dissenting.
It is clearly established that before a jury may convict of attempted murder it must be instructed that the act was committed with the specific intent to kill. Spradlin v. State (1991) Ind., 569 N.E.2d 948. This principle was given retroactive application not only to the Spradlin conviction itself, but in Simmons v. State (1994) Ind., 642 N.E.2d 511, was recognized to have retroactive effect in a post-conviction setting. In Simmons, the court held the defective attempted murder instruction to constitute fundamental error.
I find it strange indeed that a guilty plea may be accepted without the information as to specific intent required to be given a jury being imparted to the defendant whether by trial court advisement or otherwise. Here there is no suggestion that Howse was even remotely aware that before he could be con-vieted of attempted murder the State would have had to prove that when he fired the shot or shots, he did so with the specific intent of killing Leeper.
To the contrary, the fact that the guilty plea hearing was interrupted and continued when the defendant protested his innocence by claiming that he acted in self defense, is of particular moment. It reflects a lack of understanding with regard to the essential elements which the State would have to prove at trial.
The majority cites Coker v. State (1986) Ind., 499 N.E.2d 1135 and State v. Sanders (1992) Ind., 596 N.E.2d 225, for the proposition that a defendant need only understand the nature of the charge not the elements necessary to prove that charge. Those cases and similar cases did not involve the relative complexity inherent in the crime of attempted murder. Coker involved the straight-forward offenses of confinement and robbery. In Sanders, although charged with attempted murder, among other counts, the defendant pleaded guilty to involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder. Again, a situation not involving the subtleties of the specific intent to kill requirement of an attempted murder charge.
I would hold that the guilty plea was not shown to have been made knowingly or intelligently. I would reverse the denial of post-conviction relief and remand for further proceedings.