(dissenting in part and concurring in part).
[¶ 35.] The trial court erred in modifying a bargained-for, court-approved Stipulation which allocated federal income tax dependent exemptions between the parties. Therefore, the trial court erred in modifying the Stipulation (Issue 1(a)) and in retroactively applying its decision to modify the Stipulation in the 1998 tax year (Issue 1(b)). Therefore, I dissent to Issue 1(a), but concur in Issue 1(b).
[¶ 36.] The trial court erred in modifying the parties’ agreement to allocate the federal income tax dependent exemptions, and abused its discretion in doing so.
[¶ 37.] Scott and Nancy Jacobson were divorced in May of 1996. During the divorce proceedings, the parties agreed and signed a “Stipulation, Property Settlement and Child Custody Agreement” providing, in part:
In any year in which the child support paid by [Scott] to [Nancy] equals or exceeds Four Thousand Two Hundred Dollars ($4,200), the exemption for the Internal Revenue Service shall pass to [Scott] and [Nancy] shall execute any documents or papers necessary to accomplish that end....
This Stipulation was incorporated into the divorce decree.
[¶ 38.] It is clear that trial courts do not have the authority to allocate the tax exemptions because federal tax laws control the issue. Alexander v. Hamilton, 525 N.W.2d 41, 45 (S.D.1994); Voelker v. Voelker, 520 N.W.2d 903, 909 (S.D.1994). However, the parties can enter into a private agreement to allocate the exemptions and we must uphold that agreement if it complies with the federal requirements. See Jameson v. Jameson, 306 N.W.2d 240, 243-44 (S.D.1981) (.Jameson II) (stating the trial court could not obligate the child support obligor to provide for the children’s college education, but the Stipulation between the parties to do so was valid and enforceable); Weekley v. Weekley, 1999 SD 162, ¶ 18, 604 N.W.2d 19, 24 (holding that “the parties bound themselves to the trial court’s determination that California has jurisdiction over the child support issue.”).
[¶ 39.] The Internal Revenue Code § 151(c) allows taxpayers an annual exemption amount for each “dependent” as defined in section 152(a). Under section 152(a), the term “dependent” means specified individuals, such as a son or daughter, “over half of whose support, for the calendar year in which the taxable year of the taxpayer begins, was received from the taxpayer (or is treated under subsection (c) or (e) as received from the taxpayer)....”
*219[¶ 40.] Generally, the custodial parent is entitled to the dependency exemption deduction for the children. IRC § 152(e)(1). However, the statute also sets forth specific exceptions under-which the noncustodial parent is entitled to the exemptions. Scott argues that he falls within one of the exceptions and is entitled to the exemptions pursuant to section 152(e)(2): “Exception where custodial parent releases claim to exemption for the year:”
A child of [divorced] parents ... shall be treated as having received over half of his support during a calendar year from the noncustodial parent if -
(A) the custodial parent signs a written declaration (in such manner and form as the Secretary may by regulations prescribe) that such custodial parent will not claim such child as a dependent for any taxable year beginning in such calendar year, and
(B) the noncustodial parent attaches such written declaration to the noncustodial parent’s return for the taxable year beginning during such calendar year.
[¶ 41.] Typically, the written declaration attached to the noncustodial parent’s income tax return is IRS “Form 8332.” However, other documents are acceptable as long as they “conform with the substance” of “Form 8332,” which provides:
(1) names of the children for which exemption claims were released;
(2) years for which the claims were released;
(3) signature of the custodial parent;
(4) Social Security number of the custodial parent;
(5) date of signature; and
(6) name and social security number of the parent claiming the exemption.
Neal v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, T.C.Memo. 1999-97, 1999 WL 167689 (1999). The written declaration must be in strict compliance with these requirements. See White v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, T.C. Memo. 1996-438, 1996 WL 540111 (1996)(holding that a letter written and signed by the custodial parent failed “to ‘conform with the substance’ of Form 8332.”). Within the written declaration, the custodial parent may waive her entitlement to use the -exemptions annually, for a specified number of years or permanently. 33 Am.Jur.2d Federal Taxation 1249 (1999).- Consequently, once the custodial parent signed a written declaration properly waiving her right to claim the exemptions, the noncustodial parent is entitled to claim them, as long as he complies with the Stipulation and attaches the written waiver to his income tax return.8
[¶ 42.] The conference opinion states that its decision that the custodial parent be given the dependent exemptions “is consistent with the spirit of the federal law....” I respectfully disagree based on a review of the legislative history of IRC § 152(e). Prior to T984, Congress provided an additional exception which required the noncustodial parent, seeking the dependency exemption, to provide “$1,200 or more for support of each- child” and a determination that “the custodial parent did not' ‘clearly establish’ that he or she provided more than the noncustodial parent for such child’s support.” Cafarelli v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, T.C. Memo. 1994-265, 1994 WL 247954 (1994). This requirement was reduced to “$600 or more for support of each child” by 1986 and was entirely eliminated in 1996 because it presented:
subjective and difficult problems of proof and substantiation. The Internal Revenue Service became involved' in many disputes between parents who both claim the dependency exemption based on providing support over the ap*220plicable thresholds.... The Committee [wished] to provide more certainty by allowing the custodial spouse the exemption unless that spouse waives his or her right to claim the exemption. Thus, dependency disputes between parents will be resolved without the involvement of the Internal Revenue Service.
