(concurring). I agree with the Court’s conclusion that the order appealed from should be affirmed. After the prosecution set out its reasons for the peremptory strike of a female African-American prospective juror, defendant did not say anything further about her or make an attempt to seek clarification of the prosecution’s ambiguous explanation comparing her to a former state Supreme Court justice. Thus, defendant did not make the specific and timely objections necessary *61to: (1) apprise the court of the ambiguities inherent in this explanation and of his opposing arguments; and (2) give the court the opportunity to take any necessary remedial action. Thus, by failing to make an objection that the reason proffered by the prosecution was not clearly race/gender-neutral, defendant failed to preserve this argument for appellate review.
It should be emphasized, however, that after a defendant makes out a prima facie case of discrimination in the selection of jurors under Batson, the prosecution’s explanation for the peremptory challenge must be unequivocally race/gender-neutral and related to the particular case to be tried (see Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79, 98 [1986]). These requirements must be adhered to even where the prosecution gives an explanation that is not clearly race/gender-neutral among explanations that are facially race/gender-neutral.1
Here, the Appellate Division concluded that the prosecution met its step two burden of putting forth a race-neutral explanation based on its ruling that “[t]he prosecutor’s disparaging comparison of the panelist to a named individual . . . clearly referred to matters of personality and demeanor, but not race” (People v Wells, 14 AD3d 320, 321 [1st Dept 2005]).2 This Court concluded “that the record supports the trial court’s determina*62tion that the prosecutor’s justifications were race-neutral” and further ruled that: (1) the prosecutor’s reasons for exercising the peremptory challenge focused on the prospective juror’s demeanor; and (2) the “reference to a particular judge, although in cpoor taste’ . . . , was not facially race-based.” (Majority op at 58-59.) Because one of the prosecutor’s reasons for exercising a peremptory strike against this prospective juror was not unequivocally race/gender-neutral, I disagree with the above-mentioned conclusions reached by this Court and the Appellate Division.
As noted in the Court’s opinion, the prosecution cited a number of explanations in support of the peremptory challenge at issue. The explanations are set forth in the following colloquy:
“[prosecutor]: [The prospective juror] answered questions with her hand over her face, her hand over her mouth. That’s something I’m very sensitive to. In my preparation of witnesses, [ ] part of what I tell people when I prepare them to testify [is] when someone is on the stand and talks with her hand over their mouth[,] to people it signifies as a matter of body language something to hide.
“In addition she has sort of an unsettling gaze that *63I just found difficult to deal with and additionally she also reminded me, I have to say of [a named Supreme Court justice] which made me just somewhat anxious in a sort of an emotional way. So those were my concerns plus she reads she indicated affirmatively she read[s] detective stories, someone like that I think notwithstanding what she said might have expectation of what should be part of a case.
“the court: I find that to be nondiscriminatory.”
(Emphasis added.)
The prosecutor’s statement regarding how the prospective juror reminded her of a named Supreme Court justice, who is also an African-American woman, and how this made the prosecutor “anxious in a sort of [ ] emotional way,” raised issues that should have been pursued during the voir dire. Not only is this statement insulting and irrational, it is wholly ambiguous. The proffered reason, on its face, is not clearly race/gender-neutral. Nor is it clearly race/gender-based, i.e., there is no indication from the prosecutor’s explanation as to what about the prospective juror reminded the prosecutor of the named Supreme Court justice (e.g., the prosecutor did not mention that the demeanor of the prospective juror was similar to that of the named African-American woman). Nor is it clear from the explanation how the prospective juror made the prosecutor “anxious in a sort of [ ] emotional way.”3 Moreover, the prosecution’s explanation, on its face, was not related to the instant matter.
Based on the foregoing, the trial court, before accepting this explanation as race/gender-neutral (and certainly before its ruling that the explanation was nondiscriminatory), should have conducted an inquiry (or directed that defendant conduct an inquiry) to clarify the prosecution’s ambiguous explanation. *64Because no such inquiry occurred here, no further explanation of the statement at issue was provided by the prosecution. Without clarification, this statement is not clearly race/gender-neutral. Because all of the explanations for the prosecution’s strike of the prospective juror were not clearly race/gender-. neutral, the trial court should have ruled that the prosecution did not meet its step two obligation under Batson.
