concurring.
[¶ 26] I agree with the result and part II.C of the majority opinion. However, I write again separately to express my opinion on the issue of non-economic fault in the context of equitable property distribution. I join others who are of the opinion that non-economic fault should not be considered in the equitable division of marital property. I am, also, of the opinion the trial court’s findings of fact under the Ruff-Fischer guidelines do not support an unequal distribution of the marital estate.
I
[¶ 27] Under N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24, the trial court “shall make an equitable distribution of the property and debts of the parties.” In 1952 and 1966, this Court held the trial court should consider a number of factors in determining what is an equitable distribution of property. See Ruff v. Ruff 78 N.D. 775, 52 N.W.2d 107 (1952); Fischer v. Fischer, 139 N.W.2d 845 (N.D.1966). Among the enumerated Ruff-Fischer factors, the trial court may consider the “conduct of the parties during the marriage.” Therefore, the provision that non-economic fault in the breakup of the marriage is a consideration in property distribution is a judicially-created rule and not statutory. The Ruff-Fischer guidelines are based on a rule enunciated in two Nebraska Supreme Court decisions; namely, Holmes v. Holmes, 152 Neb. 556, 41 N.W.2d 919 (1950) and Ristow v. Ristow, 152 Neb. 615, 41 N.W.2d 924 (1950). Ruff, at 111. It is interesting to note that the criteria for the division of property in Nebraska are now statutory and do not include the “conduct of the parties during the marriage.” Neb.Rev.Stat. § 42-365; see Campbell v. Campbell, 202 Neb. 575, 276 N.W.2d 220, 224 (1979).
[¶ 28] At the time the Ruff-Fischer factors were announced, the grounds for divorce were: adultery, extreme cruelty, willful desertion, willful neglect, habitual intemperance, conviction of felony, or insanity. See N.D.R.C. § 14-0503 (1943) and N.D.C.C. § 14-05-03 (Supp.1965). In 1971, following this Court’s adoption of the Ruff-Fischer guidelines, the Legislative Assembly adopted “irreconcilable differences” as a ground for divorce. See 1971 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 149, § 1. Modeled after the California Family Code and *451adopting language from the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, the purpose of the amendment was to provide a basis to grant a couple’s divorce without proof of blame. See Hearing on H.B. 1097 Before the House Judiciary Comm., 42nd N.D. Legis. Sess. (Jan. 26, 1971) (testimony of Peter S. Hilleboe, Rep., and the Honorable Adam Gefreh, District Court Judge) [hereinafter “Hearing on H.B. 1097”]. Supporters of the amendment asserted it would “eliminate[ ] the manufactured excuse and [would] protect the children from thinking one of the parents [was] to blame_” Hearing on H.B. 1097 (committee discussion). The committee also heard a proposal to amend N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24, division of property and debts, to award equitable distribution of property “without regard to marital misconduct.” Hearing on H.B. 1097 (testimony of Judge Gefreh). It appears from the Journal notes that the committee did not adopt this proposal. See id. (proposed amendment attached to Judge Gefreh’s testimony); Journal of the House, 42nd N.D. Legis. Sess., 471 (Feb. 3, 1971) (committee recommendations made to the House did not include the proposed amendment). The Legislative Assembly did not eliminate any of the existing causes for divorce, but merely added irreconcilable differences as an additional cause. 1971 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 149, § 1.
[¶ 29] Following the adoption of irreconcilable differences, this Court adhered to the Ruff-Fischer guidelines, holding marital misconduct was a factor to be considered in the equitable distribution of the parties’ property. Novlesky v. Novlesky, 206 N.W.2d 865, 868 (N.D.1973). The Court relied on the fact that the 1971 legislature did not revise the causes for divorce, but only added the additional cause, irreconcilable differences. Id. In Novlesky, Justice Teigen concurred in the result, stating “[t]he 1971 amendment to the divorce statute has created a no-fault cause for divorce.... Thus where a divorce is sought on the ground of irreconcilable differences, the fault standard required to be established under the remaining seven grounds for divorce is not a factor.” Id. at 870 (Teigen, J., concurring specially).
