(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
[¶31.] I concur on issue one and respectfully dissent on issue two. The majority analyzes this case on the basis of whether there is a question of fact as to fraudulent concealment by the attorney. Conceding that issue in favor of the client is not the end of the matter, but instead brings us to the real issue; where a client commits intentional abusive acts upon his spouse which are the basis for an award of alimony, will our public policy as set forth in our statutes and case law allow the wrongdoer to shift liability for his wrongful acts to his attorney?
[¶ 32.] This litigation is the off-spring of a divorce between Terry Greene (Terry) and his ex-wife Pamela Greene (Pamela). It was prior to this marriage that Terry consulted *463Theeler in an effort to protect his assets from a potential divorce. The result of this was the antenuptial agreement which included the void provision precluding alimony.
[¶ 33.] “An attorney is liable in a malpractice action only for losses actually sustained as a proximate result of the conduct of an attorney.” Staab v. Cameron, 351 N.W.2d 463, 466 (S.D.1984) (citing Taylor Oil Co. v. Weisensee, 334 N.W.2d 27 (S.D.1983)). Here Terry is bound by the findings of the trial court in the divorce. He appealed those findings and we summarily affirmed. Greene v. Greene, 546 N.W.2d 404 (S.D.1996).
[¶ 34.] A review of our case law on divorce shows it is unusual for a court to award alimony in a marriage which had the brevity of four years. However, in awarding alimony the trial court in the divorce trial went into great detail as to Terry’s fault.4
The Court finds that [Terry] is at fault in his conduct during the marriage and leading up to the separation of the parties, that the treatment of [Pamela] as testified to at the trial was not denied by [Terry] and has resulted in extreme humiliation and loss of self-esteem to [Pamela]. (Emphasis added.)
What was the nature of this undisputed “fault?” Terry deliberately sought to “bury” a substantial portion of his profits from his business in the business to shelter them from any claims by Pamela. He also bought assets in the business name which were purely personal, such as a lake home. The most grievous misconduct, however, was of a more personal nature.
The Court finds that during the marriage Terry was unreasonably controlling of Pamela’s schedule and activities. During the marriage Terry was verbally abusive of Pamela and would make demeaning and humiliating statements to Pamela or to others about Pamela. In December 1992, Terry indicated to Pamela that if he could give her AIDS without getting it himself, he would. Approximately one week later Terry told Pamela that he had one shell for his gun and it was meant for her. Terry’s actions and statements made Pamela fearful, caused her to move out of the marital home and file for divorce.
In contrast', there is no finding of any marital misconduct by Pamela. Not surprisingly, the trial court concluded:
From the testimony, the Court finds that the defendant had been extremely cruel, controlling, overly domineering of the plaintiff during the course of the marriage. The defendant also had been involved with extremely outrageous conduct in allegations and statements made to the plaintiff.
[¶ 35.] I would submit that our holding in Staab should be controlling here. In Staab, there were a series of legal actions between a buyer and seller over the validity of an agreement for the sale of land. After three appeals to this Court, we held that there existed a valid contract for the sale of the land. Staab, 351 N.W.2d at 463. The seller then instituted an action against her attorney, Cameron. In upholding summary judgment for Cameron, we held:
[T]he delays in closing the deal, and any losses suffered therefrom, were the direct result of Staab’s [the seller’s] own actions in entering this particular contract with Skoglund [the buyer]. The effect of the Staab decisions is to preclude Cameron from being the cause of the damages alleged by Staab; whatever [Cameron] did or did not do had no effect on the ultimate result.
Staab, 351 N.W.2d at 466. See also Himrich v. Carpenter, 1997 SD 116, 569 N.W.2d 568;5 Weiss v. Van Norman, 1997 SD 40, 562 N.W.2d 113; Grand State Property, Inc. v. Woods, Fuller, Shultz, & Smith, P.C., 1996 SD 139, 556 N.W.2d 84.
