¶ 86. {concurring). I concur. This matter involves the interpretation of two of our rules, Wis. Stat. §§ (Rules) 804.12(2)(a)3. and 805.03 (2003-04) .1 Simply stated, both rules provide that when a party fails to comply with statutes governing procedure in civil actions, including an order to make or permit discovery, "the court in which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to the *117failure as are just," including dismissing the action on the merits. Sec. 804.12(2)(a)3.; 805.03. The sanctions created by these rules contemplate an act of discretion by the court. Now, in the absence of rule changes by this court or independent legislative action, the majority abandons our precedent and strips judicial officers of the discretion clearly established by these rules to issue orders determined by them to be just. The majority concludes "it is an erroneous exercise of discretion for a circuit court to enter a sanction of dismissal with prejudice, imputing the attorney's conduct to the client, where the client is blameless." Majority op., ¶ 61. While this conclusion is well intentioned, in the absence of any change implemented as part of our rule-making procedure, I cannot join the majority opinion. I therefore write separately.
¶ 87. This is not the first time this issue has been addressed by this court. This question was first addressed in 1991 in the case of Johnson v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 162 Wis. 2d 261, 470 N.W.2d 859 (1991).
¶ 88. In Johnson, the circuit court was faced with multiple violations of pretrial discovery orders during a personal injury action by the Johnsons that lasted for a period of years. Id. at 267-270. At the hearing on defendant Allis Chalmers' motion to dismiss,2 Mrs. Johnson testified that she and her husband provided their attorneys with all requested materials and were unaware of the motions to dismiss filed by the defendants earlier in the case. Id. at 270. The circuit court nevertheless granted Allis Chalmers' motion to dismiss (and denied the motion for reconsideration as to *118Sperry). Id. at 271-72. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal. Id. at 272.
¶ 89. This court in Johnson recognized that "[a] circuit court's decision to dismiss an action is discretionary," and "will be sustained [on appeal] if the circuit court has examined the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, and, using a demonstrated rational process, reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach." Id. at 273 (citations omitted). Dismissal is an erroneous exercise of discretion "if the aggrieved party can establish 'a clear and justifiable excuse' for the delay." Id. (citation omitted). Dismissal is also improper, that is, not just, "unless bad faith or egregious conduct can be shown on the part of the noncomplying party." Id. at 275 (citations omitted). This court reasoned that the sanction of dismissal will be sustained if there is a reasonable basis for the circuit court's determination that the noncomplying party's conduct was egregious and there was no clear and justifiable excuse for the party's noncompliance. Id. at 276-77.
¶ 90. Applying these principles to the case before it, this court held that there was no erroneous exercise of discretion by the circuit court in dismissing the Johnsons' claims. Id. at 277. Of more import to the present case, this court also rejected adopting a per se rule prohibiting dismissal when the failure to comply with court orders is due to counsel's conduct and the party bears no personal responsibility for that conduct. Id. at 283. This court recognized that circuit courts may exercise their discretion in appropriate cases by not punishing litigants for their counsel's errors or misconduct. Id. at 284. This court made it clear that it placed its faith in the circuit court's judgment when the circuit court imposes sanctions upon a party. Id. at 286.
*119¶ 91. The Johnson court was not unanimous. Then Justice Abrahamson, in a separate concurrence, urged this court to adopt a rule that would not impute counsel's conduct to the litigant without considering the personal fault of the litigant. Id. at 289 (Abraham-son, J., concurring). It is that rule that we adopt today,3 even though neither Wis. Stat. § 804.12(2)(a)3. nor § 805.03 have been substantively altered by this court or by the legislature.
