I respectfully dissent.
The opinion written by Justice Knudson seems to indicate that one may refuse to take the test to determine the alcoholic content of his blood and reconsider any time within a period during which the test results would be valid. Our Implied Consent Law does not so provide.
Certain sections of our Implied Consent Law are pertinent to a determination of this issue:
“39-20-01. Implied Consent to determine alcoholic content of blood. — -Any *558person who operates a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this state shall be deemed to have given consent subject to the provisions of this chapter to a chemical test, or tests, of his blood, breath, saliva, or urine for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood. The test or tests shall be administered at the direction of a law enforcement officer only after placing such person except persons mentioned in section 39-20-03 under arrest and informing him that he is or will be charged with the offense of driving or being in actual physical control of a vehicle upon the public highways while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The arresting officer shall determine which of the aforesaid tests shall be used.
“39 — 20-04. Revocation of privilege to drive motor vehicle upon refusal to submit to chemical testing. — If a person under arrest refuses to submit to chemical testing, none shall be given, but the state highway commissioner, upon the receipt of a sworn report of the law enforcement officer, forwarded by the arresting officer within five days after the refusal, showing that he had reasonable grounds to believe the arrested person had been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon the public highways while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and that the person had refused to submit to the test or tests, shall revoke his license or permit to drive and any nonresident operating privilege for a period of six months; or, if the person is a resident without a license or a permit to operate a motor vehicle in this state, the commissioner shall deny to the person the issuance of a license or permit for a period of six months after the date of the alleged violation, subject to the opportunity for a prerevocation hearing and postrevocation review as hereinafter provided.
“39-20-05. Administrative hearing on request. — Prior to issuing an order of revocation or denial under section 39-20-04, the commissioner shall give such person a written notice of intention to revoke or deny and afford him an opportunity for a hearing. If the commissioner receives a written request within ten days, he shall grant such hearing within thirty days. The hearing shall be before the commissioner or his authorized agent in the county wherein the alleged events occurred for which the person was arrested, unless the commissioner or his authorized agent and the person agree that the hearing may be held in some other county. The hearing shall be transcribed and its scope shall cover the issues of whether a law enforcement officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person had been driving or was in actual physical control of a vehicle upon the public highways while under the influence of intoxicating liquor; whether the person was placed under arrest; and, whether he refused to submit to the test or tests. Whether the person was informed that his privilege to drive would be revoked or denied if he refused to submit to the test or tests shall not be an issue. The commissioner or his authorized agent shall promptly make findings of fact, conclusions, and decision, and give notice thereof, as provided for in section 28-32-13.
“39-20-06. Judicial review. — Any person aggrieved by the decision of the commissioner or his authorized agent may, within thirty days, serve and file a notice of appeal and specifications of error in the district court in the county wherein the alleged events occurred for which he was arrested or in the county in which the administrative hearing was held. It shall be the duty of the court to set the matter for hearing, and the petitioner shall give twenty days’ notice thereof to the commissioner. The commissioner shall thereupon stay his decision until the hearing date but in no event for more than sixty days. Within fifteen days after receipt of the notice, the commissioner shall file in the office of the clerk of court to which the appeal is taken a certified transcript of the testimony and all *559other proceedings. It shall constitute the record on which appeal shall be determined. No additional evidence shall be heard. The court shall affirm the decision of the commissioner or his authorized agent unless it finds the evidence insufficient to warrant the conclusion reached by the commissioner. The court may in its discretion direct that the matter be returned to the commission for rehearing and the presentation of additional evidence.” Chapter 39-20, § 39-20-01, § 39-20-04, § 39-20-05, and § 39-20-06, N.D.C.C. [Emphasis added].
Because of the similarity between the statutes, facts and arguments involved in a recent decision of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire and the instant case, I shall quote extensively from it.
“The implied consent statute provides that a person arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of liquor ‘shall be deemed to have given consent to a chemical test or tests of any or all or any combination of the following: blood, urine, or breath . . . .’ RSA 262-A:69-a (Supp.1972); see Hallet v. Johnson, 111 N.H. 152, 276 A.2d 926 (1971). ‘If a person under arrest refuses upon the request of a law enforcement officer to submit to a chemical test . , none shall be given, but the director of the division of motor vehicles . shall revoke his license to drive for a period of ninety days . . . .’ RSA 262 — A:69-e (Supp.1972) (emphasis added). RSA 262-A:69-c provides that the officer shall ‘(1) inform the arrested person of his right to have a similar test or tests made by a person of his own choosing, (2) afford him an opportunity to request such additional test, and (3) inform him of the consequences of his refusal to permit a test at the direction of the law enforcement officer.’
