(dissenting). I disagree with the majority’s adoption of the "bright-line” rule contained in revised MRE 609(a). I share the concerns and criticisms expressed by Justice Boyle and concur in parts i, ii, hi, and iv of her dissent.
Furthermore, in granting leave in People v Allen, People v Pedrin, and People v Smith,1 we directed the parties to include among the issues to be briefed whether this Court should adopt the rule announced in Luce v United States, 469 US 38; 105 S Ct 460; 83 L Ed 2d 443 (1984), that to preserve for appellate review a claim of improper impeachment with a prior conviction, a defendant must testify. In my view, the Court should address this issue and follow the lead of the United States Supreme Court in Luce, by requiring a defendant to testify to preserve a claim of improper impeachment with a prior conviction. However, due to considerations of fundamental fairness, I would opt to apply this rule prospectively.
i
FACTS
A. PEOPLE v GRAY
On March 25, 1981, the jury convicted the defendant, Dennis Gray, of first-degree felony murder, MCL 750.316; MSA 28.548, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for the first-degree murder conviction, and to a consecutive two-year term for the felony-firearm conviction. His convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals on *623August 3, 1983. People v Gray, unpublished opinion per curiam (Docket No. 59085).
Defendant brought a pretrial motion to suppress evidence of his criminal record for impeachment purposes. Defendant had five prior felony convictions, including a 1969 conviction of assault with intent to rob, a 1972 conviction of attempting to carry a concealed weapon, a 1975 conviction of carrying a concealed weapon, and a 1976 conviction of possession of heroin. The trial judge suppressed the 1969 conviction of assault with intent to rob, noting the similarity between that offense and the felony-murder charge, but declined to suppress the four other convictions.
During the trial, prosecution witness Matta Morgan testified that sometime between 8:30 p.m. and 9:00 p.m. on March 13, 1980, her boyfriend, Lewis Carter, came to her home to visit. The defendant, Morgan’s cousin, arrived at her home sometime after midnight. Morgan asked defendant to drive Carter home and agreed to go with them. As Morgan was getting ready to leave, the defendant approached her and inquired whether Carter was carrying any money. Morgan replied, "He should. He is a numbers man.” All three then left in defendant’s car.
After driving for a while, defendant stopped the car, produced a handgun, and demanded money from Carter. After Carter gave defendant his money, defendant shot him several times, fatally wounding him. Defendant drove the vehicle a short distance further, disposed of Carter’s body, and drove home, where he gave Morgan $150.2
*624Defendant, testifying on his own behalf, denied robbing or shooting Carter, accused Morgan of being Carter’s murderer, and admitted to the four prior convictions. According to defendant’s version, Morgan summoned him to her residence during the early morning hours of March 14, 1980. When he arrived he saw Carter’s body on the kitchen floor. Morgan told him that she killed Carter because "[he] didn’t think I was serious.” Defendant then allegedly helped Morgan get rid of the body by putting it into his car and driving around until they found a place to dispose of it.
B. PEOPLE v BROOKS
On July 30, 1981, the jury convicted defendant, James R. Brooks, of armed robbery, MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797, and felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). The defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of fifteen to fifty years for the armed robbery conviction and to the mandatory two years for the felony-firearm conviction. His convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals on April 11, 1983. People v Brooks, unpublished opinion per curiam (Docket No. 60075).
Defendant brought a pretrial motion to suppress evidence of his criminal record. Pursuant to MRE 609(b), the trial court excluded defendant’s 1967 conviction of carrying a concealed weapon. However, the court denied the motion with respect to defendant’s two prior convictions of armed robbery and one prior conviction of unarmed robbery.
The evidence advanced at trial by the prosecution showed that on November 15, 1980, at approximately 4:00 p.m., defendant entered the Professional Arts Pharmacy in Ferndale, produced a handgun, and ordered the clerk, Anne Nastas, and the pharmacist, Edward Lis, to lie down on the *625floor. Defendant then took various prescription medicines, drugs, money, and a gun from the premises.
Defendant was identified by Lis, Nastas, and a customer who saw the defendant as he was leaving the store. The customer found Lis and Nastas lying on the floor behind the counter. They told the customer that they had just been robbed.
The prosecution also presented Leslie Parker, who had been located by the police through a license plate number given them by an unidentified person who had observed Parker’s car driving away from the store near the time of the robbery. Parker testified that he had driven a person known to him as "Tony” to a drugstore in Fern-dale on November 15, 1980, at approximately 4:00 p.m. Parker stated that defendant looked very similar to "Tony,” but he could not positively identify him as the same person he had driven to the store.
On direct examination, defendant testified that he had previously been convicted of armed robbery, that he was in custody for another robbery, and that he knew Edward Lis because they "did business” together. Defendant’s relationship with Lis started with prescription sales, but Lis eventually agreed to sell defendant pills without a prescription and sometimes gave him pills on consignment which defendant would sell on the street.
Defendant admitted that, at approximately 1:00 p.m. on the day in question, he went to the Professional Arts Pharmacy to obtain Talwin pills. Lis refused to give him the pills and asked defendant for money owed him for pills previously taken on consignment. Defendant denied perpetrating the robbery and maintained that he did not have a firearm in his possession when he was in the pharmacy earlier that day.
*626 C. PEOPLE v PEDRIN
On July 21, 1982, the jury convicted the defendant, Jeffrey Pedrin, of breaking and entering an unoccupied building with intent to commit larceny. MCL 750.110; MSA 28.305. Defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of four to ten years. His conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on October 25, 1983. People v Pedrin, 130 Mich App 86; 343 NW2d 243 (1983).
The prosecutor filed a pretrial motion seeking permission to impeach the defendant with evidence of his prior conviction of breaking and entering with the intent to commit larceny. The court determined that the probative value of admitting the prior conviction on the issue of defendant’s credibility outweighed its prejudicial effect and granted the motion.
The defendant’s former wife testified that defendant came to her home in Munising at 6:00 a.m. on June 8, 1982, and attempted to open the door. He told her that "he just took a car.” Defendant then fell asleep on the front porch, at which time, his former wife called the police. Defendant was arrested on her porch sometime between 8:15 a.m. and 8:30 a.m.
An automobile dealer testified that a 1983 Ranger pickup truck was stolen from his garage in Newberry on the evening of June 7, 1982.
A state trooper testified that the stolen vehicle was recovered one and three-quarters blocks away from the home of defendant’s former wife, and that the keys to the vehicle were found ten to fifteen feet from her side porch. Defendant did not testify and presented no evidence.
