota, not the child. The attorney further stated: “[t]his is a case where a guardian ad litem should be appointed for the child as well.” The child in this case, who is fatherless as a result of the decision, should have been made a party and should have been represented by a guardian ad litem.
[¶ 44] Assuming that the statute of limitations did not bar Rydberg’s assertion of nonpaternity, it was error for the district court to order genetic testing without first considering the best interests of the child and without considering whether, even with genetic testing, Rydberg was es-topped from asserting his nonpaternity. Under the Uniform Parentage Act § 608, a court may deny a motion seeking an order for genetic testing if the court determines the best interests of the child will not be protected by allowing such evidence. The section provides:
(b) In determining whether to deny a motion seeking an order for genetic testing under this section, the court shall consider the best interest of the child, including the following factors:
(1) the length of time between the proceeding to adjudicate parentage and the time that the presumed father was placed on notice that he might not be the genetic father;
*545(2) the length of time during which the presumed father has assumed the role of father of the child;
(3) the facts surrounding the presumed father’s discovery of his possible nonpaternity;
(4) the nature of the relationship between the child and the presumed father;
(5) the age of the child;
(6) the harm that may result to the child if presumed paternity is successfully disproved;
(7) the nature of the relationship between the child and any alleged father;
(8) the extent to which the passage of time reduces the chances of establishing the paternity of another man and a child-support obligation in favor of the child; and
(9) other factors that may affect the equities arising from the disruption of the father-child relationship between the child and the presumed father or the chance of other harm to the child.
Uniform Parentage Act § 608. Although North Dakota did not adopt this section of the Uniform Parentage Act, N.D.C.C. ch. 14-17 specifically requires the best interests of the child be evaluated. N.D.C.C. § 14-17-12(1) requires the judge at the pre-trial hearing in paternity proceedings to “evaluate the probability of determining the existence or nonexistence of the father and child relationship in a trial and whether a judicial declaration of the relationship would be in the best interest of the child.” The factors identified in Uniform Parentage Act § 608 would be significant in considering the best interests of this child, which as this Court noted in K.B., 490 N.W.2d at 718, should be the overriding concern.
[¶ 45] Consideration of the child’s best interests under N.D.C.C. § 14AL7-12 would not prohibit an order for genetic testing in an action properly brought within the statute of limitations. However, even if the testing establishes the child has another biological father, courts have determined that this does not end the inquiry when the child has an established relationship with a presumed father. N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354, 357 (Colo.2000) (reversing order determining paternity of biological father when the best interests of the child had not been considered in determining paternity between presumed father based upon marriage and presumed father based upon genetic testing). The best interests of this child have not been considered as no further hearing was conducted after the district court received the results of the genetic testing.
IV.
[¶ 46] Even if the statute of limitations did not bar an order for genetic testing, a court considering paternity must determine whether estoppel should operate to preclude an assertion of nonpaternity when the presumed father has acted as the child’s father and induced reliance of the child on the asserted paternity to the detriment of the child, the mother or the state. States which permit genetic tests to overcome the presumption of paternity based upon marriage consider whether, under the facts, paternity by estoppel must be recognized. See Alberto T. v. Tammy D., 274 A.D.2d 587, 587-88, 712 N.Y.S.2d 392 (N.Y.App.Div.2000) (citing Ettore I. v. Angela D., 127 A.D.2d 6, 13, 513 N.Y.S.2d 733 (N.Y.App.Div.1987) (applying the doctrine of estoppel to preclude a presumed father from asserting nonpaternity)); see also Diane S. Kaplan, Why Truth is Not a Defense in Paternity Actions, 10 Tex. J. Women & Law 69, 79-80 (explaining the New York model of applying best interests *546factors when competing presumptions arise in paternity disputes).
[¶ 47] In Pietros v. Pietros, 688 A.2d 545 (R.I.1994), the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that although an individual may rebut the presumption of paternity by clear and convincing evidence, courts may equitably estop a presumptive father from challenging paternity where the parties have accepted or agreed to a husband’s status as father of the child.
