(dissenting).
[¶ 41.] I write specially to express my disagreement with the trial court’s finding that attorney Ireland acted recklessly in regard to the court’s orders. It is obvious from the record, and the course of conduct displayed by Ireland, that his conduct went beyond reckless; it was clearly intentional.
[¶ 42.] The record is replete with instances of Ireland’s on-going course of intentional conduct, beginning during the discovery process and continuing until the trial court declared a mistrial. Prior to trial, Ireland/State Farm denied possessing any photographs of the vehicles involved in the accident; nine months later such photographs were produced. Next, Ireland claimed Biodynamics, and not State Farm, had provided the information concerning the number of times Biodynamics was paid for its testimony in South Dakota cases. However, the evidence produced at trial established that this statement was not correct. The information had come from State Farm, not Biodynamics. Also, prior to trial, Ireland claimed “it would take hundreds of hours of research” and would be impossible to obtain information regarding the number of times State Farm hired and paid Biodynamics for its testimony in eases throughout the United States. Again, Ireland’s statement was shown to be incorrect. When, on the second day of trial, it was revealed Eccleston possessed this information, State Farm/Ire*586land admitted this information could be produced. (And it must be reiterated that each time the majority refers to questionable conduct in ¶¶ 7, 12, 14, 15 and 16, it is not referring to conduct of the company, but rather actions of its counsel, Mr. Ireland. In that context, State Farm and Ireland are synonymous.)
[¶ 43.] Moreover, Ireland’s intentional conduct continued throughout the trial. During Ireland’s opening statement, he twice violated the court’s order by relating prohibited information to the jury. In addition, he stated in open court that he had possession of the videotape of Tor Tovsland, Eccleston’s husband, and that he had edited it in compliance with the court’s rulings on certain objections. However, when the tape was shown, it was clear it had not been completely edited. Because it was not properly edited, the jury heard and saw, what the trial court termed, “irrelevant and prejudicial discussions between attorneys at the deposition about one of [Eccleston’s] initial claims that had since been dropped.” It is also important to note that at the time the mistrial was granted, Ireland had “run out” of witnesses, a further indication that his conduct was intentional.
[¶ 44.] In addition, the court had before it information of Ireland’s conduct in another proceeding, which took place during the pen-dency of this case. In that ease, the court determined that Ireland, in representing State Farm, had made misrepresentations to the court. However, the court was unable to determine if the misrepresentations were intentional, so it denied the request to enter sanctions.
[¶45.] As more indicia of a pattern of Ireland’s conduct, I point to another case involving State Farm where he was the attorney, and where pretrial procedures were ignored. In Isaac v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 522 N.W.2d 752, 762 (S.D.1994), the trial court denied State Farm’s offer of proof concerning lack of damage to the vehicle driven by State Farm’s insured. State Farm/Ireland offered this proposed evidence less than three days prior to trial, even though the court required disclosure of this information two days before the pretrial conference. The pretrial conference was held on March 19, 1993; State Farm/Ireland possessed the evidence as early as March 5, 1993. The trial court held that State Farm had a duty to update its interrogatories and discovery. This Court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making such a ruling. Id.
[¶46.] In addition to being advocates for their clients, lawyers have an awesome and unique ethical and professional responsibility to the court. Litigation is not a game. Lawyers, quite appropriately, are governed by significant and important rules of professional conduct. I particularly refer to the following:
Rule 3.3 Candor Toward the Tribunal
(a)A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;
(2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client;
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(4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures.
Rule 3.4 Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel
A lawyer shall not:
(a) unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to do any such act;
(b) falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law;
(c) knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists;
(d) in pretrial procedure, make a frivolous discovery request or fail to make reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally *587proper discovery request by an opposing party;
(e) at trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence!.]
Rule 8.4 Misconduct
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the rules of professional conduct ...
* * * * * *
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation;
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice!.]
[¶ 47.] As this Court has held, “!b]ecause the courts of this state must rely upon the assistance of attorneys to ascertain the truth of matters before them, attorneys must be fair and forthright with the courts.” Matter of Discipline of Mines, 523 N.W.2d 424, 426 (S.D.1994) (citing Matter of Discipline of Schmidt, 491 N.W.2d 754, 755 (S.D.1992)); see SDCL 16-18-19. “It is absolutely necessary that each member of the bar comprehends the great responsibility that every person who has the privilege to practice law must strive for: to be a person of unquestionable integrity as he or she deals with the rights of people before the bar.” Mines, 523 N.W.2d at 427. Further, “[a] practitioner of the legal profession does not have the liberty to flirt with the idea that the end justifies the means, or any other rationalization that would excuse less than complete honesty in the practice of the profession.” Id. It is essential that “candor and fairness ... characterize the conduct of an attorney at the beginning, during, and at the close of litigation.” Schmidt, 491 N.W.2d at 755.
[¶ 48.] The trial court said that Ireland was reckless. I disagree and would hold that he acted intentionally. “It is a well-settled principle of law that the intent with which an act is done may be inferred from the nature of the act and the circumstances surrounding its commission.” State v. Catch the Bear, 352 N.W.2d 637, 640 (S.D.1984). Further, “[t]he actor must know or believe that harm is a substantially certain consequence of his act ... [t]he existence of this knowledge or intent may be inferred from his conduct and surrounding circumstances.” Harn v. Continental Lumber Co., 506 N.W.2d 91, 98 (S.D.1993).
[¶ 49.] I am firmly convinced that the trial court erred in not holding Ireland’s conduct intentional. Bland v. Davison County, 1997 SD 92, ¶ 19, 566 N.W.2d 452, 458. Therefore, I would reverse.
[¶ 50.] I am authorized to state that Justice GILBERTSON joins in this dissent.