concurring in part and dissenting in part.
In my view, the defendants’ motions to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds were properly denied insofar as the motions related to portions of the state indictment charging crimes which were clearly distinct from the federal offense under 18 U.S.C. § 241. On the other hand, to the extent that the state indictment charged essentially the same offense as the federal indictment, the motions to dismiss should have been granted. I believe that the common law prohibition against double jeopardy precludes a second prosecution by this State if the defendant has previously been *59acquitted or convicted of the same offense by another jurisdiction.1
The concept that successive prosecutions of the same defendant for the same offense are permissible as long as each prosecution is by a different “sovereign” was initially adopted in United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 43 S.Ct. 141, 67 L.Ed. 314 (1922), as a Fifth Amendment precept, and reaffirmed in Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 79 S.Ct. 676, 3 L.Ed.2d 684 (1959), and Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 79 S.Ct. 666, 3 L.Ed.2d 729 (1959). The doctrine was *60not supported by either the English cases or by the early common law decisions in this country.2
The two English cases discussed in the majority opinion, as well as earlier and later English and other authorities, establish that, as a common law principle, one could not be tried a second time for an offense if he had previously been convicted or acquitted of that offense, whether or not the first prosecution was by the same or by a different jurisdiction. See the authorities reviewed in Grant, The Lanza Rule of Successive Prosecutions, 32 Colum.L.Rev. 1309, 1318-1329 (1932). See, in addition, Fisher, Double Jeopardy, Two Sovereignties and The Intruding Constitution, 28 U.Chic.L.Rev. 591, 603-606 (1961); Harrison, Federalism And Double Jeopardy: A Study In The Frustration Of Human Rights, 17 Miami L.Rev. 306 (1963).
Neither the General Assembly nor any holding of this Court has changed this common law principle. The two cases quoted by the majority, Worthington v. State, 58 Md. 403 (1882), and State v. James, 203 Md. 113, 100 A.2d 12 (1953), did not involve successive prosecutions for the same offense.3 Furthermore neither those cases, nor any other *61cases in this Court to my knowledge, have ever discussed the common law authorities relating to successive prosecutions by different sovereigns.
Finally, I would not today modify the common law rule. The purposes underlying the prohibition against successive criminal prosecutions for the same offense are just as applicable regardless of whether those prosecutions are by the same or different jurisdictions. As has been pointed out, “most free countries have accepted a prior conviction elsewhere as a bar to a second trial in their jurisdiction.” Abbate v. United States, supra, 359 U.S. at 203, 79 S.Ct. at 675 (Black, J., dissenting).
. While assuming for purposes of argument that the state and federal indictments charged the same offenses, the majority in a footnote indicates that counts one and two of the state indictment, relating to the substantive offenses of murder, alleged different offenses from the offense under 18 U.S.C. § 241. Without intending to express any conclusion of my own regarding this issue, I am not convinced that the “substantive" homicide charges against the defendant Grandison constituted separate offenses from the federal conspiracy charge.
The federal indictment charged that Grandison “did unlawfully, knowingly and willfully ... agree” with Evans and others to injure Scott and Cheryl Piechowitz in the exercise of the federal right to be a witness, and that as “part of the conspiracy,” Grandison "solicited, induced and procured defendant Vernon Evans, Jr., to kill Scott Piechowitz and Cheryl Piechowitz to prevent them from testifying .... ” The state murder charges against Grandison were not based on the theory that Grandison had been a principal in the murders, instead, the state capital murder charges were based upon Grandison being an accessory before the fact and upon Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 413(d)(7), that "[t]he defendant engaged or employed another person to commit the murder and the murder was committed pursuant to an agreement or contract .... ”
Thus, the essence of both the federal charge and counts one and two of the state charges against Grandison was that he had entered an agreement whereby the victims were to be killed by Evans to prevent their testimony. The federal and state charges against Grandison in these cases do not represent the traditional dichotomy between a conspiracy and the substantive offense. Under the so-called "concert of action rule” or "Wharton’s rule,” one cannot be prosecuted both for a substantive offense and conspiracy to commit that offense where an agreement or the participation of two persons is a necessary ingredient of the substantive offense. Robinson v. State, 229 Md. 503, 513, 184 A.2d 814 (1962); Jones v. State, 8 Md.App. 370, 376 n. 5, 259 A.2d 807 (1969).
. As Justice Black pointed out in his dissenting opinion in Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 159, 79 S.Ct. at 699, many of the early cases cited as supporting the doctrine did not involve successive prosecutions but dealt with essentially a question of preemption, i.e., whether two different governments could make the same activity a crime. This is true of most of the early state decisions cited by the majority and the dissent in Bartkus. Compare, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fuller, 8 Mete. 313, 317-318 (Mass.1844); Harlan v. The People, 1 Douglass 207, 212 (Mich.1843); State v. Antonio, 2 Tread. Const. 776, 788 (S.C.1816); Jett v. Commonwealth, 18 Grat. 933, 939, 947, 959 (Va.1867); and State v. Randall, 2 Aikens 89 (Vt.1827), with Mattison v. State, 3 Mo. 421 (1834), and Hendrick v. The Commonwealth, 5 Leigh 707, 713 (Va. 1834). To the extent that these early cases contained dicta on the issue, the majority of opinions took the position that successive prosecutions by the federal and state governments for the same offense would not be permitted. See also Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1, 31, 5 L.Ed. 19 (1820).
. Worthington cited no cases to support its dictum. James cited Rossberg v. State, 111 Md. 394, 74 A. 581 (1909), and Bloomer v. State, 48 Md. 521 (1878). Rossberg was a preemption case, relating to a local government’s authority, and not a case involving successive *61prosecutions. Bloomer similarly did not involve successive prosecutions of the same defendant.