D. PEOPLE VALLEN
On July 2, 1981, the jury convicted the defen*627dant, Mark Anthony Allen, of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. MCL 750.520b; MSA 28.788(2). Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. His conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on November 24, 1982. People v Allen, unpublished opinion per curiam (Docket No. 59151).
On the first day of trial, defendant moved in limine to suppress evidence of his prior conviction of second-degree criminal sexual conduct. MCL 750.520c; MSA 28.788(3). Stating that defendant would not dispute having sexual relations with the complainant, but would maintain that those relations were consensual, defense counsel argued that the prejudicial effect of prior conviction evidence would far outweigh its probative value on the issue of defendant’s credibility.
In exercising his discretion to determine whether to admit the evidence, the trial judge considered the similarity of the prior conviction to the instant charge and the fact that the crime involved a one-on-one confrontation between the complainant and the defendant. The court, noting that defendant’s credibility would be an important issue, concluded that the probative value of evidence of the prior conviction on the issue of defendant’s credibility outweighed its prejudicial effect and denied the motion to suppress.
The complaining witness, Stacy Dougherty, testified that on March 24, 1981, she was working at Arby’s Restaurant on Ford Road in Garden City. At approximately 8:15 p.m., Dougherty took her evening work break and went to the ladies’ restroom, where she was confronted by the defendant who was armed with a knife, and who forced her to perform an act of fellatio.
Another Arby’s employee, Kathy Bedford, testified that she went into the ladies’ restroom shortly *628after the assault allegedly occurred and found Dougherty crouched beneath the sink, "all curled up crying really hard, [and] hyperventilating.”
The defendant, who did not testify, presented Kevin Young as his only witness. Young’s testimony implied that both he and the defendant had had consensual sexual relations with the complainant in the men’s restroom at Arby’s prior to the day of the alleged assault.
E. PEOPLE v SMITH
On June 30, 1981, the jury convicted defendant, Jackie Hagan Smith, of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b; MSA 28.788(2), and one count of assault with intent to murder, MCL 750.83; MSA 28.278. Defendant was sentenced to two terms of sixty to ninety years imprisonment for the criminal sexual conduct convictions, and to life imprisonment for the assault conviction. His convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals on August 15, 1983. People v Smith, memorandum opinion (Docket No. 61883).
Defendant moved in limine to suppress evidence of a 1969 breaking and entering conviction and a 1973 manslaughter conviction. The prosecutor stipulated to suppressing the breaking and entering conviction because it was more than ten years old.3 The trial judge granted the motion to suppress that conviction, but denied suppression of the manslaughter conviction._
*629Defendant also moved in limine to suppress evidence of the complaining witness’ line-up identification and any subsequent in-court identification. Defendant argued that his arrest was illegal because it was made without probable cause and that the line-up identification should be suppressed as a fruit of the illegal arrest, as well as any subsequent in-court identification.4 The trial court denied the motion based upon its determination that the arresting officers did have probable cause for the arrest. The defendant did not testify.
The complaining witness, Robin Northover, testified that at approximately 6:00 p.m., on January 21, 1981, she left her aunt’s house in Taylor and went with three friends to the Arcade on BeechDaly Road in Dearborn Heights. At approximately 8:45 p.m., Northover left the Arcade and, on her return walk to her aunt’s house, the defendant and two codefendants, Phillip Panik and Dana Minkler,5 drove up alongside her.6 Panik leaned out of the car window and asked Northover if she had any "papers.” When Northover responded "no,” Panik got out of the vehicle and offered her a ride.
Northover accepted the offer and got into the front seat of the car between the defendant, who was driving the vehicle, and Panik. Minkler was sitting in the back seat. After purchasing some beer, they drove around drinking and smoking *630marijuana that was mixed with "crystal.”7 North-over smoked a marijuana cigarette with the men, drank one sixteen-ounce beer, and snorted some "tea.”
After driving around for approximately two hours, the defendant drove to a Seven-Eleven store on Wayne Road to purchase more beer. Panik testified that while they were parked outside the store, two Wayne County Sheriffs deputies drove into the lot. As the deputies were walking into the store, they looked at the defendant’s vehicle. Panik was smoking marijuana at the time, and he testified that seeing the police made him feel somewhat uneasy, and that "we didn’t need them to come up to the car.” The defendants then drove away from the store.
Shortly after the parties drove away from the Seven-Eleven store, Minkler reached over the front seat and started grabbing Northover’s breasts. Northover pushed Minkler’s arm away and then began struggling with Panik and Minkler. Minkler then pulled Northover into the back seat with Panik’s assistance. Minkler removed the bottom half of Northover’s clothing and unsuccessfully attempted to have sexual intercourse with her. While Smith was still driving, Panik and Minkler traded places. Panik also unsuccessfully attempted to have sexual intercourse with North-over. Smith then stopped the car, got into the back seat while Minkler drove, and had sexual intercourse with Northover. All three of the men subsequently forced Northover to perform fellatio on them which was followed by a third round of sexual activity with the three defendants._
*631After the trio finished sexually abusing North-over, Minkler stated, "we’ve got to get rid of her.” Smith pulled the car over on a dirt road in a wooded area of western Wayne County. Smith grabbed Northover who was naked and dragged her into the woods. When they were out of sight of the car, defendant put his arm around Northover’s neck and choked her until she was unconscious.
When Northover awoke, she was bleeding profusely from a stab wound to her neck. She packed the wound with snow and walked to a nearby residence where the police were summoned.
Following defendant’s arrest, he was incarcerated in a local "lockup” with codefendant Panik. Prosecution witness Donald Perdue was also incarcerated there at that time on charges of nonpayment of child support. The prosecutor moved in limine to suppress evidence of Perdue’s twenty-six-year-old conviction for assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder. The court granted the motion because the conviction was outside the ten-year time limit of MRE 609(b).8 Perdue testified regarding various incriminating statements he overheard defendant make during a conversation between defendant and Panik while they were confined.
On redirect examination, the prosecutor asked Panik several questions about what happened in front of the Seven-Eleven store in an apparent attempt to clarify how well the sheriffs deputies had seen the defendants. The prosecutor asked Panik what he did when he saw the deputies. Panik responded, "[w]e had beer, you know, we was all on parole, we didn’t need them to come up to the car.” Defendant moved for a mistrial due to *632Panik’s statement "we was all on parole.” The court denied the motion without explanation.9
ii
LUCE v UNITED STATES
In granting leave to appeal in People v Allen, People v Pedrin, and People v Smith, we directed the parties to include among the issues to be briefed whether this Court should adopt the rule announced in Luce, supra, that to preserve for appellate review the claim of improper impeachment with a prior conviction, a defendant must testify.