Chief Judge Kaye and Judges G.B. Smith, Ciparick, Rosenblatt, Read and R.S. Smith concur with Judge Graffeo; Judge G.B. Smith concurs in a separate opinion.
Order affirmed.
. In New York, service on a grand or petit jury is a civil right that cannot be arbitrarily denied (NY Const, art I, § 1; Civil Rights Law § 13 [“No citizen of the state possessing all other qualifications which are or may be required or prescribed by law, shall be disqualified to serve as a grand or petit juror in any court of this state on account of race, creed, color, national origin or sex”]).
Under the Equal Protection clauses of the federal and New York State constitutions (US Const, 14th Amend, § 1; NY Const, art I, § 11), peremptory challenges may not be used to exclude prospective jurors from jury service on the basis of race or gender (see Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79 [1986]; J. E. B. v Alabama ex rel T. B., 511 US 127 [1994]; People v Kern, 75 NY2d 638 [1990]; People v Allen, 86 NY2d 101 [1995]). A three-step process was set forth by the United States Supreme Court to address violations of this rule. First, a prima facie case of discriminatory purpose based on a pattern of peremptory challenges (e.g., all Hispanic or male jurors excluded), or other factors, must be established. Second, the prima facie case may be rebutted if the proponent of the strike(s) proffers a race/gender-neutral explanation that is related to the particular case to be tried. Third, the court must determine whether the explanation articulated is a pretext for discrimination (see Batson, 476 US at 96-98; see also J. E. B. v Alabama ex rel. T. B.).
. At “step two”: (1) the explanation proffered by the prosecution need not be persuasive or plausible (see Purkett v Elem, 514 US 765 [1995]; see also People v Allen, 86 NY2d at 109 [Court stated “step two is met by offering any facially neutral reason for the challenge — even if that reason is ill-founded — so long as the reason does not violate equal protection”]); and (2) “ ‘the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor’s explanation. Unless a discriminatory *62intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral’ ” (Purkett v Elem, 514 US at 768, quoting Hernandez v New York, 500 US 352, 360 [1991] [plurality op]; 500 US at 374 [O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment]).
I do not agree with the position that “any” facially neutral explanation, no matter how implausible or ridiculous, as long as it comports with the strictures of equal protection, can rebut a defendant’s prima facie case of race- or gender-based discrimination in jury selection. Under this formulation, there would be an inequity in terms of the burdens to be met by the opponent and proponent of the strike, i.e., the opponent of the strike has to establish a pattern of discrimination, or other discriminatory factors, while the proponent could meet its burden by putting forth rote, facially neutral explanations. Moreover, there is a potential for the trivialization of the voir dire process based on the types of explanations that can be advanced by the proponent of a strike. Specifically, since the improper use of peremptory challenges involves rights of a constitutional dimension, the proffered explanations, which essentially argue that the use of such challenges was proper, should reflect the seriousness of the rights involved. In my view, facially neutral explanations should at least be reasonable and, in accordance with Batson, related to the trial at hand (see Batson, 476 US at 98). Whether the proffered explanation is reasonable does not go to the court’s step three analysis. A “reasonable explanation” requirement would merely ensure that the explanations make sense under the circumstances.
. As noted above, “Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral” (Purkett v Elem, 514 US at 768). Moreover, this Court’s conclusion that the prosecution’s explanation was race-neutral was based, in part, on its statement that the explanation “was not facially race-based.” These principles should only apply when a race/gender-neutral (or race/gender-based) explanation has been clearly set forth. However, in the instant case, where the prosecutor has put forth an explanation: (1) that is not clearly race/gender-neutral; (2) from which no clear intent of purpose (discriminatory or nondiscriminatory) can be gleaned; and (3) which is not discriminatory on its face, applying these principles necessarily leads to an erroneous result, i.e., a court would be required to find a race/gender-neutral explanation even where one was not clearly present.