“Plaintiff’s primary contention is that the purpose of the implied consent statute is the securing of a reliable blood-alcohol test whenever possible, and that this purpose is best served by allowing a person initially refusing to submit to the test a reasonable time after the refusal to reconsider and to then demand that the test be administered. She urges that this period for reconsideration should extend for as long a time as the test results still will be valid, which may be as long as four hours after the arrest. State v. Gallant, 108 N.H. 72, 227 A.2d 597 (1967). The State has admitted that the test would have been valid had it been administered immediately after the plaintiff requested it. But the position of the State is that the statute contemplates that once the driver has indicated his refusal to submit to the test, ‘none shall be given’ regardless of how soon thereafter the driver changes his mind.
“Other courts considering whether a person properly advised by the police may rescind an initial refusal to submit to an implied consent law blood-alcohol test and demand that the test then be administered have almost unanimously concluded that the test need not be administered once a substantial period has elapsed from the initial refusal. Zidell v. Bright, 264 Cal.App.2d 867, 71 Cal.Rptr. 111 (1968) (driver changed mind 30-45 minutes after refusal); Krueger v. Fulton, 169 N.W.2d 875 (Iowa 1969) (1 hour, 23 minutes); State v. Palmer, 291 Minn. 302, 191 N.W.2d 188 (1971) (1⅛ hours); In re Brooks, 27 Ohio St.2d 66, 271 N.E.2d 810 (1971) (⅛ hour); Application of Kunneman, 501 P.2d 910 (Okl.App.1972) (driver’s request to take test made as he was being placed in jail cell after refusing five requests of officer to take test); Sundstrom License, 47 Pa.D. & C.2d 1 (3 hours); see Mills v. Bridges, 93 Idaho 679, 471 P.2d 66 (1970) (under 1 hour); Dobbins v. Tofany, 38 A.D.2d 870, 328 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (Sup.Ct.1972) (within 2 hours); Donigan, Chemical Tests and the Law, 26-27 (Supp.1972). Those few cases holding that the driver was entitled to the test after initially refusing have been based upon the driver’s reasonable misunderstanding of his rights and responsibil*560ities under the law due to statements made by the police. E. g., Sweeney v. Tofany, 30 A.D.2d 934, 293 N.Y.S.2d 876 (Sup.Ct.1968) (1 hour); Thomas v. Schaffner, 448 S.W.2d 319 (Mo.App.1969) (20 minutes).
“We think that our implied consent statute like most others contemplates that the test be administered without unreasonable delay. See State v. Gallant, 108 N.H. 72, 227 A.2d 597 (1967); Zidell v. Bright, supra. ‘Clearly implied in the statute is the requirement that one of its described tests be submitted to and completed expeditiously; otherwise the purpose of the law would be frustrated.’ Smith v. Cozens, 25 Cal.App.3d 300, 302, 101 Cal.Rptr. 787, 788 (1972). ‘[T]he testing officers should not be required “to await the driver’s convenience of a different time or place” to submit to the statutory requirement.’ State v. Palmer, 291 Minn. 302, 308-309, 191 N.W.2d 188, 191-192 (1971). The effectiveness and reliability of the breathalyzer as well as the blood test diminishes with the passage of time. State v. Gallant supra; Mills v. Bridges, 93 Idaho 679, 471 P.2d 66 (1970). There is no sound reason to give the driver the opportunity to delay the test to his benefit contrary to the purpose of the test, and the statute to obtain as accurate an indication of his condition as possible. See Donigan, Chemical Tests and the Law 45 (2d ed. 1966); Erwin, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases § 15.03 (3rd ed. 1972); cf. 13 N.H., Judicial Council 45 (1970).
“We disagree with plaintiff’s contention that the assistance of counsel is required prior to submitting to the test. See generally Donigan, supra at 33-35 (Supp.1972). In State v. Petkus, 110 N.H. 394, 269 A.2d 123 (1970), we ruled that the taking of a blood sample under the implied consent law is not a critical stage of a criminal proceeding requiring the assistance of counsel under the sixth and fourteenth amendments. Cf. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972). Plaintiff’s argument that a driver is in need of counsel in deciding whether to submit to a breathalyzer test cannot be entertained in light of our decision in State v. LaRochelle, 112 N.H. 392, 297 A.2d 223 (1972).
* * * * * *
“We conclude that the plaintiff’s initial refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test was not cured by her offer to take the test one hour later. ‘We are not faced with a situation where a defendant had almost immediately retracted his refusal and had been denied the test and had been told that his belated consent was unacceptable.’ ” [Citations omitted]. Harlan v. State, 113 N.H. 194, 308 A.2d 856 (1973).
To permit a person charged with driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor to vacillate between not taking and taking a test to determine the alcoholic content of his blood places an additional administrative burden upon our already overburdened law enforcement officials and grants that person a luxury not contemplated by the Legislature nor justified by reason.