In Luce, the defendant was charged with conspiracy and possession of cocaine with intent to *633distribute. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to preclude the prosecution from using evidence of defendant’s prior state conviction of possession of a controlled substance. On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial court abused its discretion under MRE 609(a) in allowing evidence of the prior conviction.10 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the issue was not reviewable because defendant did not testify at trial.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed in a unanimous decision, holding "that to raise and preserve for review the claim of improper impeachment with a prior conviction, a defendant must testify.” Id., 469 US 43. In so ruling, the Court reasoned:
A reviewing court is handicapped in any effort to rule on subtle evidentiary questions outside a factual context. This is particularly true under Rule 609(a)(1), which directs the court to weigh the probative value of a prior conviction against the prejudicial effect to the defendant. To perform this balancing, the court must know the precise nature of the defendant’s testimony, which is unknowable *634when, as here, the defendant does not testify. [Id., 41.]
The Luce Court further explained that "any possible harm” flowing from such a ruling in limine is wholly speculative. The Court noted that a trial court can change its ruling in limine after the evidence unfolds, particularly where the defendant’s testimony differs from that which was stated in the proffer. Moreover, the Court noted that a reviewing court has no way of knowing whether the prosecution would have actually used the prior conviction to impeach the defendant. A prosecutor may choose not to use an arguably inadmissible prior conviction, particularly where the defendant’s testimony can be impeached by other means or when the prosecution’s case is strong. Id.
The defendants essentially argue that the Luce rule is unnecessary, that the concerns expressed by the Luce Court are exaggerated, and that its underlying rationale is contrary to well-established principles in this jurisdiction. I disagree.
MRE 609(a) was derived from FRE 609(a) and similarly requires the court to engage in a balancing process in determining whether the probative value of admitting a prior conviction for impeachment purposes outweighs its prejudicial effect upon the defendant.11 Our Court of Appeals has recognized the difficulty inherent in reviewing claims that a trial court erred in allowing a defendant to be impeached with prior convictions outside of a concrete factual context.
The case of People v Jones, 98 Mich App 421; 296 NW2d 268 (1980), illustrates the difficulty encountered. In balancing the probative value against the prejudicial effect on the issue of credi*635bility, the court must consider, inter alia, the effect on the decisional process if the accused does not testify out of fear of impeachment by prior convictions.12 In Jones, the Court recognized that in most cases, a trial judge is in no position to conclusively rule on that factor until he has heard the prosecution’s proofs, learned the substance of the defendant’s proposed testimony, and has some idea of what other proofs the defendant will present. The Jones Court keenly observed that the following questions represent a partial list of factors crucial in determining the effect on the decisional process of a defendant’s decision not to testify:
(1) Will the defendant’s testimony directly contradict the testimony of one or more key prosecution witnesses? When the trial becomes a credibility contest, background information about the disputants is essential to a jury. (2) Will the defendant claim or imply good character, by his own testimony or by a character witness, that his hidden record would refute? MRE 609 does not entitle a defendant to "pull the wool” over the jury’s eyes. (3) Will the defendant claim a defense such as diminished capacity due to intoxication, mistake, ignorance or accident that becomes far less probable in the light of his prior criminal conduct? A claim by a defendant, for example, that he left the store without paying for an item because he forgot he had put it in his pocket does not go over so well when it becomes known, on cross-examination, that the defendant has been convicted of several thefts before. [Id., 430.]
The Jones Court further recognized that, in some cases, defense counsel will make a motion in limine under MRE 609(a), although the defendant *636had nothing reasonable to say in his own defense and will not testify regardless of the ruling; that he may even prefer an adverse ruling to gain an appealable issue out of an otherwise hopeless trial. Id.
In light of these inherent problems, the Court of Appeals adopted the following rule expressed in United States v Cook, 608 F2d 1175, 1186 (CA 9, 1979):
"In future cases, to preserve the issue for review, a defendant must at least, by a statement of his attorney: (1) establish on the record that he will in fact take the stand and testify if his challenged prior convictions are excluded; and (2) sufficiently outline the nature of his testimony so that the trial court, and the reviewing court, can do the necessary balancing contemplated in Rule 609.” [Jones, supra, 431.]
The Luce Court rejected the above procedure because "[Requiring a defendant to make a proffer of testimony is no answer; his trial testimony could, for any number of reasons, differ from the proffer.” Luce, supra, 41, n 5. The Luce Court was also concerned with the potential for planting error requiring reversal.13
I share the concerns of the Luce Court. Furthermore, from my review of the cases, I note that in the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions that have addressed this issue, the rule enunciated in *637Luce has been adopted.14 Moreover, some federal circuits have extended application of the Luce rule to other rulings in limine outside the context of FRE 609(a).15 I am persuaded that the rationale underlying the Supreme Court’s adoption of the Luce rule is sound and that it is equally applicable to Michigan practice. Therefore, I would hold that to preserve a claim of error as to the admission of evidence of a prior conviction for impeachment purposes, a defendant must testify.
It does not follow, however, that the Luce rule *638should govern the cases before us. This Court has held that three factors must be considered in determining whether a judicially created rule of law should be applied retroactively.
[1] the purpose of the new rule,
[2]the general reliance on the old rule, and
[3] the eifect on the administration of justice. [People v Nixon, 421 Mich 79, 85; 364 NW2d 593 (1984).]
I believe that the defendants’ reliance on the old rule outweighs other considerations favoring retroactive application. The defendants have done everything necessary to preserve the issue under the old rule. Adoption of the Luce rule was not even reasonably foreseeable at the time of their trials. Under these circumstances, I believe it would be unduly harsh to apply the Luce rule to these defendants. Therefore, I would apply the rule only prospectively, i.e., to trials beginning after this decision is final.
in
ANALYSIS
MRE 609(a) pertinently provides:
General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by public record during cross-examination but only if
(1) the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted, or the crime involved theft, dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment, and
(2) the court determines that the probative value *639of admitting this evidence on the issue of credibility outweighs its prejudicial effect and articulates on the record the factors considered in making the determination.
As noted by the majority, the factors to be considered in performing the balancing required by MRE 609(a)(2) have been gleaned from case law which predated adoption of the Michigan and federal Rules of Evidence. Five factors have repeatedly emerged as the appropriate criteria to be considered in determining whether to allow a defendant witness to be impeached with prior conviction evidence:
(1) the impeachment value of the prior offense (i.e., to what degree does the prior offense relate to the witness’ propensity for truthfulness?);
(2) the vintage of the prior offense (the probative value is enhanced with the recency of the prior offense);
(3) the similarity of the prior offense to the crime charged (the greater the similarity the greater the prejudicial effect);
(4) the effect on the decisional process should the accused choose not to testify out of the fear of impeachment;
(5) the centrality of the credibility issue.16
This Court has stated that the underlying purpose in balancing these factors is:
1) [t]o put before the jury only those prior convictions indicative of the defendant’s disposition toward truthfulness and veracity; and_
*6402) [t]o keep from the jury those convictions which, although they may be indicative of defendant’s disposition towards truthfulness, may interfere with the jury’s ability to determine the defendant’s guilt or innocence on the basis of the evidence. Such interference is what is meant by "prejudice.” [People v Hughes, 411 Mich 517, 520-521; 309 NW2d 525 (1981).]
