ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
On July 23, 1974, the court granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, declaring that 28 C.F.R. § 48.1 (1974) was an erroneous interpretation of the Newspaper Preservation Act and enjoining implementation of that regulation. In its Memorandum Opinion the court stated “that these arrangements [joint newspaper operating arrangements] are and will be entered into by competing daily newspapers. . . . ” Memorandum Opinion at 51. Defendant has petitioned the court to reconsider its earlier judgment, asserting that the above statement is inaccurate and that the inaccuracy was a substantial factor in the court’s decision to rule for plaintiff.
In answer, the court first corrects defendant and explains that the quoted statement did not contribute substantially to the court’s decision but arose mainly because of defendant’s failure to respond to the court’s questions. See note 2 infra.1 Rather, the court’s reasoning rested predominantly upon the clear and unambiguous language of the statute and the evidence in legislative history that Congress, in return for grant of a limited antitrust exemption, sought to limit future joint newspaper operating arrangements unless prior approval was obtained in conformance with the strict requirements of the Act. Under the authorities cited in the court’s earlier opinion and given the complete absence of contrary legislative intent, the court feels obligated to give the statute its literal and obvious interpretation.
Defendant now has submitted an affidavit and documents which purport to show that there are some joint newspaper operating arrangements between noncompeting newspapers which would be illegal under the court’s earlier ruling. This evidence was not submitted to the court for consideration on the motion for summary judgment.2 However, even when considering such evidence, the result remains the same. The statutory language and lack of contrary legislative intent militate against defendant’s interpretation. If, as defendant contends, this interpretation is not what Congress meant, then the proper course for defendant is to seek Congressional clarification or amendment. Further, there is no showing by defendant how many of the multiple use printing plants cited by defendant are actually joint newspaper operating arrangements within the Act’s definition,3 and the evidence defendant *54submits in no way indicates how many of these multiple use printing plants involve noncompeting newspapers. Finally, in the Department of Justice’s regulation there was no delineation between competing and noncompeting newspaper arrangements.4 Under the Department’s regulation, any joint newspaper operating arrangement, even those between competing papers, could be put into effect without prior approval. Section 4(b) of the Act evinces a Congressional concern that prior to any such arrangements, permission be sought and obtained. At least in part this was due to Congress’ desire to avoid the disruptive effect of later invalidation. See Memorandum Opinion at 51. Given this Congressional concern, it is perfectly logical for Congress to have required permissible joint newspaper operating arrangements to meet the Act’s strict definition and obtain prior Attorney General approval.
Ordered that defendant’s motion for rehearing be and the same hereby is denied.
. Indeed, the cited statement constituted only one paragraph of the court’s opinion.
. Defendant, although not submitting evidence earlier, argued that such noncompeting joint newspaper operating arrangements did exist. The court dismissed that contention when, in answer to the court’s query for some examples, defendant could not cite a single example. Further, as plaintiff points out, such evidence as defendant now submits was not before Congress when the Act was enacted and thus probably should not be considered by the court in interpreting the Act.
. See 15 U.S.C. § 1802(2). For example, if two papers use an independent printing establishment with no arrangement between *54the papers, then no joint newspaper operating arrangment would appear to have been established.
. In passing the court notes that in this motion for rehearing the Department of Justice contests as erroneous only the court’s statement that such arrangements are not entered into by noncompeting newspapers. By inference, although not admitted by defendant, it thus appears that defendant accepts that such arrangements between competing newspapers would violate the Act absent compliance with section 4(b).