dissenting.
[¶ 27] I concur in Parts IV and V of the majority opinion. However, I am of the opinion that the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law awarding primary residential responsibility to Eric Deyle were induced by an erroneous application of factors (d), (h), and (m), N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1). Therefore, I, respectfully, dissent from Part II.
I
[¶ 28] The trial court must award primary residential responsibility to the parent who will better promote the children’s best interests. Hammeren v. Hammeren, 2012 ND 225, ¶6, 823 N.W.2d 482. In awarding primary residential responsibility, the trial court must consider the best interests of the child and all the relevant factors under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1). Id. A trial court’s award of primary residential responsibility is a finding of fact, which is “clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, if no evidence exists to support it, or, although there is some evidence to support it, on the entire record, we are left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made.” Id. at ¶ 7.
[¶ 29] In awarding primary residential responsibility to Eric Deyle, the trial court found factor (b) “strongly” favored Christina Deyle; factor (c) “slightly” favored Eric Deyle; factors (d), (h), and (m) favored Eric Deyle; and the remaining best interests factors either favored neither party or were irrelevant. I believe Christina Deyle’s role as primary caretaker, the trial court’s improper speculation of where Christina Deyle will reside two years post-divorce, and Eric Deyle’s failure to financially support his children resulted in findings unsupported by the record and a misapplication of factors (d), (h), and (m).
1. Primary Caretaker
[¶ 30] In 2009, the legislature amended N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1), the best interest factors. See 2009 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 149, § 5. The amendment combined the pre-amended factor (d), “the length of time the child has lived in a stable satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity,” with the pre-amended factor (e), “the permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home,” into the new factor (d), “the sufficiency and stability of each parent’s home environment, the impact of extended family, the length of time the child has lived in *254each parent’s home, and the desirability of maintaining continuity in the child’s home and community.” Id.
[¶ 31] The amendment was intended to combine and clarify the factors, but not to change the meaning or application of either factor. See Hearing on S.B.2042 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 61st N.D. Legis. Sess. (Jan. 19, 2009) (testimony of Attorney Sherry Mills Moore, State Bar Assoc, of N.D., lobbyist). Moore explained:
Proposed paragraph (d) requires the court to look at the sufficiency and stability of each parent’s home environment, the length of time the child has lived in each home and the desirability of maintaining continuity in the child’s home and community. The amendments are not intended to eliminate the court’s ability to consider the permanence of the family unit.
Id. Therefore, this Court’s interpretation of the new factor (d) should be consistent with this Court’s interpretation of the pre-amended factors (d) and (e).
[¶ 32] Although this Court does not presume custody in favor of the primary caretaker, the concept of the primary caretaker “inheres in the statutory factors” and deserves recognition. Gravning v. Gravning, 389 N.W.2d 621, 622 (N.D.1986); see also Heggen v. Heggen, 452 N.W.2d 96, 101-02 (N.D.1990); Von Bank v. Von Bank, 443 N.W.2d 618, 620 (N.D.1989).
While a trial court may not rely upon the primary caretaker status to the exclusion of all other factors, it certainly should consider which parent served as the primary caretaker. N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1)(a), (b), (d), (e); see also, e.g., Wolf v. Wolf, 474 N.W.2d 257 (N.D.1991); Dinius [v. Dinius, 448 N.W.2d 210 (N.D.1989)] (Levine, J., dissenting). Established patterns of care and nurture are relevant factors. Heggen v. Heggen, 452 N.W.2d 96 (N.D.1990). “Continuity in a child’s relationship with the closest, nurturing parent is ... a very important aspect of stability.” Roen v. Roen, 438 N.W.2d 170, 174 (N.D.1989).
Foreng v. Foreng, 509 N.W.2d 38, 40 (N.D.1993). If factors (d) and (e) are properly construed, “they go to the overriding importance of the stability, continuity, and permanence embodied in a primary caretaker’s relationship with the children.” Dinius, 448 N.W.2d at 219 (Meschke, J., dissenting) (factors (d) and (e) were named factors (4) and (5), respectively, at the time of that opinion; however, the substantive language remained unchanged).
