dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the conclusion that defendant was unlawfully arrested at his home. I would affirm the finding of the trial court that defendant was not arrested until he confessed to the crime at the police station. The majority reliance on In re J.W., 274 Ill. App. 3d 951, 654 N.E.2d 517 (1995), eases my burden. I adopt the reasoning (and some of the zeal) of the dissent of Justice DiVito in that case, which relies on People v. Williams, 164 Ill. 2d 1, 645 N.E.2d 844 (1994).
The record here makes clear that whatever the trial judge said about the encounter between Officer Bankston and defendant at defendant’s home, the ruling before us is that defendant was not placed under arrest until after he made a statement at the police station. The majority quotes a statement of the trial judge about the events leading up to the arrival of Officer Bankston at defendant’s home, as if the threshold issue in this case is whether Officer Bankston had probable cause to arrest defendant at his home. But all the trial court said was that the officer was justified in going to defendant’s home. The court made no finding that there was probable cause to arrest at that time. I agree with the majority that anonymous phone calls, lacking indicia of reliability, cannot support probable cause to arrest, but given the trial court finding that no arrest took place at defendant’s home, the discussion is irrelevant.
Our supreme court has adopted a de novo standard of review for the ultimate question of whether a confession is voluntary (In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37, 49-50, 727 N.E.2d 1003 (2000)), but has left the standard of review for factual findings firmly in place. Great deference is given to the trial court’s factual findings, which are to be reversed only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 50. These factual findings must include the resolution of disputed testimony. See People v. Sigafus, 42 Ill. 2d 26, 28, 244 N.E.2d 175 (1969). The trial court found, based on Officer Bankston’s testimony, that defendant was not handcuffed, searched or patted down and that Bankston would have interviewed defendant at home if defendant chose not to go to the station. That should have been the end of the matter, unless we are prepared to explain, based on the record, why the trial court’s factual findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence. To do this under the standard of review that binds us, we must make a finding that Officer Bankston’s testimony was less credible than the testimony that conflicts with it and explain our reasons for doing so based on the record.
I respectfully dissent.