I believe that a further purpose properly served by this inquiry is to assure that the jury is not deprived of this traditional device for assessing a witness’ credibility when its value to the truth-seeking process is crucial.
Although credibility is virtually always at issue in any trial, its significance is critically magnified, and often becomes the dispositive issue, when the trial is essentially reduced to a swearing contest between two opposing witnesses. I believe that this situation may tip the balance in favor of allowing the defendant to be impeached with evidence of prior convictions if the question is otherwise close.
I believe that the existing factors utilized in making determinations under MRE 609(a) constitute appropriate and adequate criteria. The following analyses of the cases sub judice illustrate how these factors should be applied, under varying circumstances, to best serve the purposes behind the sometimes difficult balancing process required by MRE 609(a)(2).
A. PEOPLE v GRAY
In ruling on defendant Gray’s motion to suppress evidence of his five prior felony convictions, the trial court stressed that the case primarily involved a credibility contest between the prosecution’s chief witness, Matta Morgan, and the defendant. The court determined that it would be important for the jury to be aware of both the *641defendant’s and the witness’ prior criminal records in determining who was telling the truth.17 Therefore, the court denied the motion with regard to the three prior convictions of carrying a concealed weapon and the possession of heroin conviction. The court suppressed the assault with intent to rob conviction, recognizing the similarity between that offense and the felony-murder charge, the underlying felony being robbery. Defendant admitted to the four prior convictions on direct examination.
The Court of Appeals held that the trial judge properly considered the relevant factors in allowing defendant to be impeached with his prior convictions and that she did not abuse her discretion in doing so.
I agree that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in allowing the defendant to be impeached with his four prior felony convictions. The principal issue at trial was the identity of the murderer. Resolution of that issue necessarily depended upon whether the jury believed defendant’s or Morgan’s version of what happened.
Morgan testified that the defendant robbed and then fatally shot the victim as they were driving in the defendant’s car. Defendant maintained that Morgan had murdered the victim in her house and then asked him to help her dispose of the body.
Standing alone, evidence of convictions of carrying a concealed weapon and possession of heroin may not be highly probative of an individual’s credibility. However, the value of such evidence to *642the truth-seeking process was critical because the trial had boiled down to a swearing contest between two opposing witnesses. Thus, it was essential that the jury be aided by any evidence that was probative of credibility. It would indeed have been deceptive to permit the defendant to portray himself as a person who has led a blameless life and as worthy of belief as one who has.18
In light of the foregoing, I cannot say that the trial judge abused her discretion in allowing the defendant to be impeached with the evidence of the prior convictions. Therefore, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
B. PEOPLE v BROOKS
Defendant Brooks similarly argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his two prior convictions of armed robbery and one prior conviction of unarmed robbery. In People v Baldwin, 405 Mich 550, 553; 275 NW2d 253 (1979), we held that it was error for a trial judge to consider the similarity of a prior offense as a factor weighing in favor of admissibility. Although evidence of prior similar offenses is not inadmissible per se for impeachment purposes, such offenses should be admitted for that purpose only when there is a compelling need for such evidence, and then only sparingly. The danger inherent in admitting evidence of a prior conviction for impeachment purposes is particularly acute when the prior offense is the same or similar to the charged offense. The court in Gordon v United States, 127 US App DC 343, 347; 383 F2d 936 (1967), stated:_
*643A special and even more difficult problem arises when the prior conviction is for the same or substantially the same conduct for which the accused is on trial. Where multiple convictions of various kinds can be shown, strong reasons arise for excluding those which are for the same crime because of the inevitable pressure on lay jurors to believe that "if he did it before he probably did so this time.” As a general guide, those convictions which are for the same crime should be admitted sparingly; one solution might well be that discretion be exercised to limit the impeachment by way of a similar crime to a single conviction and then only when the circumstances indicate strong reasons for disclosure, and where the conviction directly relates to veracity.
In the instant case, there were no compelling reasons to impeach the defendant with three prior robbery convictions. I believe that once the jury learned that defendant had committed three prior robberies, the danger that the jury would draw the impermissible inference, i.e., he did it three times before so he probably did it again this time, is too substantial to allow such evidence to be used. The prejudicial effect of the error was exacerbated by its cumulative nature. The admission of two prior convictions of the very samé offense and one prior conviction of a very similar offense was unwarranted.
I am persuaded, however, that, although the court clearly abused its discretion in allowing the prior convictions for impeachment purposes, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the particular facts of this case.
It was the defendant’s theory that the pharmacist fabricated the robbery allegations because the defendant was in arrears on payments he owed the pharmacist for prescription drugs he had taken on an earlier consignment. However, my review of *644the record compels the conclusion that defendant’s theory is wholly incredible. Were defendant’s story true, the pharmacist and the clerk would have to have been uncommonly good actors. Three different police officers testified that the pharmacist was visibly shaken when he reported the robbery. Furthermore, the question left unanswered by defendant is, why would the pharmacist wait until 4:00 p.m. to report the robbery if the defendant, by his own admission, was in the store at approximately 1:30 p.m. the same day?
Defendant’s story also does not posit any explanation as to why the clerk, who had only been working at the store for two months, would perjure herself. There was never any suggestion that she was involved in the alleged illicit business. The clerk corroborated the pharmacist’s testimony that an armed robbery had occurred and positively identified the defendant as the perpetrator.
Most importantly, there is absolutely no reason to believe that the customer who entered the pharmacy immediately after the robbery allegedly occurred would have perjured herself. The customer positively identified defendant as the person she had observed in the pharmacy immediately before she approached the counter and found the pharmacist and clerk lying on the floor.
Therefore, in light of the totally unbelievable nature of the defendant’s testimony and the overwhelming strength of the prosecution’s case, I would find that the error in admitting evidence of defendant’s prior convictions for impeachment purposes was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Defendant further argues that the trial court erred in failing, sua sponte, to give a limiting instruction on the use of prior convictions for *645impeachment purposes pursuant to CJI 3:1:08.19 The defendant did not request such an instruction; nor did he object to the trial court’s failure to so instruct.
