concurring as to Issue II and dissenting as to Issue I.
While I concur with the majority's opinion as to Issue II, I respectfully dissent from the majority's opinion as to Issue I. It is my opinion that the trial court improperly ruled that the binding arbitration provision in Mother and Father's Agreement of Settlement was void for the reason that it is against public policy.
On July 23, 2000, Mother filed her Petition for Modification of Settlement Agreement and Petition for Contempt Citation. On August 25, 2000, Father filed his Motion for Rule to Show Cause by Troy D. Cohoon, and to Dismiss All Petitioner's Motions Before the Court. On March 6, 2001, a telephonic pretrial conference was conducted. During this conference, the trial court held that "whether a party is in contempt of the prior order is not encompassed within the binding arbitration provision of the Agreement of Settlement and Decree herein and that this Court has jurisdiction over enforcement of its orders." (Appellant's App. p. 50). Also, during the pretrial conference, Mother withdrew her Petition for Modification of Settlement Agreement. On March 7, 2001, the trial court held a hearing on the Petition for Contempt Citation. At the hearing, Father made a continuing objection to all of the evidence presented on the grounds that the Petition for Contempt Citation was not properly before the trial Father argued that the issue of court. support should have been submitted to binding arbitration pursuant to the Agreement of Settlement.
Mother's Petition for Contempt Citation was properly before the trial court, regardless of the binding arbitration provision in the Agreement of Settlement. It is within "the inherent powers of a trial court to use contempt as a remedy in the context of child support." Pettit v. Pettit, 626 N.E.2d 444, 446 (Ind.1993) (emphasis added). Thus, the issue of contempt did not fall within the seope of the binding arbitration provision. See id. With this in mind, the trial court had no need to delve into this issue any further to decide whether the Petition for Contempt Citation was properly before it, as trial courts always have the authority to rule on contempt issues. See id. It is my opinion that the trial court sua sponte raised and ruled on the issue of whether the binding arbitration provision in the Agreement of Settlement was void. The binding arbitration provision had nothing to do with the matter before the trial court. This is especially true considering the fact that Mother withdrew her Petition for Modification of Settlement Agreement.
Admittedly, this court has held that "agreements pertaining to the support and custody of children are of a different character and will not be deemed effective unless, and until, they are approved by the court." In re Paternity of K.J.L., 725 N.E.2d 155, 159 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). "If there is one overriding policy concern in dissolution actions, it is protecting the welfare and interests of children." Voigt v. Voigt, 670 N.E.2d 1271, 1278 n. 10 (Ind.1996). Furthermore, sua sponte action taken by a trial court does not automatically constitute advocacy, as a trial court is not required to allow improper procedures. See Hudgins v. State, 451 N.E.2d 1087, 1090 (Ind.1983).
*897On the other hand, in Cavazzzi v. Cavazzzi, 597 N.E.2d 1289, 1293 (Ind.Ct.App.1992), the trial court ordered father to pay for the college expenses of his child. This court held that the trial court erred in its order, because mother's petition did not contain a request for college expenses. Id. "It was error for the court to order relief not requested by the petition." Id. Further, where parents agree that the needs of their children are being met under an existing court order, and neither is petitioning the court for modification, the court is not required to initiate modifications. See Gielsdorf-Aliah v. Aliah, 560 N.E.2d 1275, 1277 (Ind.Ct.App.1990).
In the present case, the Agreement of Settlement contained a binding arbitration provision concerning child support, custody, and/or visitation. There was not an issue before the trial court concerning child support, custody and/or visitation. Granted, there was an issue of contempt for nonpayment of child support. However, as previously stated, the issue of contempt for nonpayment of child support did not fall within the binding arbitration provision. Thus, the trial court raised an issue not submitted by either party. Then, it proceeded to rule on that issue. I find this to be an abuse of the trial court's authority. To rule otherwise, we would be encouraging trial courts to raise issues not presented by the parties. This is not the role of a trial court. Consequently, it would be my determination that the trial court erred by sua sponte raising and ruling on the issue of whether the binding arbitration provision in Agreement of Settlement was void, as it was not before the trial court to do so. See Cavazzi, 597 N.E.2d at 1293.