[¶ 30] I am of the opinion that it is time we discard the trial court’s consideration of non-economic fault in distributing marital property when granting a divorce on any ground. This judicially-created rule that “conduct of the parties during the marriage” is a factor to be considered was adopted prior to the adoption of irreconcilable differences. The purpose behind granting a divorce based on irreconcilable differences was to avoid shifting blame on one spouse, creating a potentially damaging situation for the children involved. See Hearing on H.B. 1097. Allowing non-economic fault, especially extramarital affairs, to play a role in property distribution does not further this purpose, but rather, undermines it. Therefore, I believe non-economic fault should not be a consideration in the equitable distribution of property especially when divorces are premised on irreconcilable differences, which are the majority of cases today.
[¶ 31] In the years following Novlesky, Justices Teigen, Vogel, and Levine wrote separately advocating for the abolishment of non-economic fault as a factor in property distribution. See Erickson v. Erickson, 384 N.W.2d 659, 662 (N.D.1986) (Levine, J., concurring specially and Meschke, J., joining); Nastrom v. Nastrom, 262 N.W.2d 487, 494 (N.D.1978) (Vogel, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Haugeberg v. Haugeberg, 258 N.W.2d 657, 667 (N.D.1977) (Vogel, J., dissenting); Hultberg v. Hultberg, 259 N.W.2d 41, 46-47 (N.D.1977) (Vogel, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In Erickson, Justice Levine opined: “Fault is an appropri*452ate consideration only insofar as it can be shown to have substantially affected the economic status of the parties. Marital misconduct which is not significantly related to the economic condition of the marriage is not germane to a division of property and should not be considered.” 884 N.W.2d at 662 (Levine, J., concurring specially and Meschke, J., joining).
[¶82] This position is consistent with the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act. The Uniform Act “provides unambiguously ... allocation of marital property ... be made ‘without regard to marital misconduct.’ ” American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations, at 46 (2002). A majority of jurisdictions have adopted the Uniform Act’s position and do not consider fault as a factor in deciding property distribution. See id. at 50, 73-89 (listing the collection of states and supporting authority and noting a systematic examination of authorities conducted in 1996 concluded “[o]n the allocation of property at least [thirty-two] states have a pure no-fault system”).2
[¶ 33] The conduct of the parties during the course of the marriage should only be considered when it “substantially affect[s] the economic status of the parties.” See Erickson, 384 N.W.2d at 662 (Levine, J., concurring specially and Meschke, J., joining). I would, therefore, allow consideration of conduct involving domestic violence or other forms of significant physical, emotional, or mental abuse that cause economic loss or expense to the marital estate in addition to marital affairs that dissipate the marital estate.
[¶ 34] Further, eliminating consideration of non-economic fault would allow for an even-handed approach to determining an equitable distribution and minimize the potential for inconsistent and disparate treatment and application of non-economic fault among trial courts. Currently, a trial court is left to its own discretion when applying the guidelines, resulting in one court considering an extra-marital affair or moral misconduct significant and another court considering it only if it causes the dissolution of the marriage and, yet another, considering it not significant at all. See van Oosting v. van Oosting, 521 N.W.2d 93, 96 (N.D.1994). Concerning this inconsistency, I agree with Justice Vogel:
For this state of affairs I assign no blame. Some of the reasons may be historical. Trial courts have tried to follow our direction, and we have tried to give their rulings the respect due them under Rule 52(a), N.D.R.Civ.P. Regardless of the causes, the results are not felicitous.
Haugeberg, 258 N.W.2d at 668 (Vogel, J., dissenting) (discussing the inconsistencies in property distribution awards based on fault of a spouse); see also Wilhelm v. Wilhelm, 1998 ND 140, ¶ 31, 582 N.W.2d 6 (Maring, J., concurring and Meschke, J., joining) (pointing out the trial court, in dismissing the wife’s argument that her husband’s affair should be considered, stated “ ‘[s]uch are the days of our lives’ ”).
[¶ 35] It is my opinion this Court should adopt the Uniform Act’s position and join the majority of states that limit the consideration of fault as a factor in property distribution only to economic fault.
II
[¶ 36] I, also, am of the opinion that the trial court’s findings of fact do not *453support the conclusion that an unequal property distribution in favor of Rodney Rebel is equitable.