[¶ 33] Here, the trial court found Christina Deyle to be the primary caretaker. However, the trial court erred when it found this to weigh in her favor only under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(l)(b). A primary caretaker can be given consideration under factor (b); however, to reduce the primary caretaker to consideration of whether a person provides “adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and a safe environment” undermines the psychological relationship shared by a child and the primary caretaker. See N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(l)(b). A primary caretaker has intimate interactions with the child creating a vital bond. Gravning, 389 N.W.2d at 625 (Levine, J., dissenting). Consideration of this social and emotional bond must be given weight under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(l)(d).” Stoppler v. Stoppler, 2001 ND 148, ¶ 31, 633 N.W.2d 142. The trial court’s findings under factor (d) completely ignored Christina Deyle’s role as primary caretaker and is, therefore, clearly erroneous.
[¶ 34] Further, factor (d) focuses on the emotional stability as well as the physical environment of a child’s past and fu*255ture home. The pre-amended version of N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(l)(d) “addresses past stability of [the] environment, including a consideration of place or physical setting, as well as a consideration of the prior family unit and its lifestyle as part of that setting. It also addresses the quality of that past environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity.” Stoppler, 2001 ND 148, ¶9, 688 N.W.2d 142. A prior custodial arrangement should be considered when examining factor (d). Id.
[¶ 35] To decide factor (d) solely based on the children remaining in a location wrongfully places the emphasis on geography rather than parental relations. See Stoppler, 2001 ND 148, ¶31, 633 N.W.2d 142 (citing Craig v. McBride, 639 P.2d 303, 308 (Alaska 1982) (Rabinowitz, C.J., concurring) (explaining that “[u]nder factor (d), ‘stability is often a function of parental attitude and not of geography5 ”)). I continue to be troubled by the emphasis on the continuity of the child’s physical setting over the importance of the continuity of the parent-child relationship under factor (d).
2. Speculation of Move
[¶ 36] Unsupported speculation of where Christina Deyle will be two years post-divorce pervade the trial court’s findings that factors (d), (h), and (m), N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1), favored Eric Deyle and are, therefore, clearly erroneous.
[¶ 37] The trial court found that “Christina’s living situation is likely going to change at least two and perhaps three times in the foreseeable future[:] moving out of her parent[s’] home ..., possibly moving to Wahpeton for school, and then moving to find work as a hygienist.” Any reliance on Christina Deyle’s move from her parents’ home is misplaced as a basis to find against her under factors (d), (h), or (m). The record establishes that Eric Deyle did not provide a stable home for the children in the interim, and he failed to pay the mortgage forcing the children and Christina Deyle out of their home. Christina Deyle took the children with her to her parents’ home. Any move from her parents’ home is a direct result of Eric Deyle’s actions and should not be weighed against Christina Deyle.
[¶ 38] Any reliance on subsequent moves is not supported by the record. The trial court found Christina Deyle is likely to move for school. However, the record is completely void of any reference to her moving for school. Further, Christina Deyle testified that she is applying to the dental hygienist program, but has not yet been accepted. When asked about the dental hygienist program, Christina testified:
THE COURT: ... During your testimony you indicated that it’s going to take you about 2 1/2 years to finish dental hygienist school after you’re accepted. My questions are, are you currently accepted or what’s the situation?
MS. DEYLE: I find out in April.
THE COURT: So you are not accepted at this point?
MS. DEYLE: No.
THE COURT: You will find out. All right. You’re, based on your testimony, anticipating that you will be accepted is my understanding. Is that correct?
MS. DEYLE: Hopefully. Yeah. Yes.
Based on this testimony, the trial court found Christina Deyle was likely moving to Wahpeton for school, yet she has not been accepted into the program. Further, Christina Deyle currently attends classes in Wahpeton while living with her parents in Milnor. There is no basis for the trial court to speculate such an arrangement would be different if she attended the dental hygienist program.
*256[¶ 39] The trial court also found Christina Deyle would likely move out of the area after she finishes school. However, Christina Deyle testified she would like to remain in the Milnor area after she finishes school:
[COUNSEL]: Okay. And your long term employment goal would be to be a dental hygienist?