A trial court is under no obligation to give, sua sponte, a limiting instruction to the jury. People v Chism, 390 Mich 104; 211 NW2d 193 (1973); People v DerMartzex, 390 Mich 410; 213 NW2d 97 (1973). This Court held in Chism and DerMartzex that "in the absence of request or proper objection under present Michigan case law, there is no absolute requirement that the trial judge give limiting instructions, even though such an instruction should have been given.” Id., 416. At issue in both cases was the trial court’s failure, sua sponte, to give a limiting instruction regarding evidence of other crimes offered for purposes other than impeachment.20 In DerMartzex, this Court noted that defense counsel may have declined to request a limiting instruction to avoid highlighting the prior acts to the jury. That rationale is similarly applicable to limiting instructions regarding evidence of prior convictions offered for impeachment purposes. Therefore, the trial court did not err in failing, sua sponte, to give the limiting instruction on the use of prior conviction evidence.
I would affirm the defendant’s conviction._
*646 C. PEOPLE vPEDRIN
The sole issue raised by defendant Pedrin is whether the trial court erred in granting the prosecutor’s motion in limine to allow impeachment of defendant with evidence of his October, 1981, conviction of breaking and entering. At the hearing on the prosecutor’s motion to allow impeachment with evidence of defendant’s prior breaking and entering conviction, defense counsel proffered that, if defendant testified, he would deny breaking into the garage and stealing the truck, and would testify that he had hitchhiked to his former wife’s residence in Munising. Defense counsel stated that defendant had no alternative method of presenting his defense because he did not know who drove him to Munising.
The trial judge noted that the similarity of the prior conviction to the charged offense, and the defendant’s inability to present his defense other than by testifying, militated against its admissibility. Nevertheless, the judge determined that the probative value of evidence of the prior conviction on the issue of defendant’s credibility outweighed the prejudicial effect because the prior offense involved "moral turpitude” and "dishonesty.” Defendant maintains that he did not testify as a result of that ruling.
The Court of Appeals, emphasizing that the prior conviction was a theft offense, held that the trial court’s decision to admit the evidence was not an abuse of discretion.
I disagree and conclude that the trial court did abuse its discretion in ruling that defendant could be impeached with evidence of the prior breaking and entering conviction. As in Brooks, supra, the similarity of the prior conviction to the charged offense was a factor weighing heavily against its *647admission, and there were no compelling reasons to permit such impeachment. Gordon, supra. The effect on the decisional process of the defendant’s failure to testify out of fear of impeachment similarly weighed against admissibility. There was no alternative way for defendant to present his story that he had hitchhiked to his former wife’s residence, and there were less prejudicial means of impeaching the defendant, e.g., by evidence of his statement to his former wife that he "just took a car.”
Furthermore, I cannot conclude that the error was harmless. The prosecutor’s case was not overwhelming, being based primarily on circumstantial evidence. I cannot say that not even one juror would have voted for acquittal had defendant testified. Therefore, I would reverse defendant’s conviction and remand the matter for a new trial.
D. PEOPLE v ALLEN
Defendant Allen argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence of his conviction of second-degree criminal sexual conduct. Defense counsel proffered that defendant would admit to having had sexual relations with the victim in the women’s lavatory at Arby’s and that he would maintain that the relations were consensual. The trial judge noted that the similarity between the prior conviction and the charged offense militated against admissibility. However, recognizing that the crime involved a one-to-one confrontation of the defendant and the victim, and the centrality of the credibility issue, the court denied the motion to suppress.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that it was not an abuse of discretion to admit the prior conviction under the particular circumstances pre*648sented. I agree. The similarity of the prior offense and the fact that it is not an offense like perjury which bears directly on credibility weigh against its admission. Nevertheless, the rationale underlying our decision in Gray, supra, is similarly applicable here where the question of guilt or innocence rests on the credibility of opposing witnesses. Had defendant testified, his credibility, as well as the victim’s, would have been the dispositive issue which had narrowed to the question whether the complaining witness had consented to sexual relations. Furthermore, it does not appear that there were any less prejudicial means to impeach the defendant, and he was able to present his consent defense, in part, through the testimony of Kevin Young.
Young testified that on a previous occasion, he and the defendant had met the victim at the restaurant, at which time both of them engaged in consensual sexual relations with her. The defendant was able to inferentially raise his consent defense and mitigate the prejudicial effect of his failure to testify, while simultaneously impeaching the victim’s assertion that the sexual relations were in fact nonconsensual. Had the defendant testified, his testimony would have directly contradicted the victim’s testimony on the consent issue. Under these circumstances, I cannot say that the trial judge abused his discretion in allowing impeachment with evidence of the prior conviction.
Defendant Allen argues further that the trial court erred in denying him the opportunity to impeach the complaining witness, Stacy Dougherty, with her testimony at the preliminary examination. Defendant argues that Dougherty’s testimony at the examination was inconsistent with her testimony at trial.
At the preliminary examination, Dougherty tes*649tified that when she walked into the ladies’ restroom the door to the stall for handicapped persons was open and she noticed someone standing in that stall. She could not tell whether the person standing there was a male or female, being able to see only the person’s backside, tan corduroy pants, and an orange kinky hairdo. After entering the stall adjacent to the handicapped stall and latching the door, she came back out immediately because she thought that something was "fishy.” Witness Dougherty was washing her glasses at the sink when the defendant approached her and told her to perform an oral sex act. She said "no” and the defendant then forced her to do so. Defense counsel asked if defendant had asked her to perform the sex act with the understanding that he would reciprocate by engaging in oral sex with her. Dougherty stated that she could not recall.
At trial, Dougherty testified that when she walked into the ladies’ restroom she could only see the person in the handicapped stall from approximately the knee down on one leg and that she did not notice what color pants the person was wearing. She also testified that when she first went into the restroom, she thought the person standing in the handicapped stall may have been sick. She denied that she had agreed to engage in a mutual sex act with defendant.
During cross-examination, defendant attempted to impeach Dougherty with the preliminary examination transcript in regard to the above differences in her testimony. Pursuant to the prosecutor’s objection, the trial court declined to allow defense counsel to impeach Dougherty with her preliminary examination testimony as a prior inconsistent statement.21
*650The Court of Appeals held that there was no inconsistency between Dougherty’s preliminary examination testimony and her testimony at trial; thus, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the admission of Dougherty’s examination testimony.
