concurring:
I concur with the majority and write only to emphasize one point. This case turns simply on the question of whether or not the trial judge abused his discretion in barring the evidence of a confession given by a man named Simon, approximately 17 years after the occurrence and recanted several years after that. The latter fact was unknown to the trial judge at the time of his ruling. Whether the judge abused his discretion hinges in turn on whether any reasonable person could have reached the conclusion this judge did. The answer in my view is a resounding “yes.” See Dawdy v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 207 Ill. 2d 167, 176-77 (2003) (holding that it is well settled that an abuse of discretion will be found where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court); People v. Jenkins, 383 Ill. App. 3d 978, 989 (2008) (holding that a trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling is “arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable!,] or when no reasonable person would take the same view”).
It has long been acknowledged that the trial court is in the best position to make decisions regarding the admission of evidence on any given case. People v. Slater, 228 Ill. 2d 137, 151 (2008); People v. Cook-son, 215 Ill. 2d 194, 213 (2005); In re Marriage of Walker, 386 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1042 (2008). Further, it is not the prerogative of the appellate court to reweigh the evidence and substitute its judgment for that of the trial court even if that judgment would be different. In re C.B., 386 Ill. App. 3d 735, 744 (2008) (finding that it is not the function of a reviewing court to reweigh the evidence previously and properly considered by circuit court). The dissent contends that the 1999 confession should have been admitted because it is relevant to the issue of whether the arresting officers acted with malice in 1982. Although I believe this conclusion relies on a good deal of speculation, even assuming the confession was relevant, that is hardly the end of our inquiry. The remaining and perhaps more important question is whether the evidence is more prejudicial than probative, and again in my view, the answer is another resounding “yes.” I agree with this very experienced trial judge that the probative value of a confession given 17 years after the fact would do little to illuminate the issue of malice; instead, the jury would almost certainly infer that these officers somehow knew someone else committed the crime but were deliberately framing defendant no matter what instructions were given. Related to that, in my view, it is only common sense to take judicial notice of Simon’s later recantation in spite of the fact that the dissent gives the recantation short shrift. The recantation casts serious doubt on the likelihood that the officers knew defendant was not the perpetrator but were nonetheless maliciously framing him, not to mention on the questionable validity of the Governor’s pardon predicated upon Simon’s now-recanted confession.
In any event, the trial judge is in a unique position to evaluate the effect of this evidence on this particular jury given his opportunity to observe their competence and demeanor at voir dire. The appellate court, working from a cold record, lacks this insight, so these decisions have long been the province of the trial court. Slater, 228 Ill. 2d at 151, citing People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425, 431 (2001). In my view, this court made the correct decision.
For the foregoing reasons, I concur.