(concurring).
[¶46.] I fully join in" the opinion of the Court. I write only to examine points on two issues.
[¶ 47.] As to issue two, the situation here is far different from that where the Legislature enacts a three percent raise for all COHE members. In such an instance, there is nothing for the Regents or COHE to negotiate as by Legislative mandate all will get three percent no matter what subsequent COHE-Regents negotiations yield. Whatever Legislative direction10 contained in Section 31 of SB 242 is far different. Placing salary dollars with the Regents to be distributed “at the sole discretion of the Board of Regents” allows it in theory to give all the funds to one professor, to a limited group of professors at one institution, or any infinite combinations up to and including an across-*397the-board raise. Obviously, the discretionary formula for this distribution of funds affects COHE membership and its representatives should be allowed to be heard thereon. To conclude that this bill changes SDCL ch. 3-18 requires no more than an examination of the text of SDCL 3-18-2, which provides in part, “[p]ublic employees shall have the right to designate representatives for the purpose of meeting and negotiating with the governmental agency or representatives designated by it with respect to ... conditions of employment[.]” To this is now added a caveat; except funds appropriated by § 31 of SB 242 for 1998 which are to be distributed “at the sole discretion of the Board of Regents.”
[¶48.] I do not view issue four as being determined by statements of individual legislators concerning the intent of the Legislature as a whole. Unlike evidence offered in Cummings v. Mickelson, 495 N.W.2d 493 (S.D.1993), this is not an attempt by an individual Legislator to make his or her subjective reasoning on why he or she voted for a bill become the intent of the Legislative body as a whole. Rather, this documentation was provided as background as to the nature of the problem and why and how the Legislature sought to address it. Both parties to this action submitted affidavits from Legislators to provide this background. Given the fact this is an original action filed in this Court with no time nor procedure for taking live testimony, it was a recognized method of informing this Court of the necessary facts. To this end neither party objected to this method of production of evidence, but instead sought to challenge its content by contradictory evidence submitted in the same manner.
[¶ 49.] The Legislature does not address a problem in an evidentiary vacuum. See In re Estate of Jetter, 1997 SD 125, ¶16, n. 5, 570 N.W.2d 26, 29, n. 5 (noting views of the members of the State Bar of South Dakota on why this State adopted the Uniform Probate Code are nonbinding but persuasive “commentary”); In re Certif. of Questions (Knowles v. United States), 1996 SD 10, ¶¶ 60-62, 544 N.W.2d 183, 195-96 (legislative background and investigation into medical malpractice insurance crisis); Brandriet v. Larsen, 442 N.W.2d 455, 460 (S.D.1989) (recommendations of the South Dakota Commission on Child Support as a basis for the enactments incorporated into SDCL 25-7-7). Given the expedited nature of these original proceedings, the use of affidavits by Legislators as to the background of this case was proper and did not constitute a forbidden attempt to transfer subjective intent of one Legislator into the collective intent of the entire body.
.COHE did not raise the issue of constitutional delegation of authority from the Legislature to the Board of Regents. See generally Boever v. South Dakota Bd. of Accountancy, 1997 SD 34, 561 N.W.2d 309; Boe v. Foss, 76 S.D. 295, 77 N.W.2d 1 (1956).