(concurring). Although I reach the same result as the majority, and concur in much of its analysis, I write separately in order to clarify my own position. MCL 600.2925a(5); MSA 27A.2925(1)(5) essentially states that a tortfeasor (plaintiff) is not entitled to contribution from another tortfeasor (defendant) unless two preconditions are satisfied: (a) an alleged contributee has been made a party to the underlying tort action and (b) a reasonable effort has been made to inform the alleged contributee of the commencement of the tort action.
But for the impossibility here of performing condition a, there would be no disagreement that the performance of both condition a and condition b are *681required in order for plaintiff to avail itself of contribution under this statute. Thus, the only question here is, given the impossibility of performing condition a,1 what is the relationship between the two conditions and statutory contribution. There are at least three possible interpretations of this relationship.
First, as plaintiff argues, the impossibility of performing condition a vitiates the need to perform condition b because these conditions are set forth in the conjunctive in the statute, and because condition b describes an action that is apparently preliminary to condition a. Given that condition a cannot be performed, and given that condition b is predicated on condition a, i.e., because they are joined together as a precondition for contribution, neither need be performed if both cannot be performed. Any other interpretation, in plaintiff’s view, would “absurdly” require compliance by a tortfeasor with a futile notification process.
Second, as defendant and the trial court argue, even though condition a cannot be performed, the performance of condition b by itself serves an independent legislative purpose under the contribution statute and should therefore be required even though condition a remains impossible. As the trial court observed:
[Whatever the party might have been able to do, whether they might have been able to participate as a party in a lawsuit or whether they may not, whatever they might have *682been able to do they never got a chance to do. ... I don’t think they could have become a party, but they certainly could have participated in negotiations. They would have had some weight at that table with everyone knowing that they are a potential litigant in the Court of Claims, and those things could have been settled with all three parties participating in it, but it never happened and couldn’t happen because notice wasn’t given ....
To deny a defendant notice of a tort action, even one to which it could not have been joined as a party, is to deny the defendant an opportunity to take an array of informal actions that may protect its interests.
Third, the statute is at least susceptible to the interpretation that, given the impossibility of satisfying condition a—a dilemma that could reasonably have been anticipated by the Legislature that enacted the contribution statute given that the relevant impossibility arises out of the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution, which was ratified in 1798, nearly four decades before Michigan became a state—the Legislature did not intend that the contribution statute would apply to the state where the underlying tort was federally derived.
Each of these three interpretations is vulnerable to legitimate criticisms. Concerning the latter interpretation—the partial exemption of state entities from the contribution statute—even defendant, the Michigan Department of Transportation itself, has not suggested that such an interpretation draws rational distinctions or is otherwise consistent with the intent of the enacting Legislature. Further, one would expect that a legislative purpose of exempting from portions of the statute as significant an entity as the Michigan Department of Transportation itself, could have been better achieved either by an explicit exception to that *683effect or by a negative inference drawn from the definition of the parties within the scope of the statute, rather than by a negative inference drawn from the preconditions required for contribution.
Concerning the interpretation adopted by the majority—requiring that a tortfeasor satisfy the nonimpossible condition b—I believe that this represents the most reasonable outcome albeit only among outcomes that are each unsatisfactory in some respect. I remain hard-pressed to reconcile this outcome with the express language of the statute. Although this interpretation has the benefit of relying on language in condition b that is expressly contained within the statute, it is flawed—as the majority also appreciates2—by the need to effectively ignore language in condition a that is also expressly contained within the statute. While again, for the reasons set forth by the majority, the outcome is a reasonable one, I am concerned nevertheless that we are taking two conditions, which are not only related as part of an apparent sequence of conduct but joined formally in the conjunctive, and determining that they are to be severed for the purpose of a class of actions—a class that is nowhere identified as in any way distinct in the statute. Still, in this effort, the majority is undertaking to give reasonable meaning to a statute that may not otherwise be susceptible to a reasonable meaning.
