(dissenting).
[¶ 19.] Crucial to the analysis of this issue is the standard of review. Abuse of discretion is broad, but it is tempered by its own definition: “[a]n abuse of discretion refers to a discretion exercised to an end or purpose not justified by and clearly against, reason and evidence.” State v. Jensen, 1998 SD 52, ¶ 20, 579 N.W.2d 613, 617 (quoting State v. Jones, 521 N.W.2d 662, 673 (S.D.1994) (citation omitted) (internal quotations omitted)). Furthermore, “[fimplicit ... within the exercise of discretion is the requirement that the decision not be arbitrary, meaning it must be within a range of permissible choices and have a rationale based in evidence.” Pellegrin v. Pellegrin, 1998 SD 19, ¶ 31, 574 N.W.2d 644, 650 (Konenkamp, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
[¶ 20.] “Ordinarily, ‘arbitrary’ is synonymous with bad faith or failure to exercise honest judgment and an arbitrary act would be one performed without adequate determination of principle and one not founded in nature of things.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 104-05 (6th ed.1990) (citation omitted). “A court’s failure to explain its reasoning leaves an unnecessary void in the process, which may, in certain circumstances, obscure an arbitrary decision.” Pellegrin, 1998 SD 19, ¶ 31, 574 N.W.2d at 650 (Konenkamp, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Braaten v. Deere & Co., Inc., 569 N.W.2d 563, 565 (N.D.1997) (stating that an “abuse of discretion occurs when a court acts in an arbitrary ... manner”)). The Nebraska Supreme Court also recently defined an abuse of discretion:
A judicial abuse of discretion exists when a judge, within the effective limits of authorized judicial power, elects to act or refrain from acting, but the selected option results in a decision which is untenable and unfairly deprives a litigant of a substantial right or a just result in matters submitted for disposition through a judicial system.
Tyler v. Tyler, 253 Neb. 209, 570 N.W.2d 317, 319 (1997) (citing Jirkovsky v. Jirkovsky, 247 Neb. 141, 525 N.W.2d 615 (1995); Pendleton v. Pendleton, 242 Neb. 675, 496 N.W.2d 499 (1993)).
[¶ 21.] In this case, it was an abuse of discretion for Judge Meierhenry to deny Burgers’ request for a change of judge 47 days after she granted the request. Initially, Burgers had been notified that he would be appearing before Judge Meier-henry. When he appeared at his arraignment, Judge Srstka was presiding instead due to an emergency in Judge Meierhen-ry’s family. Burgers had no notice that Judge Srstka would be presiding over his arraignment.
*282[¶ 22.] On July 15, 1998, Judge Meier-henry denied Burgers’ request for a change of judge. However, after Burgers requested a motion hearing, she granted his request on July 29 and stated, in part: “I did not realize when the Affidavit reached my office that this case was originally my case and that Judge Srstka only took the plea because I could not be there. Disregard the denial and set the matter for sentencing on my calendar.”
[¶23.] An informal meeting was then held in her chambers on July 31 with Judge Srstka, State’s Attorney Dave Nelson and Burgers’ attorney, Michael Butler, present. On August 12, she changed her mind and issued a written decision in support of her decision to deny Burgers his request for a change of judge. She concluded that, based on SDCL 15-12-24, Burgers “waived his right to disqualify Judge Srstka by submitting his plea of guilty to Judge Srstka.”
[¶ 24.] Judge Meierhenry’s decision to ultimately deny Burgers’ request was arbitrary and, therefore, an abuse of discretion. It was inherently unfair to deny Burgers a change of judge in light of the fact that he had no notice that Judge Srstka would be taking his case. Given the specific circumstances of this case, Judge Meierhenry was correct when she granted Burgers’ request for a change of judge and abused her discretion when she subsequently denied the request after 47 days had lapsed.
[¶ 25.] I would reverse and remand for a new sentencing hearing before Judge Meierhenry.
[¶ 26.] Although it is not necessary to reach, the majority opinion’s analysis is further flawed in that a plea is not a submission of an “argument or proof in support of a motion or application” as required by SDCL 15-12-24.
[¶ 27.] SDCL 15-12-28 allows a party to file an affidavit for a change of judge when the judge who is to preside was not the one regularly scheduled to do so. This statute provides:
If the affidavit for change is against a judge or magistrate who is to preside who was not regularly scheduled to do so, the provision of § 15-12-27 shall govern if there be sufficient time after the party has knowledge or notice of such change of judge or magistrate, and if there is not sufficient time, the request for disqualification and the affidavit may be filed promptly after such knowledge or notice, but must be filed prior to the time set for the trial of such action.