[¶ 37] Helen Rebel argues the trial court failed to equitably distribute the assets of the parties. The majority opinion, at ¶ 15, addresses this issue concluding that “[b]eeause the district court has not adequately articulated reasons justifying its calculated $856,769.00 disparity in favor of Rodney Rebel, and Helen Rebel received property which is clearly worth less than the value ascribed to it by the trial court, we cannot determine whether the resulting property distribution is equitable.” (Quotation omitted.) The majority rightly remands the case to the trial court to reconsider the property distribution.
[¶ 38] As noted, in distributing marital property, the trial court must apply the Ruff-Fischer guidelines. Peterson v. Peterson, 1999 ND 191, ¶ 7, 600 N.W.2d 851. The Ruff-Fischer guidelines provide:
The respective ages of the parties, their earning ability, the duration of the marriage and conduct of the parties during the marriage, their station in life, the circumstances and necessities of each, their health and physical condition, their financial circumstances as shown by the property owned at the time, its value at the time, its income-producing capacity, if any, whether accumulated before or after the marriage, and such other matters as may be material.
Peterson, at ¶ 7.
[¶ 39] Here, the trial court found “[t]he efforts of both have resulted in a substantial marital estate.” Additionally, the trial court found that “for several years after the parties married Helen did work at the farm” and, after she gained employment off the farm, “substantially all of her income was used for family purposes and she has provided the health insurance for the family through Schmidt Repair.” The trial court also found the “farm has a history as a successful farm with more than sufficient cash flow to service the debt against it ... and allow for reinvestment back into the farm, which has resulted in an increasing value thereof.”
[¶40] “When a spouse’s contributions to the family enable the other spouse to devote full time and attention to a business, contributing to the accumulation, appreciation, and preservation of assets, the spouse’s contributions deserve equivalent recognition in a property distribution.” Peterson, 1999 ND 191, ¶ 9, 600 N.W.2d 851. Here, the record indicates that not only did Helen Rebel contribute to the farm as a homemaker, but the trial court found she acquired employment off the farm and contributed “substantially all of her income was used for family purposes.” Helen Rebel’s financial contributions allowed for reinvestment back into the farm, which resulted in its increased value. Her contributions to the marriage and the marital estate allowed Rodney Rebel to focus on farming and to retiring the debt against it. It was her employment that provided him with health insurance after he was diagnosed with leukemia. The financial contributions of both parties to the marital estate favor an equal division of the marital estate.
[¶ 41] The trial court also found other factors favoring an equal division of the marital estate: (1) the marriage was considered a long-term marriage; (2) the circumstances and necessities of each were equal, and (3) neither party owned any substantial property at marriage. However, the trial court awarded an unequal division of the marital estate, stating:
If unequal, a smaller share to Helen could still be equitable because:
1. Her infidelity precipitated the action.
*4542. All the real estate has been in the Rebel family for generations.
3. In 2009, they purchased a significant portion of the real estate on extremely favorable terms from his parents.
4. An equal split would require liquidation of' the assets compromising the farm.
5. This would leave Rodney to lose the only occupation for which he is qualified.
The trial court’s conclusion wholly abandons the Ruff-Fischer guidelines. The trial court disregarded its findings with regard to the duration of the marriage; the circumstances and necessities of each party; and the financial contributions to the property owned, its value, its income-producing capacity, and when it was accumulated. Instead, it gave undue weight to the familial history and potential disposition of the farm. This Court has held that “preserving the family farm is not to be done at all costs nor should it engulf all other factors” and when preservation appears to increase rather than decrease the potential economic harm, liquidation is appropriate. See Marschner v. Marschner, 2001 ND 4, ¶¶ 18, 20, 621 N.W.2d 339. Here, the trial court disregarded the holding in Marschner and awarded inequitable distribution of the marital estate based on the sole fact that the source of the property was Rodney Rebel’s family and the farm must be preserved. The trial court simply ignored that Helen Rebel substantially contributed to the purchase and appreciation of the farm. I am of the opinion the trial court’s findings do not support a disparity in property distribution. Therefore, I believe on remand the trial court must consider Helen Rebel’s financial contributions to the acquisition and maintenance of the farm property.
Ill
[¶ 42] I would reverse and remand for a determination of property distribution without regard to non-economic fault and under the correct application of our law.
[¶ 43] Mary Muehlen Maring
. Although a systematic examination of authorities has not been conducted since 1996, most of the states decided whether to apply the no-fault principles to property division at the time they adopted no-fault divorce in the 1970s and 1980s. See Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations, at 51.