¶ 92. The interpretation of statutes and court rules present questions of law that we review independently. State v. Sorenson, 2000 WI 43, ¶ 15, 234 Wis. 2d 648, 611 N.W.2d 240. When construing statutes and court rules, we assume that the intent of the legislature or this court is expressed in a statute or court rule. State v. Denis L.R., 2005 WI 110, ¶ 35, 283 Wis. 2d 358, 699 N.W.2d 154 (citation omitted). Therefore, our analysis begins with the language of the statute or rule. Id. In general, we give statutory language its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning. Id. "Further, we consider language 'in the context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results.'" Id. (quoting State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110). If this analysis yields no ambiguity, our inquiry ends. Id.
¶ 93. I start with Wis. Stat. § 804.12(2)(a)3. That section provides in relevant part that if a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, the court may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, "and among others the following:... [a]n order ... *120dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party" (emphasis added). The plain language of the rule clearly contemplates a circuit court's exercise of discretion, and clearly includes the sanction of dismissal as a remedy, as the Johnson court so held.
¶ 94. I look next at Wis. Stat. § 805.03. That section provides in relevant part that "for failure of any party to comply with the statutes governing procedure in civil actions or to obey any order of court, the court... may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, including but not limited to orders authorized under s. 804.12(2)(a)" (emphasis added). Once again, the plain language of the rule clearly contemplates a circuit court's exercise of discretion, and clearly includes the sanction of dismissal as a remedy, as the Johnson court so held.
¶ 95. A per se rule that "it is an erroneous exercise of discretion for a circuit court to enter a sanction of dismissal with prejudice, imputing the attorney's conduct to the client, where the client is blameless[,]" majority op., ¶ 61, deprives the circuit court of the very discretion provided within the statute itself. Such a rule also deprives the circuit court of a necessary tool to compel compliance with the statute by removing a critical power to sanction the noncomplying party. I see no reason to adopt such a rule now, particularly when this court has already rejected it in the past.
¶ 96. It certainly makes a difference which of the Johnson tests this court applies in this case. I happen to agree with now Chief Justice Abrahamson that once this court adopts the Johnson concurrence as the standard to be applied in this case, a reversal is warranted. First, I agree that the circuit court did not apply the test we adopt today when rendering its decision, *121and by definition, therefore, its conduct was "beyond the limits of discretion." See dissent, ¶ 102. Second, I agree with the chief justice that Industrial Roofing (as opposed to its attorney) was blameless. See dissent, ¶ 103. If I were to join the majority in overruling Johnson, I would be forced to join the dissent in this case.
¶ 97. It is not wise to abandon precedent unless there is a compelling reason to do so. See Johnson Controls v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶¶ 94-95, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257. I find no such compelling reason in this case. Industrial repeatedly failed to comply with discovery throughout the pendency of this case. The circuit court had been made aware during the proceedings that Industrial's attorney accepted fault for not responding. The circuit court bent over backwards to bring about compliance without having to dismiss the action, postponing and ultimately denying the first motion to dismiss for noncompliance, imposing attorney's fees along the way as a sanction for noncompliance, and finally dismissing the complaint without prejudice. Even then, the circuit court allowed that Industrial could re-file if it paid Marquardt's attorney's fees of $3,926.81 within 60 days, although it would have to demonstrate the viability of the allegations against the Marquardt defendants in the complaint both factually and legally. When Industrial failed to meet the circuit court's conditions, the dismissal was then ordered with prejudice.
¶ 98. I fail to see what else the circuit court could have done. Industrial was not in compliance with the discovery orders. Progressive sanctions were being implemented, to no avail. The circuit court gave Industrial every opportunity to comply; yet compliance was not forthcoming. It was blatantly unfair to Marquardt to drag these proceedings out, without an end in sight. *122When such an end was provided, Industrial was nonetheless given an escape clause that it did not avail itself of. Under these circumstances, and applying the Johnson majority analysis, I find no erroneous exercise of discretion here.
¶ 99. I therefore respectfully concur in the mandate that affirms the decision of the court of appeals. I cannot, for the reasons stated, join the majority opinion.
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-04 version unless otherwise noted.
A second motion had been previously granted on behalf of defendant Sperry Rand Corporation, but was being reconsidered at the hearing.
Majority op., ¶ 61.