SDCL 15-12-28. In this case, Burgers appeared in magistrate court on June 12, 1998. He waived his right to a preliminary hearing and an arraignment was scheduled for June 12, 1998 in front of Presiding Circuit Court Judge Judith Meierhenry. However, Judge Meierhenry was unable to attend on June 12 and Judge Srstka handled the arraignment. During the arraignment, Judge Srstka announced that the cases he heard that morning would be assigned to him.
[¶28.] At the end of the arraignment, Burgers pled guilty to sexual contact with a child under sixteen years of age, a violation of SDCL 22-22-7.
[¶29.] Eleven days later, on June 26, 1998, Burgers’ attorney asked Judge Srstka to recuse himself and filed an affidavit for change of judge. Judge Meier-henry granted Burgers’ request for change of judge. Judge Meierhenry was right. However, 47 days later, on August 12, 1998, Judge Meierhenry reconsidered and found that Burgers had waived his right to request a change of judge by entering a guilty plea, which she considered to be a “submission” under SDCL 15-12-24.
[¶ 30.] SDCL 15-12-24 reads, in part:
The submission to a judge or magistrate of argument or proof in support of a motion or application, or upon trial, is a waiver of the right thereafter to file an affidavit for change of such judge or *283magistrate by any party or his counsel who submitted the same ....
This statute specifically restricts the submission to an “argument or proof in support of a motion or application”; a submission does not include the entering of a guilty plea at an arraignment.
[¶ 31.] When the recusal statutes are read together, one must conclude that “submission” refers to an argument or proof that goes to the heart of the merits. SDCL 15-12-28 authorizes a party to file, within the time constraints of SDCL 15-12-27, an affidavit for change of judge after receiving notice of the change of judges. SDCL 15-12-27 allows a party to file the affidavit not less than 5-10 days before trial, depending on the circumstances. Yet, the majority opinion is saying that this statutory right is thwarted by SDCL 15-12-24, which waives that right after that party makes a “submission” to the court. However, when the statutes are read together, the “submission” must clearly be an argument or motion relating to the merits of the case and which involves the court’s discretion; as the statute specifically reads, it must be an “argument or proof in support of a motion or application” which involves the merits of the action. Under this proper reading, the entering of a guilty plea at an arraignment is not such a “submission.”
[¶ 32.] In State v. Winckler, 260 N.W.2d 356 (S.D.1977), this court dealt with a similar issue. The defendants in Wmckler sought recusal before the arraignment and Judge Kern refused to recuse himself. The statute involved in Wmckler has since been changed, but the discussion is still pertinent:4
The difficulty with defendants’ reliance on [the recusal statute] and the cases- interpreting its precursors is that the statute has no relation to proceedings under consideration. The statute is aimed at insuring that defendants receive a fair and impartial trial. The fear is that the jurors may be swayed by the bias or prejudice of the judge asked to step down. However, an arraignment contains none of those trappings. We find that [the recusal statute] applied only to the actual trial of the criminal case and did not require the judge to step down in this pretrial proceeding.
Id. at 364 (internal footnotes omitted) (citations omitted). In a footnote, the court recognized that “[t]he statutes [SDCL 15-12-27] currently in force may yield a different result.” Id. at n. 11. In analysis, the purpose of the recusal statutes remains the same: to ensure a fair and impartial trial. The arraignment proceeding consists of the “reading [of] the indictment, information or complaint, as is applicable, to the defendant or stating to him the substance of the charge and calling on him to plead thereto.” SDCL 23A-7-1. The only action taken by the judge at the arraignment is receipt of the defendant’s plea; the judge does not hear arguments regarding the merits of the action at this phase. Clearly, the arraignment is not the venue where an “argument or proof in support of a motion or application” is made. The entering of a guilty plea is not a “submission” under SDCL 15-12-24; thus, the right to make a motion for change of judge was not waived here.
*284[¶ 33.] Therefore, Judge Meierhenry was right in granting Burgers’ request for a change of judge and we should reverse and remand for a new sentencing hearing before Judge Meierhenry.
[¶ 34.] AMUNDSON, Justice, joins this dissent.
. The statute provided:
If the defendant in a criminal action prosecuted in the circuit court by indictment or information shall make affidavit that he cannot have an impartial trial by reason of the bias or prejudice of the presiding judge of the circuit court where the indictment or information is pending, the judge of such court must call some other judge of the circuit court to preside at said trial ... and do any other act with reference thereto as though he were presiding judge of said circuit court. If said affidavit shall be filed at least twenty days before the term of court at which said case is for trial, the clerk shall forthwith transmit a copy thereof to the presiding judge of the Supreme Court, who shall forthwith designate the judge to try said case.
SDCL 23-28-8, replaced by the recusal statutes in SDCL ch. 15-12, by virtue of Supreme Court Rule 75-5, effective January 1, 1976.