As a general rule, the only contradictory evidence that is admissible for impeachment purposes is that which directly tends to disprove the exact testimony of the witness. People v McGillen #1, 392 Mich 251; 220 NW2d 667 (1974); People v Johnson, 113 Mich App 575, 579; 317 NW2d 689 (1982). The question of inconsistency is one within the discretion of the trial judge. People v Graham, 386 Mich 452, 457; 192 NW2d 255 (1971). In the instant case, I am not persuaded that the trial judge abused his discretion in ruling that Dougherty’s trial testimony was not inconsistent with her testimony at the preliminary examination. Although Dougherty’s preliminary examination testimony contained certain details about defendant’s clothing which she was unable to recall at trial, her trial testimony was not inconsistent, but rather, it appears to reflect a lapse in memory. Similarly, at the preliminary examination, complainant testified that she could not recall if defendant had asked her to consent to a sexual act and subsequently testified at trial that he did not. Considered in the. total context of Dougherty’s testimony, I do not view these two variances in the testimony as contradictory. Therefore, I conclude that the trial judge’s refusal to allow impeachment with the preliminary examination testimony was not an abuse of discretion, thus I would affirm defendant’s conviction.
E. PEOPLE v SMITH
Defendant Smith argues that the trial court *651erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence of his prior manslaughter conviction. The trial court ruled that the prior conviction would be admissible for impeachment purposes without explanation.
The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s conviction finding no error on this issue.
Defendant first argues that the trial judge erred by failing to state, on the record, the factors he considered in deciding to admit the manslaughter conviction and that reversal is required. MRE 609(a)(2) provides in part that the court must articulate on the record the factors it considered in making its determination. The trial judge in the instant case did not comply with that requirement. Nevertheless, the record establishes that the trial judge was aware of his discretionary power to exclude use of prior convictions to impeach defendant and that he considered the relevant factors in reaching his decision to admit the manslaughter conviction. I would deem the error to be harmless under these circumstances. People v Eggleston, 148 Mich App 494; 384 NW2d 811 (1986), lv den 426 Mich 862 (1986).
Defendant further argues that the trial judge misapplied the relevant factors and abused his discretion in denying the motion to suppress. I agree. Defendant aptly notes that all of the pertinent factors militate against admissibility. Manslaughter is not an offense which is very probative of credibility. Such convictions should only be admitted when the weight of the other factors tips the balance in favor of admissibility.
In this case, all of the remaining relevant factors militate against admissibility. Manslaughter is sufficiently similar to the charged offense of assault with intent to murder to be deemed a *652factor weighing against admissibility. There were no compelling reasons to justify the use of a similar conviction. The offense did not involve a one-to-one confrontation of the defendant and the victim, nor did the determination of defendant’s guilt or innocence reduce itself to a credibility contest between two key witnesses. Thus, the need for such impeachment evidence was marginal.
In light of the foregoing, I believe the trial judge abused his discretion in declining to suppress the manslaughter conviction. Nevertheless, I conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to the overwhelming strength of the prosecution’s case. The victim’s positive identification of the defendant was well substantiated in light of the face-to-face confrontation she had with her assailants over several hours. Most importantly, the two codefendants, Panik and Minkler, consistently testified in minute detail of defendant’s complicity in perpetrating the offense. Under these circumstances, I find it inconceivable that the jury would have acquitted defendant on the basis of his tenuous purported defense of misidentification. Thus, the trial judge’s erroneous ruling on defendant’s motion to suppress use of his prior manslaughter conviction does not constitute grounds for reversal of defendant’s conviction.
Smith raises several other issues which I believe merit discussion. First, defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence of the line-up identification and any subsequent in-court identification. At trial, defendant argued that he had been arrested without probable cause, that his line-up identification should be suppressed as a product of the illegal arrest, and that any subsequent in-court identification would be the product of the illegal line-up identification *653which similarly should be suppressed.22 The trial court denied the motion. Detective Kohlstrand subsequently testified to the line-up identification of the defendant by the complaining witness, Robin Northover, who also identified defendant at trial as one of her assailants.
On this appeal, defendant has abandoned his theory that the arrest was illegal because it was made without probable cause. Defendant now argues that the arrest was illegal because there were no exigent circumstances justifying an arrest without a warrant, relying on Payton v New York, 445 US 573; 100 S Ct 1371; 63 L Ed 2d 639 (1980).
Generally, issues not raised in the trial court will not be considered on appeal. People v Lynch, 410 Mich 343, 351; 301 NW2d 796 (1981); People v Snow, 386 Mich 586, 591; 194 NW2d 314 (1972). While exception to the general rule has been made on numerous occasions in "both civil and criminal cases, a prerequisite to having new issues considered on appeal is that there must be a sufficient record to allow for thorough judicial review. Id.; Meek v Wilson, 283 Mich 679, 689; 278 NW 731 (1938).
In the instant case, an adequate record was not established to resolve the new arguments raised by the appellant here. Defendant’s contention that the police made an illegal warrantless entry into his home to effect his arrest is clearly not supported by the record. The evidence and arguments advanced on defendant’s motion to suppress the identification evidence related solely to whether there was probable cause for the arrest. No evidence was presented concerning the circumstances surrounding defendant’s arrest, nor can such evidence be gleaned from elsewhere in the record. *654Although there is no question that the defendant’s arrest was made without a warrant, it cannot be determined from the record whether the arrest was justified by one of the various exceptions to the warrant requirement.23 Therefore, the issue has not been properly preserved for appellate review. Id.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in admitting photographs and slides of the victim’s wounds.24 It is well-settled that the admission of photographic evidence lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge. People v Eddington, 387 Mich 551, 562; 198 NW2d 297 (1972). The court’s decision to admit photographs will be upheld if they were substantially necessary or instructive to show material facts and it does not appear that they were offered in an attempt to excite passion or prejudice. People v Falkner, 389 Mich 682, 685; 209 NW2d 193 (1973). Assuming relevance of the photographs, it must still be determined whether the probative value of admitting the photographs outweighs the prejudicial effect. Id.
In the instant case, defendant argues that the photographs and slides admitted into evidence were gory, inflammatory, and irrelevant to any issue in dispute. Defense counsel indicated that he would stipulate to the sexual assault and the assault with intent to murder because the defense was that the defendant was not the perpetrator.
The prosecutor argues that the photographs were relevant to proving the intent element of the *655assault with intent to murder charge notwithstanding defendant’s offer to stipulate to that element. There is no rule that stipulations per se negate admissibility. People v Green, 74 Mich App 351, 357; 253 NW2d 763 (1977), aff'd 405 Mich 273; 274 NW2d 448 (1979). The prosecution bears the burden of establishing each and every element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and the jury must be instructed to consider each element regardless of stipulation. Id. See also People v Reed, 393 Mich 342; 224 NW2d 867 (1975), cert den 422 US 1044, 1048 (1975). Therefore, defendant’s argument that the offer to stipulate to the elements of the crime rendered admission of the photographs irrelevant to proving the element of intent is without merit.