Id. (emphasis added). Clearly, the purpose behind the specified exceptions to the general rule that the custodial parent receives the dependent exemptions was to free the IRS from becoming involved in factual disputes over which parent provides over one-half of the child’s support. The spirit behind IRC § 152(e)(2) is one of agility by allowing the parties to determine, between themselves, how to allocate the exemptions without encumbering IRS resources.
[¶ 43.] I agree with the conference opinion’s statement that the issues of dependent exemptions and child support are “absolutely interlocking considerations.” Sarver v. Dathe, 439 N.W.2d 548, 551 (S.D.1989). However, the conference opinion’s attempt to use this determination to support its conclusion that a trial court can modify an agreement allocating the dependency exemptions is strained. As I explained in my special concurrence therein:
[T]he tax exemption is part of the child support issue.... The trial court has the power to reduce the amount required to be paid under the [child support] guidelines by a sum equal to the value of the exemption as child support in the event of a refusal by the custodial parent to agree or execute the necessary waiver. SDCL 25-7-7. This power stems from the direct effect the exemption has on the ‘[f]inancial condition of the parents’ under subsection (1) relating to deviations from the guidelines and ‘[fincóme taxes withheld’ under subsection (1) relating to deductions from monthly gross income. SDCL 25-7-7.
Id. at 554 (Sabers, J., specially concurring) (internal citations omitted).9 Obviously, the child support may be modified, but the parties’ agreement to allocate the dependency exemptions can not be modified.
[¶ 44.] The conference opinion also states that once a trial court approves a Stipulation, “it also has the authority to later modify a provision as part of the overall modification of the decree.” While this is true when dealing with support obligations, it is not true when dealing with issues that the trial court had no authority to initially impose. See Jameson II, 306 N.W.2d at 243-44. Furthermore, this decision does not improperly or illegally “bind the hands of judges” as claimed by the conference opinion. Judges have no authority to order a party to pay for a child’s college education or to allocate federal tax exemptions. Only the parties can agree to impose those obligations on themselves. Judges have no authority over the agreement between the parties. We have provided ample warning that these types of agreements are binding and should be entered into cautiously because “it is not the role of courts in modification proceedings to relieve a party of his or her bad bargain.” Weekley, 1999 SD 162, ¶ 19, 604 N.W.2d at 24 (quoting Jameson v. Jameson, 1999 SD 129, ¶ 20, 600 N.W.2d 577 (Jameson IV)) (citing Olson v. Olson, 1996 SD 90, ¶ 11, 552 N.W.2d 396, 399; Whalen v. Whalen, 490 N.W.2d 276, 283 (S.D.1992); Jameson v. Jameson, 90 S.D. 179, 239 N.W.2d 5, 7 (S.D.1976) (Jameson I)).
[¶45.] Here, the parties agreed that Scott would pay Nancy a monthly child support amount of $868, or $10,416 per year. It appears from the record that Scott is current on his child support obligations. The parties also agreed that “[fin any year in which the child support paid by [Scott] to [Nancy] equals or exceeds ... $4,200, the exemption for the Internal Revenue Service shall pass to [Scott].... ” *221Scott fulfilled the stated condition to the passing of the exemptions and the exemption will continue to pass to Scott as long as he (1) continues to pay $4,200 in annual child support payments and (2) attachés, to his income tax return, a properly drafted declaration signed by Nancy in which she waives her right to the' dependency exemptions. See Agee v. Agee, 1996 SD 85, ¶¶ 25-26, 551 N.W.2d 804, 807 (disallowing the exemptions to be taken by the noncustodial parent because the accompanying conditions were not satisfied). For every year that Scott satisfies the $4,200 condition, the parties agreed that Nancy “shall execute any documents or paper necessary” for Scott’s claim of the exemptions. Therefore, Nancy’s failure to provide the proper written declaration to Scott could result in contempt. See Jameson II, 306 N.W.2d at 243-44.
[¶ 46.] The loss of these bargained-for tax exemptions will résult in a loss to Scott exceeding $700 per year. The trial court and the supreme court fail to compensate Scott for this loss. Therefore, their decisions are not only in error, but constitute abuses of discretion.
[¶ 47.] Thus, I vote to reverse the trial court’s modification of the ' Stipulation which allocated the federal income tax dependent exemptions.
[¶ 48.] I would not award any attorney’s fees to Nancy as she should not be the successful party when there is a clear violation of the law, a violation of the Stipulation and agreement and an abuse of discretion.
[¶ 49.] AMUNDSON, Justice, joins this special writing.
. When the custodial parent waives her entitlement to use the dependent exemptions, she “does not relinquish the child care credit, the earned income credit, or head of household status in the case of married persons living apart....” 33 Am.Jur.2d Federal Taxation 1249 (1999).
. SDCL 25-7-7 was repealed in 1989 but replaced with similar language in SDCL 25-7-6.10.