specially concurring:
I agree that section 24 — 24 of the School Code is not applicable to this case, and I concur in the holding that the judgments of the appellate and circuit courts must be reversed and the cause remanded. In its discussion of section 24 — 24 the majority states, “Since the foregoing statute specifically confers upon educators the status of parent or guardian to the students, and since a parent is not liable for injuries to his child absent wilful and wanton misconduct (Nudd v. Matsoukas (1956), 7 Ill. 2d 608), it therefore follows that the same standard applies as between educator and student. (Kobylanski v. Chicago Board of Education (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 165.)” (69 Ill. 2d at 636.) In our dissent in Kobylanski, Mr. Chief Justice Ward, Mr. Justice Schaefer and I said: “Although not made an issue in these appeals, we consider it appropriate to comment upon one additional matter. The majority, and apparently the parties, appear to accept as settled law ‘that a parent is not liable for injuries to his child absent wilful and wanton misconduct. See Mroczynski v. McGrath, 34 Ill. 2d 451, 455; Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d 608, 619.’ (63 Ill. 2d at 170.) On the contrary, this court has never decided that question. In Nudd, wilful and wanton misconduct was alleged (7 Ill. 2d at 610), and the language to which the majority opinion refers (7 Ill. 2d at 619) does not hold that parental immunity bars an action based on negligence. Mroczynski explains what was said in Nudd but does not decide the question.” 63 Ill. 2d 165, 178-79.
If, as the majority states, the rule in this jurisdiction is that “a parent is not liable for injuries to his child absent wilful and wanton misconduct” it should rest on some ground more sound than the repetitive misreading of Nudd v. Matsoukas.