Furthermore, I believe the probative value in admitting the photographs outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice. There were no witnesses to the slashing of the victim’s neck. The victim was herself rendered unconscious before her neck was cut. The photographs and slides at issue depict the location of the wound and its severity. Coupled with the treating physician’s testimony, I believe the photographs and slides were highly probative of defendant’s intention to kill the victim. Photographs that are admissible for a proper purpose are not rendered inadmissible merely because they vividly depict a gruesome injury, even though they may arouse the passions or prejudice of the jurors. Eddington, supra, 563. Thus, I cannot conclude that the trial judge abused his discretion in admitting the photographs and slides at issue.
Next, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial. Defendant argues that he was entitled to a mistrial when witness Panik testified on redirect examination that "we was all on parole” when the prose*656cutor was questioning him about the encounter with two Wayne County Sheriffs deputies in front of the Seven-Eleven store.25
It is well settled that the decision to grant or deny a motion for mistrial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. People v Kelsey, 303 Mich 715; 7 NW2d 120 (1942); People v Holly, 129 Mich App 405, 415; 341 NW2d 823 (1983). To constitute error requiring reversal in a criminal trial, the error complained of must have been so extreme that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial and resulted in a conviction that was a miscarriage of justice. People v Ritholz, 359 Mich 539, 559; 103 NW2d 481 (1960); MCL 769.26; MSA 28.1096. A volunteered and unresponsive answer to a proper question is generally not cause for granting a mistrial. Kelsey, supra.
From my review of the record, I am not persuaded that Panik’s volunteered and unresponsive answer to the prosecutor’s question deprived defendant of a fair trial. The statement "we was all on parole” was ambiguous, and it cannot be said that it was an improper and prejudicial reference to the defendant’s prior record. It is highly unlikely that this one isolated, ambiguous, and unresponsive comment resulted in significant prejudice to defendant. Therefore, I cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial.
Finally, the defendant also argues that reversal is warranted because he was not permitted to impeach prosecution witness Donald Perdue with evidence of Perdue’s 1955 conviction of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder. He relies on the Court of Appeals decision in People v Redmon, 112 Mich App 246; 315 NW2d *657909 (1982).26 The trial court agreed with the prosecutor that such impeachment was precluded under MRE 609(b) because of the age of the conviction.
MRE 609(b) provides:
Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date.
Crucial to our analysis of this issue is an examination of the unique facts in Redmon. Defendant Redmon was charged with inciting, inducing, or exhorting prosecution witness Russell Haynes to commit murder. At her 1980 trial, the defendant sought to put before the jury the fact that between 1940 and 1967 Haynes had been convicted eight times of larceny and fraud-related activities. The trial court reluctantly disallowed such impeachment under authority of MRE 609(b).
The Court of Appeals reversed, stating that the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation took precedence over the court rule, as applied to a prosecution witness, under the peculiar facts in Redmon. The Court emphasized that the defendant’s theory was that Haynes had lied to authorities about the defendant’s involvement in an effort to ward off a severe sentence, which he feared because of his past extensive criminal record.
The instant case is clearly distinguishable. The compelling need for admission of the evidence of the prior conviction which was present in Redmon is not present here. Perdue’s prior conviction was not relevant to the defense theory; indeed, it had nothing to do with the facts of the instant case. *658Further, I note that Perdue’s twenty-six-year-old conviction was not for an offense bearing on truthfulness, and that defendant was permitted to explain fully the reason for Perdue being in jail with defendant, i.e., nonpayment of child support.
Our conclusion that Redmon is distinguishable makes it unnecessary for us to discuss the correctness of the Court of Appeals opinion in Redmon. Nonetheless, I emphasize the narrowness of that decision, and further observe that nothing in MRE 609(b) restricts its applicability to defendants who testify as opposed to other witnesses.
Finding no error, I would decline to extend the Redmon decision to encompass the facts in this case, and would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
IV
SUMMARY
On the issue for which leave was granted, I would hold that to preserve a claim of improper impeachment with a prior conviction for appellate review, a defendant must testify. However, because considerations of fundamental fairness compel prospective application of the rule, it should not govern the cases at bar.
In People v Gray, I would hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the defendant to be impeached with evidence of three prior convictions of carrying a concealed weapon, and one prior conviction of possession of heroin.
In People v Brooks, I would hold that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the defendant to be impeached with two prior robbery convictions and one prior unarmed robbery conviction due to the similarity of those offenses and the *659charged offense of armed robbery. However, I find the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. I find no merit in the remaining issue raised in Brooks.
In People v Pedrin, I would hold that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the defendant to be impeached with a prior breaking and entering conviction due to the similarity of that offense and the charged offense of breaking and entering.
In People v Allen, I would hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the defendant to be impeached with a prior conviction of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, notwithstanding the similarity of that offense to the charged offense of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. The impeachment evidence was properly ruled admissible due to the one-to-one nature of the offense, the centrality of the credibility issue, the lack of an alternative method of impeachment, and the defendant’s ability to present his theory of defense without testifying. I find no merit in the remaining issue raised in Allen.
In People v Smith, I would hold that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that defendant could be impeached with evidence of his prior conviction of manslaughter. However, I find the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, after careful consideration of the remaining issues raised in Smith, I conclude that there is no basis for reversal.
422 Mich 972, 973 (1985).
Morgan admitted that she initially lied to the police and told them that Carter had been over to her house on the night in question, that she fed him two hot dogs, that they were drinking Crown Royal, and that he left her house on foot. She stated that she lied to the police out of fear. She subsequently recanted that story and told the police substantially the same facts that she testified to in court.
MRE 609(b) provides:
(b) Time Limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date.
See Wong Sun v United States, 371 US 471; 83 S Ct 407; 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963); People v Kachar, 400 Mich 78; 252 NW2d 807 (1977).
Before the trial began, Minkler pled guilty of two counts of criminal sexual conduct (the degree is not clear from the record). Panik also pled guilty of criminal sexual conduct (the degree or number of counts is similarly not clear on the record).
Earlier that day, Panik, Minkler, and Smith drank some whiskey, smoked marijuana, and ingested some "crystal” (pcp). Panik testified that they originally left Smith’s house with a general intention of perpetrating a burglary. Minkler testified that they intended to steal tape decks out of cars.
Other evidence showed that the term "crystal” and "tea” are slang for the controlled substance phencyclidine which is also referred to as "pcp.”
See n 2.
