concurring.
I concur in the result arrived at in this case but disagree with some of the implications to be found in the, foregoing opinion.
The court first states that consultation with a lawyer prior to- deciding whether or not to take a test for intoxication must be permitted if it does not jeopardize the effectiveness of the test. It then goes on to say that the taking of such a test “is not ordinarily required to be delayed” by a request that the arrested motorist be permitted to contact legal counsel. (Emphasis supplied.)
The obviously ambiguous statements can only result in confusion and uncertainty.. They will render law enforcement officials uncertain of the proper method of *17procedure and will confuse arrested motorists as to the extent of their rights under such circumstances. In some instances, delays encountered may render the tests ineffective and arrested motorists may deliberately insist upon consulting counsel for that purpose.
There is an attempt here to place the Implied Consent Law on the same footing as “in-custody interrogation” where a request for counsel must be honored. I know of no law to that effect. There is no constitutional right to counsel in taking tests under the Implied Consent Law. See State v. Oleson, 180 Neb. 546, 143 N. W. 2d 917.
White, C. J., and Carter, J., join in this concurrence.