[¶ 36.] SDCL 25-2-18 recognizes the validity of premarital agreements except “where *464in violation of public policy.” In Connolly v. Connolly, 270 N.W.2d 44 (S.D.1978), we held it violated public policy as set forth in SDCL 25-2-13 and SDCL 25-4-41 to recognize the validity of an agreement which would be a waiver of support via alimony. The first sentence of SDCL 25-2-13 states, “[a] husband and wife cannot by any contract with each other alter their legal relations, except as to property[.]” Could Pamela waive alimony claims in the future, thus allowing Terry free reign to engage in the above conduct towards his wife with no accountability? What about our public policy as set forth in SDCL 25-2-1? “Husband and wife contract toward each other obligations of mutual respect, fidelity and support.” (Emphasis added.) More recently, our legislature has shown its justifiable contempt for such spousal misconduct by enacting SDCL ch 25-10, which prohibits “domestic abuse” and provides “protection orders” against such activities. SDCL 25-10-1(1) defines domestic abuse to include “infliction of fear of imminent physical harm or bodily injury.” The trial court’s finding that “Terry told Pamela that he had one shell for his gun and it was meant for her” and that these comments were serious enough that they “made Pamela fearful, caused her to move out of the marital home and file for divorce” certainly fall within the definition of domestic abuse.6
[¶ 37.] In Bayer v. Burke, we granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant being sued for a gambling debt. 338 N.W.2d 293 (S.D.1983). In doing so we brushed aside the argument that this was only a suit on a note and went to the real nature of the dispute, “[a]s this court has stated, gambling contracts often try to take the form of legitimate contracts. It is the duty of the courts to pierce this disguise and to ascertain the real activities involved.” Id. at 294 (citing Waite v. Frank, 14 S.D. 626, 86 N.W. 645 (1901)).7
[¶ 38.] Most recently in Himrich we squarely addressed the same issue we should address today, whether the intentional violation of a statute by a client should place the monetary loss on that client or should the client’s lawyer be liable under a malpractice theory. Like the case now before us, the client’s liability had been previously decided by a decision of this Court. See Speckels v. Baldwin, 512 N.W.2d 171 (S.D.1994). In the subsequent malpractice action, we rejected the claim against the attorney as it was the client, and not the attorney, who had violated the public policy as set forth in the statute. We held, “[e]quity and natural justice invalidate contracts which, by their nature, threatened to “weaken public confidence in the integrity of the public service.’” Himrich, 1997 SD 116 ¶ 14, 569 N.W.2d at 572 (citations omitted). The same public policy considerations must surely apply to the public policy of promoting the institution of marriage and its corresponding benefits to the participants, their family, and society in general.
[¶39.] Clearly, attorneys are not insurers to their clients for any losses the client may sustain based on wrongful intentional acts by the client. Given that, our analysis in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wertz, 540 N.W.2d 636, 640 (S.D.1995), is appropriate to the issue now before us:
Having now determined that Wertz intentionally caused personal injuries to Martin and property damage to Anderson, we must now consider whether such conduct falls within the coverage provided by State Farm. We conclude that there is no coverage in such circumstances, because public policy prohibits extending insurance coverage to an individual who intentionally harms others. In Raphtis v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Co., 86 SD 491, 494,198 N.W.2d 505, 507 (1972) we wrote: “It is contra bonos mores to allow a man to insure against the consequences of his own rascality or recover for a loss resulting from his own criminal conduct.” We have similarly observed: ‘Were a person able to insure *465himself against economic consequences of his intentional wrongdoing the deterrence attributable to financial responsibility would be missing.” City of Fort Pierre, 468 N.W.2d at 849.8 We will not allow Wertz to contravene this well-established public policy and inflict deliberate harm with financial impunity.