The response to which the defendant objected arose during the following colloquy which occurred after it was established that the deputies were approximately thirty to thirty-five feet from the defendants’ vehicle when they looked at it.
Q. [Prosecuting Attorney]: When they got that close to you— you said you were smoking, is that right?
A. [Panik]: Yeah.
Q. Did you let the joint stay out so that they could see it?
A. No.
Q. What did you do?
A. We had beer, you know, we was all on parole, we didn’t need them to come up to the car.
Q. All right. So, you didn’t act in a way that would attract attention?
A. No.
Q. All right. Did you say anything to the officers?
A. No.
Q. Was anybody struggling, or moving around, or doing anything in the car?
A. No.
Q. Did they come over to the car?
A. No.
Q. They just went into the store?
A. Yeah.
Q. You remember them, because they were police officers, and you were on parole, is that right?
FRE 609(a) provides:
General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by public record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
MRE 609(a) modified the federal rule by inserting the word "theft” before the phrase "dishonesty or false statement,” and by requiring a determination that probative value outweighs prejudicial effect "as a condition of admissibility as to all convictions used for impeachment.” Note to MRE 609(a). Effective May 14, 1980, MRE 609(a)(2) was amended to require that the trial court "articulate[ ] on the record the factors considered in making [that] determination.”
Id.
People v Hughes, 411 Mich 517; 309 NW2d 525 (1981); People v Crawford, 83 Mich App 35, 39; 268 NW2d 275 (1978).
"Requiring that a defendant testify in order to preserve Rule 609(a) claims, . . . will also tend to discourage making such motions solely to 'plant’ reversible error in the event of conviction.” Luce, supra, 469 US 42.
See also People v Owens, 131 Mich App 76, 82-83; 345 NW2d 904 (1983); People v Sanders, 130 Mich App 246; 343 NW2d 513 (1983); People v Casey, 120 Mich App 690; 327 NW2d 337 (1982); People v Wilson, 107 Mich App 470; 309 NW2d 584 (1981).
See People v Collins, 228 Cal Rptr 899; 722 P2d 173 (1986); People v Brewer, 720 P2d 583 (Colo App, 1985); Vaupel v State, 708 P2d 1248 (Wy, 1985); State v Allie, 147 Ariz 320; 710 P2d 430 (1985); State v Means, 363 NW2d 565 (SD, 1985); State v Glenn, 285 SC 384; 330 SE2d 285 (1985); State v Harrell, 199 Conn 255; 506 A2d 1041 (1986); State v Garza, 109 Idaho 40; 704 P2d 944 (1985); State v Whitehead, 203 NJ Super 509; 497 A2d 548 (1985); People v Hartfield, 137 Ill App 3d 679; 484 NE2d 1136 (1985); People v Redman, 141 Ill App 3d 691; 490 NE2d 958 (1986).
See also Jimenez v State, 480 So 2d 705 (Fla App, 1985); State v Chapman, 496 A2d 297 (Me, 1985); State v White, 43 Wash App 580; 718 P2d 841 (1986); State v Banner, 717 P2d 1325 (Utah, 1986); McBride v State, unpublished opinion of the Texas Court of Appeals, decided August 28, 1986 (Docket No. 01-85-0301-CR); Page v State, 725 P2d 1082 (Alas App, 1986).
Contra State v McClure, 298 Or 336; 692 P2d 579 (1984); State v Ford, 381 NW2d 30 (Minn App, 1986); Commonwealth v Richardson, 347 Pa Super 564; 500 A2d 1200 (1985).
In United States v Johnson, 767 F2d 1259, 1270 (CA 8, 1985), the court, citing Luce, supra, declined to review defendants’ contention that the trial court erred in denying their motions in limine to exclude evidence of other crimes (FRE 404[b]) the government indicated it intended to introduce during cross-examination and in rebuttal if the defendants testified. In United States v Weichert, 783 F2d 23, 25 (CA 2, 1986), the court held that defendant failed to preserve for review the correctness of the trial court’s ruling in limine that the government could impeach him under FRE 608(b) due to his failure to testify.
Similarly, in Spell v McDaniel, 606 F Supp 1416 (ED NC, 1985), the court ruled that Luce precluded review of defendant’s contention that the court’s advisory ruling that plaintiff could not be impeached with a prior narcotics conviction was erroneous because defendant failed to call plaintiff as a hostile witness. See also United States v Sebetich, 776 F2d 412 (CA 3, 1985) (implying that a party’s objection to failure to allow impeachment of a witness with hearsay statements was not preserved due to failure to call the witness).
This Court initially suggested that these were the relevant factors in People v Jackson, 391 Mich 323, 333; 217 NW2d 22 (1974), citing Gordon v United States, 127 US App DC 343; 383 F2d 936 (1967). Although Jackson preceded the March 1, 1978, effective date of the Michigan Rules of Evidence, it is well established that these factors continue to be the appropriate criteria relevant to the balancing required by MRE 609(a)(2). See People v Hughes, 411 Mich 517, 520; 309 NW2d 525 (1981).
The trial judge initially indicated that Morgan could also be impeached with her prior record to show that neither the defendant nor the witness had "clean slates.” However, it was later discovered that Morgan’s prior record consisted primarily of misdemeanor convictions of accosting and soliciting which were suppressed because that offense does not involve theft, dishonesty, or false statement. A 1969 conviction of preparation to burn was also suppressed because it fell outside the ten-year time limit. See MRE 609(b).
In addition to emphasizing the centrality of the credibility issue, the court also considered the lack of similarity between the prior convictions and the charged offense. The fourth factor, the effect of the court’s ruling on the decisional process if the accused does not testify out of fear of impeachment, is not relevant because the defendant testified.
CJI 3:1:08 provides:
(1) There is evidence that the defendant has [a] prior criminal convictionjs],
(2) This evidence is to be considered by you only insofar as it may affect the defendant’s credibility [believability] as a witness. It-must not be considered by you as evidence of his guilt of this crime, nor should it be considered by you as increasing the probability of his having committed the crime.
The Court of Appeals has held that a trial court is not required, sua sponte, to give a limiting instruction regarding use of a defendant’s prior record for impeachment. People v Haukom, 56 Mich App 244, 245; 223 NW2d 648 (1974).
See MRE 613.
See n 3.
Entry into a private home without a warrant to effect the arrest of a defendant is justified either by consent or exigent circumstances. Steagald v United States. 451 US 204; 101 S Ct 1642; 68 L Ed 2d 38 (1981).
Defendant specifically objects to the admission of four slides of the victim’s neck wound that were photographed by the treating physician prior to suturing and three photographs which depict the victim’s neck and face after the wound was treated.
See n 7.
Redmon was decided subsequent to defendant’s conviction.