[MS. DEYLE]: Yes.
[COUNSEL]: Okay. And where would you plan to do that work?
[MS. DEYLE]: Hopefully around the area.
[COUNSEL]: Are you aware of whether or not there is positions in the area in that field?
[MS. DEYLE]: I am not.
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[COUNSEL]: What is your, you’mentioned you’re currently living with your parents, what’s your long term housing plan?
[MS. DEYLE]: Once I can save up my money get affordable housing for the kids and I.
[COUNSEL]: And where would you be looking for housing?
[MS. DEYLE]: In the Minor area for now.
[¶ 40] The trial court speculated, based on the fact Christina Deyle was unaware of dental hygienist jobs in the Milnor area, that she would move away from Milnor. However, her testimony does not support such a finding.
[¶ 41] The trial court found Christina Deyle to be the primary caretaker, yet found factor (d) to weigh in favor of Eric Deyle because of its speculation that Christina Deyle “may move.” I agree with the majority in holding that a trial court may look into the future to determine whether factor (d) favors one parent. However, the trial court may not speculate as to future events, when such is not supported by the record. I am of the opinion that the trial court went beyond the forward-looking approach discussed in Lindberg v. Lindberg, 2009 ND 136, 770 N.W.2d 252, and engaged in speculation unsubstantiated by facts in the record. As discussed above, a move by Christina Deyle in the future is without a factual basis. The trial court’s finding that, because she “may move,” factor (d) weighs in favor of Eric Deyle is clearly erroneous.
[¶ 42] Under factor (h), the trial court found the potential effect of any change to home, school, and community weighed “slightly” in favor of Eric Deyle. However, again, this finding is premised on speculation that Christina Deyle “may move.” As pointed out, the trial court’s finding is not supported by the record and is, therefore, clearly erroneous.
[¶ 43] Under factor (m), the trial court found Eric Deyle was able to provide a more stable physical and emotional environment. This is again premised on the trial court’s speculation that Christina Deyle “may move.” The trial court’s finding that N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(l)(m) favored Eric Deyle is clearly erroneous, because it is based on speculation that has no factual support in the record of this case.
3. Financial Support
[¶ 44] The trial court further erred in its findings under factor (m) when it ignores its findings under factor (b). In its analysis of N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(l)(b), “[t]he ability of each parent to assure that the child receives adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and a safe environment,” the trial court found that Eric Deyle has done little to financially support his children since the parties’ separation. Specifically, the trial court found:
These children have been without meaningful financial support from Eric *257since June 2010. Eric earns considerably more than Christina but has provided very little financial support for the children’s needs since their separation. Eric allowed the home that his children were living in go into foreclosure.
The fact that Eric failed to support his children during the separation and that he allowed the home in which they were living to go into foreclosure during the parties’ separation weigh heavily against him in this court’s consideration of residential responsibility. (Emphasis added.)
The trial court specifically found Christina Deyle “has been the children’s primary caregiver during the marriage and separation,” and, therefore, concluded factor (b) “strongly favors” Christina Deyle. Those findings are supported by the evidence in the record. And yet, after finding Eric Deyle’s failure to financially support his children “weigh heavily against him” and finding Christina Deyle was the children’s primary caretaker in its analysis under factor (b), the trial court then found Eric Deyle would provide a more stable physical and emotional setting for the children under factor (m).
[¶ 45] The evidence in this record supports that Eric Deyle allowed the home in which his children lived to go into foreclosure; he has not provided a stable environment for the children; he essentially caused his children to become homeless; and he has failed to pay child support since June of 2010.
[¶ 46] Therefore, I am of the opinion that the trial court’s finding that Eric Deyle is able to provide a more stable physical and emotional environment than Christine Deyle and, therefore, N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(l)(m), favors him is clearly erroneous.
II
[¶ 47] I believe the trial court erroneously applied factors (d), (h), and (m) of N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1). Therefore, I respectfully dissent and would remand for a correct application of the law.
[¶ 48] MARY MUEHLEN MAKING
WILLIAM F. HODNY, S.J., joins in the dissent.