Concerning plaintiff’s interpretation—that the impossibility of performing one condition allows all *684the other conditions, at least those that are conceptually related in some fashion to one another, to be disregarded—I believe this to be the most flawed of the three interpretations. That one of several conditions is impossible, and cannot be performed in order for a party to avail itself of the benefits conferred by a statute, may reasonably mean that the statute simply cannot be satisfied, or alternatively that all the other possible conditions must be performed and will suffice, but it cannot mean that the statute is satisfied where neither the impossible nor the possible conditions have been performed. Plaintiff specifically invokes MCL 600.2925a(5); MSA 27A.2925(1)(5) in support of its contribution claim, and contribution cannot be allowed under this provision where there are conditions that are not impossible and that have not been performed.3 While plaintiff contends that the impossibility of condition a has rendered condition b a nullity, I concur with the majority and with the trial court that this is a determination better left to the contributee than to the contributor—and better still left to the Legislature than to the courts.
The majority has engaged in an intelligent analysis of this difficult statute. It is likely correct in its conclusion that the statute is best interpreted to require only the performance of condition b under the circumstances of the instant case. However, I am more comfortable in finding merely that the interpretation urged upon us by plaintiff cannot be endorsed and, therefore, that defendant prevails. Whatever this imperfect statute means, it does not mean that a *685party seeking contribution under its authority can fail to perform required conditions that are not impossible.4 Therefore, I join the majority in affirming the trial court’s orders granting summary disposition for defendant.
Although this Court, see majority opinion at note 4, recognizes that there are limited circumstances under which a state can waive its sovereign immunity, or effectively have it waived by federal legislative action, for all practical purposes the state in a case such as that which underlies the instant contribution action cannot be sued in federal court.
“While this interpretation does render part of this provision surplus-age, we find that it furthers the Legislature’s overall intent that potential contributees have some notice of the original action against the tortfeasor.” See majority opinion, ante at 680.
Whether there are nonstatutory grounds in support of contribution is not before this Court because no such grounds have been raised by plaintiff.
Plaintiff additionally argues that, even if the contribution statute requires notice, failure to provide such notice does not mandate dismissal unless defendant suffered actual prejudice. Assuming that this issue is preserved, this Court has held that it will not read a requirement that prejudice be shown into statutory notice requirements unless the legislative purpose for the notice requirement is unclear and a litigant challenges the constitutionality of the statute. As this Court stated in Neal v Oakwood Hosp Corp, 226 Mich App 701; 575 NW2d 68 (1997):
[W]ere we to hold that a plaintiffs noncompliance with [the statute] requires dismissal only if the noncompliance prejudices the defendant, we would be supplying a judicial gloss contrary to the clear statutory language mandating that “a person shall not commence an action alleging medical malpractice ... unless the person has given . . . written notice . . . not less than 182 days before the action is commenced.” [Id. at 715, citing Brown v JoJo-Ab, Inc, 191 Mich App 208, 212; 477 NW2d 121 (1991).]
MCL 600.2925a(5); MSA 27A.2925(1)(5) unambiguously requires that notice of the commencement of an action be given before contribution can be sought. Nowhere does the statutory language require a showing of prejudice; thus, to read such a requirement into the statute would be to give the statute a judicial gloss contrary to the clear mandate of the statute.
In support of its contention that defendant should have shown actual prejudice before invoking the notice provision of MCL 600.2925a(5); MSA 27A.2925(1)(5) as a defense, plaintiff cites cases that are inapposite. The cases cited by plaintiff involve the issue whether the notice requirement set forth in a statute is reasonable under equal protection analysis, not whether a litigant must show actual prejudice to enforce a statute. For example, in Brown v Manistee Co Rd Comm, 452 Mich 354; 550 NW2d 215 (1996), the Supreme Court considered whether a sixty-day notice requirement was reasonable under an equal protection analysis. The Court therefore had to determine whether the statutory notice requirement was supported by a rational basis. Noting that the statute’s purpose was the prevention of prejudice to the party entitled to receive notice, the Court held that the sixty-day notice period did not fulfill that purpose. Id. at 362-363. The Court held that a statute regarding a specific notice period must serve the purpose of preventing prejudice, not that a party seeking to enforce such a statute must show actual prejudice to invoke the statute’s notice provision.