[¶48] In Randy A.J. v. Norma I.J., 2004 WI 41, ¶ 2, 677 N.W.2d 630, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held the mother and putative father were equitably es-topped from asserting the genetic test results, showing a 99.99% probability that the putative father was the biological father, to rebut the statutory presumption that the man married to the mother was the father of the child. The court noted “[elquitable estoppel requires proof of three elements: (1) an action or an inaction that induces; (2) reliance by another; and (3) to his or her detriment.” Id. at ¶26. The Wisconsin court decided that the mother and putative father’s actions and lack of actions, which were relied on by the child and the presumed father, combined with the state’s interest in preserving the status of the child as a marital child, outweighed any interest “in a purely biological approach to parenthood.” Id. at ¶ 31.
[¶ 49] From the scant facts alleged in this record, estoppel must be considered. The child was born in March 1992. Rydberg signed an acknowledgment of paternity the day after her birth and subsequently married the child’s mother. When this action for support was commenced in June 2002, the mother and Rydberg had only been separated since April 2002, and had not divorced. It is clear that the trial court in this case did not apply considerations of estoppel, although estoppel -was raised at the hearing on September 23, 2002. Once the results of the genetic testing were known to the court, no further hearings were conducted. The court ordered the application for child support dismissed and entered an order stating, “Andrew G. Rydberg is not the father of the child.” It was error for the trial court to do so.
[¶ 50] The district court considered the genetic tests determinative and the majority opinion effectively determines that biology should outweigh the emotional investment a child puts into a man who acts as her father for many years. For centuries, society has fully recognized the importance of parent-child relationships between individuals who are not bound by biology. The majority minimizes the potential parent-child relationship developed between parents and children who are not necessarily genetically linked. Modern technology allows for donor sperm, donor eggs, and surrogate mothers to give birth to children even when they are not related by biology. The majority opinion, by making genetics determinative, disregards the similar emotional and psychological bonds developed by adoptive parents, parents who have benefitted from assisted reproduction, and other non-traditional parent-child relationships. Genetics does not necessarily triumph over the rewards and obligations of parenting, and N.D.C.C. ch. 14-17 indicates that it ought not under the circumstances of this case.
V.
[¶ 51] I would reverse the decision, vacate the order of the court declaring Andrew G. Rydberg not to be the father and dismissing the support action, and require the support action to proceed. I believe this is required under N.D.C.C. § 14-17-05, because Rydberg failed to commence an action to declare his nonpaternity with*547in five years of acknowledging the child as his own. Even if the statute of limitations is not applied to bar the assertion of non-paternity, I believe the case must still be reversed and the order vacated. In order to examine the issue of paternity, the court must appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the child, afford her the protections of N.D.C.C. ch. 14-17, and consider the possibility that, despite the biological evidence, Rydberg may be estopped from asserting nonpaternity.
[¶ 52] Carol Ronning Kapsner
. After this Court’s decision in K.B., the legislature enacted N.D.C.C. ch 14-19. This chapter substantially strengthens the effect of an acknowledgment of paternity. Under N.D.C.C. § 14-19-04, acknowledgment of paternity through a signed writing filed with the department of health has the "force and effect of a relationship of father and child established through judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction.” Under the chapter, an even shorter limitation period applies to an attempt by the acknowledging father to set aside the acknowledgment. Although not applicable to Rydberg’s 1992 acknowledgment of paternity, it is indicative of the legislative view of the significance and impact of acknowledging paternity.
. Courts have distinguished between a "pure” statute of limitations (or "prescriptive” limitations period) and a “special” (or "peremp-tive”) statute of limitations. "A ‘pure’ statute of limitations operates only to bar a remedy, and does not affect the substantive existence of a legal right or power. A special limitation, by contrast, is an integral, substantive element of the right or power in question; the right or power cannot exist in scope beyond the special limitation.” Cunningham v. Ins. Co. of North America, 515 Pa. 486, 530 A.2d 407, 412 (1987). N.D.C.C. ch. 14-17 establishes a special limitation period in which a presumed father can contest his paternity.