(concurring in part and dissenting in part). While I agree with the majority’s rejection of plaintiffs arguments under the defective building exception to governmental immunity, I am unable to agree with its disposition of the intentional nuisance issue. Therefore, I dissent from that portion of the opinion.
As the majority points out, there is a conflict in the decisions of our Court over the elements of intentional nuisance. While all the cases look to Justice Moody’s opinions in Rosario v City of Lansing, 403 Mich 124; 268 NW2d 230 (1978), and Gerzeski v Dep’t of State Highways, 403 Mich 149; 268 NW2d 525 (1978), the cases differ in their interpretation of Justice Moody’s teachings.
The line of cases led by Ford v Detroit, 91 Mich App 333, 336; 283 NW2d 739 (1979), interpret Supreme Court precedent on the issue of the intent element of intentional nuisance as follows:
To establish the necessary intent, a plaintiff must show that the defendant who created or continued the nuisance knew or must have known that harm to the plaintiff was substantially certain to follow as a result of defendant’s actions. Rosario, supra at 143, fn 2 and Gerzeski, supra at 161-162.
However, a different interpretation of Justice Moody’s opinion has been reached by other panels, most notably Veeneman v Michigan, 143 Mich App 694; 373 NW2d 193 (1985), lv gtd 424 Mich 876 (1986), and Garcia v City of Jackson, 152 Mich *313App 254; 393 NW2d 599 (1986). In Garcia, supra at 259-260, Judge R. B. Burns quoted Rosario and concluded that the Veeneman panel was correct in its conclusion on the issue:
We now turn our attention to the question of what a plaintiff must show to establish an intentional nuisance. Justice Moody’s opinion in Rosario, supra, p 142, set forth the following definition:
"In order to find an intentional nuisance, the trier of fact must decide based upon the evidence presented that the governmental agency intended to bring about the conditions which are in fact found to be a nuisance. This finding comports with the definition of intentional nuisance set forth in Denny v Garavaglia, 333 Mich 317, 331; 52 NW2d 521 (1952):
" 'A second [type of nuisance] includes nuisances which are intentional, using that word as meaning not that a wrong or the existence of a nuisance was intended but that the creator of them intended to bring about the conditions which are in fact found to be a nuisance.’ ”
Justice Moody again quoted from Denny in his opinion in Gerzeski. Gerzeski, supra, pp 161-162. A plaintiff must show that (1) the condition is a nuisance and (2) the government intended to create the condition.1
As can be seen from the above quotations, the difference in the Ford standard and the Veeneman-Garcia standard is that Ford requires the plaintiff who pleads intentional nuisance to estab*314lish that the defendant intended to create a nuisance. On the other hand, Veeneman and Garcia require only that the plaintiff establish that the defendant intended to create the condition which the jury later finds to constitute a nuisance. Obviously, the Ford standard is much more difficult to meet.
I concur with my former colleague, the learned Judge R. B. Burns, that the standard set down by Justice Moody and, for that matter, in the Supreme Court’s opinion in Denny is that, to establish intentional nuisance, the plaintiff must merely show that the defendant intended to create the condition found to be a nuisance, not that the defendant intended to create a nuisance as the Ford Court would have us believe.1
I believe that Justice Moody clearly articulated *315that the standard for establishing an intentional nuisance is the "intent to create the condition” standard and not the "intent to create a nuisance” standard. Since the Veeneman-Garcia standard, and not the Ford standard, correctly applies Supreme Court precedent,21 cannot join the majority inasmuch as it incorrectly applies the Ford rationale.3 Turning to the facts of the case at bar, plaintiff alleged that defendants intended to create the condition, namely the speed bump.4 The question of whether the speed bump is, in fact, a nuisance must be determined by the trier of fact. Veeneman, supra at 699. Accordingly, I believe that plaintiff is entitled to proceed to trial on his intentional nuisance claim.5
*316For the above reasons, I would reverse and remand the case for trial on the intentional nuisance claim.6
We note that a conflict exists in this Court over this issue. Compare Ford v Detroit, 91 Mich App 333; 283 NW2d (1979), with Veeneman, supra. We believe that Veeneman more accurately interprets Rosario and Gerzeski and that Justice Moody’s opinions in those two cases remain the best statement from the Supreme Court on the issue.
