concurring.
I concur. I write separately only to note what I believe is a fundamental shift in Indiana’s constitutional jurisprudence.
In the landmark case of Price v. State, 622 N.E.2d 954 (1993), our Supreme Court held that Article I, Section 9 provides protections to Indiana citizens of the rights of freedom of expression independent of its federal counterpart and that the State may not materially burden political expression, which is a core value under Indiana’s Bill of Rights. Price had been convicted of disorderly conduct for “screaming” profanities at police officers while objecting first to a colleague’s arrest and then to her own. After several verbal exchanges, police directed Price to desist and threatened her with arrest for disorderly conduct, to which she responded “F— you. I haven’t done anything.” The Court reversed the conviction holding that Price’s loud and profanity-laced complaints about police officers conducting an arrest of a third party and then of Price herself was political expression which the State could not materially burden.
In J.D. v. State, 859 N.E.2d 341 (Ind. 2007), our Supreme Court held that speech, albeit political, was not entitled to constitutional protection under Article I, Section 9 of the Indiana Constitution where the speech “consisted of persistent loud yelling over and obscuring of [the arresting officer’s] attempts to speak and function as a law officer.” Id. at 344. The Court concluded that the speech “clearly amounted to an abuse of the right to free speech” and thus subject to accountability under Article I, Section 9.
I believe J.D. tacitly overrules Price. In Price, Justice Dickson dissented “strenuously disagreeing” with the majority5 and arguing that Price’s speech was not protected by Article I, Section 9 because it constituted an abuse of the right of freedom of expression6 — the same rationale *589utilized by the Court in J.D. where Justice Dickson was writing for a unanimous Court. There is no discussion in J.D. of core values or material burdens, only the conclusion that J.D. had abused the right of free expression. Finally, although the Court in J.D. distinguishes Price on the grounds that the harm in Price “did not rise ‘above the level of a fleeting annoyance,’” J.D. 859 N.E.2d at 344, in his dissent in Price, Justice Dickson made no mention of a “fleeting annoyance” but rather observed that “the majority posits that unreasonable noise which would otherwise constitute disorderly conduct must be shielded from criminal penalty if it is an expression of ‘concern about the role of police’ ” and concluded that the “message sent by today’s opinion is that persons confronted with imminent arrest may now react with unlimited noise and vulgarity — so long as such profanities include a protest about police conduct.” Price, 622 N.E.2d at 969 (Emphasis added.).
Without regard to whether J.D. is the death knell of Price and Indiana’s independent constitutional jurisprudence, Black-man’s speech here falls within that determined to be abusive by the Court in J.D. Accordingly, I concur in the majority’s decision.
. "The essence of the majority opinion is that a person facing arrest who protests by screaming vulgar profanities into the face of an arresting officer does not violate Indiana's disorderly conduct statute prohibiting unreasonable noise. I strenuously disagree.” Price, 622 N.E.2d at 967 (Dickson, J., dissenting).
. "Our constitution-makers did not intend protection for rude or vile language, but in*589stead assumed that citizens would remain civilly and criminally responsible for abuse of the right.’ Id. at 968.