(concurring specially).
State v. Seifert, 256 N.W.2d 87, 88 (Minn.1977), held that the legislature intended a broad definition of “firearm,” one not restricted to weapons using gunpowder. In State v. Newman, 538 N.W.2d 476, 478 (Minn.App.1995), review denied (Minn. Nov. 30, 1995), we concluded that the legislature presumptively adopted the expansive definition in Seifert. See also Western Union Tel. Co. v. Spaeth, 232 Minn. 128, 132, 44 N.W.2d 440, 442 (1950) (“reenactment of a statute without change, after construction * * * by the court, presumptively constitutes an adoption of such construction”).
One could make a case that a paintball gun, which discharges a potentially harmful paint pellet through C02 power, is a firearm under the expansive definition of the term. The district court made such a case. But, as the majority aptly points out, if the expansive definition is applied to every device that discharges a projectile of some sort, the logical result would be the criminalization of various toys and tools. That would be absurd and could not be what the legislature intended.
I am not persuaded that the demarcation between a firearm and a nonfirearm should depend on the purpose of the projectile the device is designed to discharge, as the majority holds. I do agree, however, that the serious adult toy called the paintball gun is not the kind of device the legislature reasonably intends to classify as a firearm under the criminal law. If used properly, the gun will not cause injury, nor is it intended to do so.
If we were to classify a paintball gun as a firearm, we would set a precedent that ineluctably would draw into its ambit virtually any device that discharges a projectile.
It is the legislature’s prerogative and responsibility to fashion an appropriate, comprehensive definition of firearm for the criminal law. Justice is not served by relying on the courts to create a definition piecemeal as cases arise.