(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
[¶ 29.] I agree with the majority’s analysis in Issue 1, but I believe the trial court abused its discretion in failing to explain why it sheltered some of Warren’s premarital assets, while it allowed Norma absolutely no deduction for her premarital contributions. The trial court excluded from its property division approximately $28,000 of premarital holdings for Warren. Yet, while acknowledging in its findings that Norma brought $50,000 in premarital assets to the marriage, the court failed to discuss why she should not receive any credit for such contributions. In total, Warren received property worth $138,-685, which included the $28,000 set aside by the trial court, and Norma received $110,010. Admittedly, a trial court is not required to give both divorcing parties credit for their premarital assets, but if one is given such credit, while the other is not, it is incumbent upon the court to at least state a rationale for its decision. See generally Laird v. Laird, 322 N.W.2d 254, 256 (S.D.1982).
*650[¶30.] Trial courts have “broad discretion in determining whether property is marital in nature and subject to division.” Heckenlaible v. Heckenlaible, 1996 SD 32, ¶ 8, 545 N.W.2d 481, 483. “This Court has consistently held that the trial court has discretion in determining how to consider premarital assets ...; [whether to include or exclude them from the marital estate].” Strickland v. Strickland, 470 N.W.2d 832, 836 (S.D. 1991). Before setting aside certain property as premarital, the trial court must weigh the seven principal factors considered in making an equitable property division. Voelker v. Voelker, 520 N.W.2d 903, 907 (S.D.1994). This Court will not disturb a trial court’s division of property unless it clearly appears from the record that it abused its discretion. Vander Pol v. Vander Pol, 484 N.W.2d 522, 523 (S.D.1992); Kanta v. Kanta, 479 N.W.2d 505, 507 (S.D.1991); Johnson v. Johnson, 471 N.W.2d 156, 159 (S.D.1991); Fox v. Fox, 467 N.W.2d 762, 766 (S.D.1991); Nelson v. Nelson, 454 N.W.2d 533, 537 (S.D.1990). While this discretion is broad, it is not uncontrolled and must be soundly and substantially based on the evidence. Gibson v. Gibson, 437 N.W.2d 170, 171 (S.D.1989); Goehry v. Goehry, 354 N.W.2d 192, 194 (S.D.1984); Owen v. Owen, 351 N.W.2d 139, 141 (S.D.1984).
[¶ 31.] What is an abuse of discretion? The definition will always depend upon the context in which discretion is used. Sometimes it will be defined broadly, other times, narrowly. 1 S. Childress & M. Davis, Federal Standards of Review § 4.21, at 4-155 (2d ed 1992). Generally, discretion means “no decision either way is dictated by the law.” H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 272 (2d ed 1994). “Abuse of discretion is a phrase which sounds worse than it really is.” In re Josephson, 218 F.2d 174, 182 (1st Cir.1954). Implicit, however, within the exercise of discretion is the requirement that the decision not be arbitrary, meaning it must be within a range of permissible choices and have a rationale based in evidence. “Wide discretion is accompanied by heavy responsibility....” Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 480, 69 S.Ct. 213, 220, 93 L.Ed. 168 (1948). A court’s failure to explain its reasoning leaves an unnecessary void in the process, which may, in certain circumstances, obscure an arbitrary decision. See Braaten v. Deere & Co., Inc., 569 N.W.2d 563, 565 (N.D.1997)(stating that an “[a]buse of discretion occurs when a court acts in an arbitrary manner.”). See also Lovcik v. Ellingson, 569 N.W.2d 697, 700 (N.D.1997); Tyler v. Tyler, 253 Neb. 209, 570 N.W.2d 317, 319 (1997)(“A judicial abuse of discretion exists when a judge, within the effective limits of authorized judicial power, elects to act or refrain from acting, but the selected option results in a decision which is untenable and unfairly deprives a litigant of a substantial right or a just result in matters submitted for disposition through a judicial system.”); Huener v. Huener, 110 Ohio App.3d 322, 674 N.E.2d 389, 391 (1996).
[¶ 32.] The court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law give no hint why what appears to be equal was treated unequally. It is not for us to supply an explanation when the trial court gave none. Therefore, I would reverse and remand with instructions to the court to reconsider the factors used in effecting an equitable property distribution, and provide a rationale for its distribution scheme. Lastly, I would grant Norma $1,000 for appellate attorney fees.
[¶ 33.] SABERS, J., joins this special writing.