(dissenting).
[¶ 31.] I dissent on Issue 1 and would not reach Issues 2 through 4.
[¶ 32.] The failure of the trial court at sentencing to advise Brakeall of the minimum and maximum sentence prevents a knowing, intelligent and voluntary plea and is reversible error.
[¶ 33.] The majority opinion provides mere lip service to the language cited with approval in State v. Richards, as follows: The failure to advise of the mandatory minimum sentence is more than a technical, harmless error and demonstrates a manifestation of injustice.
The trial court’s express statement on the record of an applicable mandatory minimum sentence eliminates the inherent danger of misinterpreting whether the defendant’s decision to plead guilty was made with full knowledge of the sentence which must be imposed as a result of that plea.
The interests of justice require that [the defendant] be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea.
Richards, 2002 SD 18, ¶¶ 12-14, 640 N.W.2d at 483 (quoting State v. Schumacher, 452 N.W.2d 345 (N.D.1990)) (internal citations omitted).
[¶ 34.] The majority opinion then proceeds to ignore Richards because it involved a direct appeal rather than a habe-as corpus action, on the claimed basis that the violation is not a constitutional defect. By relying on a footnote in Richards to come to its conclusion that the law of that case does not apply here, the majority opinion ignores the actual text of the opinion. As noted in Richards, “[t]he importance of advising a defendant of the minimum penalty cannot be denied since a mandatory minimum penalty is an absolute while a maximum penalty is only a possibility.” Richards, 2002 SD 18, ¶ 11, 640 N.W.2d at 482. It is important to recognize that the footnote relied upon by the majority opinion deals specifically with mandatory maximum, rather than minimum penalties. The majority opinion’s assertion that failure to advise Brakeall of the mandatory minimum does not amount to constitutional error also ignores the law clearly expressed in South Dakota statutes.
[¶ 35.] SDCL 21-27-16(3) specifically provides:
Causes for discharge of applicant committed on judicial process. If it appears on the return of a writ of habeas corpus that the applicant is in custody by virtue of process from any court legally constituted, he can be discharged only for one or more of the following causes:
(3) where the process is defective in some substantial form required by law;
(emphasis supplied).
[¶ 36.] SDCL 23A-7-4(l) provides:
Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, a court must address the defendant personally in open court ... and inform him of, and determine that he understands the following:
(1) The nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, *89and the maximum possible penalty provided by law.
(emphasis supplied). “It is the trial court’s responsibility to inform a defendant of the mandatory minimum penalty and the maximum penalty provided by law.” Richards, 2002 SD 18, ¶ 7, 640 N.W.2d at 482 (citing State v. Wilson, 459 N.W.2d 457 (S.D.1990)).
[¶ 37.] Citing United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 99 S.Ct. 2085, 60 L.Ed.2d 634 (1979), the majority opinion asserts that Brakeall is required to show prejudice before he is entitled to relief. However, that assertion was not accepted by the majority opinion in Richards, which held that the defendant was entitled to withdraw his plea despite the fact that the mandatory minimum sentence was discussed at his sentencing hearing in his presence. Richards, 2002 SD 18, ¶¶ 20-23, 640 N.W.2d at 484. This Court should uphold its own precedent as provided in Richards.
[¶ 38.] In the context of habeas corpus, jurisdictional error is given an expansive construction. Due process violations, compliance with substantive statutory procedures and personal and subject matter jurisdiction are all subject to challenge in habeas corpus proceedings. Security Sav. Bank v. Mueller, 308 N.W.2d 761, 762 (S.D.1981) (additional citations omitted).
[¶ 39.] Here, “the process is defective in some substantial form required by law” and we have no choice but to reverse and issue a writ of habeas corpus to allow Brakeall to withdraw his plea.