dissenting.
Based upon this record of proceedings, the conclusion is unavoidable that appellant's petit jury was chosen in contravention of the mandate of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. When as here, the prosecution peremptorily challenged the only two black persons on the venire, and a prima facie case of discrimination against the black defendant was thus shown, the burden was upon the prog-ecution to present a non-racial basis upon which the prosecutor might reasonably believe that it was desirable to challenge them. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). In justification of the peremptory challenge of prospective juror Brodie, the prosecutor responded to the court in the following manner, "... in Miss Brodie's case, I feel that she just did not exhibit to me a good understanding of what beyond a reasonable doubt was such to the point where I felt that she would not make a suitable juror, and I think that's all it needs." There is nothing in this record of the voir dire examination upon which one could reasonably question her understanding of this concept, and the prosecutor does not identify any factors to support his feelings which might not be reflected in the cold record of voir dire examination, such as hostility, grimacing or other body language. Based upon this record, I can only conclude that the prosecution failed to rebut appellant's pri-ma facie case of discrimination on account of race, by articulating a neutral reason for *985its peremptory challenge of Brodie, related to the particular case to be tried. Batson, supra. I therefore respectfully dissent and vote to reverse this judgment.
DICKSON, J., concurs.