In fairness to the Ford Court and its progeny, their erroneous standard was not cut out of whole cloth. Rather, it arises from Ford’s misplaced reliance on a footnote in Justice Moody’s opinion in Rosario which discussed Professor Prosser’s thoughts on the subject. The nature of the Ford Court’s mistake was succinctly discussed in Judge Jasper’s well-written concurring opinion in Carney v Dep’t of Transportation, 145 Mich App 690, 704; 378 NW2d 574 (1985):
Further research evidences how Ford arrived at its standard. In Rosario, the Supreme Court provided a footnote which served as an observation of what Professor Prosser said regarding nuisances. See Rosario, supra, p 143, fn 2. Seizing this language, the Court in Ford held that that was what a plaintiff had to prove in his or her intentional nuisance case against the government. However, the Court in Ford went a step further and also cited Gerzeski as stating the same proposition. However, nowhere in the Gerzeski opinion does this or similar language appear, much less at the pages cited in Ford. In fact, at the page numbers cited in Ford v Detroit with reference to Gerzeski, the Supreme Court’s concurring justices [Moody and Williams] restated the proof requirement they articulated earlier in Rosario, as follows:
" 'A second [type of nuisance] includes nuisances which are intentional, using that word as meaning not that a wrong or the existence of a nuisance was intended but that the creator of them intended to bring about the conditions which are in fact found to be a nuisance.’ ” Gerzeski, supra, pp 161-162. See, also, Rosario, supra, p 142. (Quoting from Denny v Garavaglia, 333 Mich 317, 331; 52 NW2d 521 [1952].)
*315Judge Jasper then went on and pointed out that the above standard was applied by the Gerzeski Court, not the standard articulated in Ford.
This Court is bound by the doctrine of stare decisis. Recently, the Supreme Court tersely reminded us that it is inexcusable for this Court to fail to apply Supreme Court precedent. See People v Mitchell, 428 Mich 364, 369-370; 408 NW2d 798 (1987). Although Justice Moody was writing for a plurality in Rosario and Gerzeski, and thus his opinion in not binding under the stare decisis doctrine, the Denny opinion upon which Justice Moody relied is binding under the doctrine because it is the last decision of the Supreme Court which defined the standard to be applied in intentional nuisance cases. It is not appropriate for this Court to speculate on whether the Supreme Court will change the applicable standard when it hands down a decision in Veeneman. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra. It is manifest error for this Court to follow the Ford decision since Ford misinterprets Supreme Court precedent. Since we must apply the law as it exists and not as we believe it should be or how the Supreme Court might someday reinterpret the law, it is not an option for this Court to continue to follow Ford until and unless the Supreme Court overrules Denny.
I acknowledge that it is inaccurate to refer to a "VeenemanGarcia” standard as it is actually a "Rosario-Gerzeski” standard. However, I use the "Veeneman-Garcia” nomenclature to identify the line of cases which do not share the Ford Court’s reading of Rosario and Gerzeski.
Indeed, since I am not aware of any mechanism by which a speed bump can arise without human assistance and design, clearly someone at sometime had to intend to create the speed bump.
It has been brought to my attention that the position I take in the *316case at bar, in preferring the Veeneman-Garcia standard over the Ford standard, appears to be inconsistent with my position in the per curiam opinion in Eyde Brothers Development Co v Roscommon Co Bd of Rd Comm’is, 161 Mich App 654; 411 NW2d 814 (1987). The appearance is correct as Eyde Brothers does follow the Ford standard. I can only explain this by saying that I should not have signed the Eyde Brothers opinion so long as it employed the Ford standard. In my authored opinion in Li v Wong, 162 Mich App 767, 773; 413 NW2d 493 (1987), I indicated that the Veeneman-Garcia standard was correct. This is the position I hold now and have always held. To the extent that I permitted my name to be associated with the Ford standard in the Eyde Brothers case, I clearly erred.
I do, however, agree with the majority that the individual defendants are immune as their actions in deciding to place speed bumps and the configuration the bumps would take is discretionary/decisional. Thus, I would remand only the issue of the school district’s liability under the intentional nuisance theory.