[¶ 40.] The authorities from other jurisdictions are in accord and will dismiss claims by clients against their attorneys where the client had been guilty of intentional misconduct. Mallen & Smith, Legal Malpractice 4th Ed § 20.4. Anyone should know the conduct of emotional abuse engaged upon by Terry was wrong. In reviewing the obviously blatant misconduct of a client, the court in Pantely v. Garris, Garris & Garris, P.C., 180 Mich.App. 768, 447 N.W.2d 864 (1989) reasoned:
[P]erjury in not complex; to tell the truth poses no dilemma. Even against the backdrop of a moral relativism that passes for intellectual sophistication in contemporary America perjury is wrong_ A law degree does not add to one’s awareness that perjury is immoral and illegal, any more than an accounting degree adds to one’s awareness that tax fraud is immoral and illegal.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in dismissing an attorney malpractice case for client misconduct, justified its holding on the following public policy rationale:
Although the public interest is served by discouraging attorney misconduct, it would be inappropriate to promote that interest by removing the damage to those who deliberately and willfully lie under oath in bankruptcy proceedings. A court should not encourage others to commit illegal acts upon their lawyer’s advice by allowing the perpetrators to believe that a suit against the attorney will allow them to obtain relief from any damage they might suffer if caught. The attorney’s misconduct of advising clients to perform illegal acts should be discouraged by threat of attorney disciplinary action.
[¶ 41.] Evans v. Cameron, 121 Wis.2d 421, 360 N.W.2d 25, 29 (1985). See also General Car & Truck Leasing System, Inc. v. Lane and Waterman, 557 N.W.2d 274 (Iowa 1996). “There is not the slightest unfairness in holding plaintiff responsible for the bitter fruit of the scheme which he masterminded and in which he and his attorney jointly participated.” Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1121 (1st Cir.1989).
[¶42.] Even more telling in this case is that there is nothing in the record to indicate that Theeler was aware of Terry’s intended marital misconduct at the time the agreement was drafted or prior to the commencement of the divorce. Terry does not even attempt to argue to the contrary. Thus, what public policy justification can there be for requiring Theeler to pay damages in this ease? See Mettes v. Quinn, 89 Ill.App.3d 77, 44 Ill.Dec. 427, 411 N.E.2d 549 (1980) (dismissing malpractice action against negligent attorney where that negligent advice caused the plaintiff/client’s fraud to be uncovered).
[¶43.] The real issue before us is who should pay the alimony which is based on fault, Terry who perpetrated the abuse upon Pamela or Theeler who failed to draft an agreement to allow Terry to perpetrate the abuse with impunity. Theeler did not cost Terry Greene $24,000 in alimony payments by drafting a void clause. Terry is bound by the divorce findings that it was his misconduct towards his wife that was the cause. Again, an “attorney is liable in a malpractice action only for losses actually sustained as a proximate result of the conduct of the attorney.” Staab, 351 N.W.2d at 466. Under our holding in Staab and subsequent authority, Greene v. Greene is the law of the case and Terry cannot relitigate it.
[¶44.] As such I would affirm the trial court and doing so respectfully dissent on issue two.
. We take judicial notice of our previous cases. In addition, Theeler petitioned for judicial notice of the findings of fact, conclusions of law and attached memorandums in the divorce trial. By order dated August 22, 1997, we granted this request.
. Contrary to any suggestion that there is a question of fact in these types of cases, Staab, Weiss, Grand State and Himrich were all decided at the summary judgment stage of the litigation and were affirmed by this Court.
. At trial, Pamela also testified that Terry physically assaulted her although it occurred before the couple were married. Terry did not deny the allegation of this physical abuse.
. In accord is SDCL 53-9-1 which states, "[a] contract provision contrary to an express provision of law or to the policy of express law, though not expressly prohibited or otherwise contrary to good morals, is unlawful."
. A legislative expression of this public policy is also found in SDCL 53-9-3, which provides: “All contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsi-bilily for his own fraud or willful injury to the person or property of another or from violation of law whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the law." (Emphasis added.)