The defendant, a foreign citizen, pleaded guilty of a drug offense. After sentencing, he persuaded the circuit court to permit him to withdraw the plea on the ground that he had not understood that his plea would place him in jeopardy of deportation. The Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds that immigration consequences are collateral matters, and that failure to appreciate those consequences does not render a plea unknowing or involuntary. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
i
In 1997, the defendant was charged with possession of marijuana with intent to deliver.1 He pleaded guilty *448in circuit court to a reduced charge of attempted possession with intent to deliver.2
At sentencing, the court was presented with a presentence report that described the defendant as “an Israeli citizen in the United States on a Non-Immigrant Visa.” In light of that status, the court and the assistant prosecutor had this exchange:
The Court: Mr. Prosecutor, do you have anything to say in regard to sentencing?
[Assistant Prosecutor]: Your Honor, the Defendant has one prior, I believe, it was in 1991, this case involved the Drug Enforcement Agency in regard to narcotic sales. I don’t know exactly what the status of the Defendant is or whether or not he should be in the country. The Court might want to address it.
The Court: I don’t want to address it.
[Assistant Prosecutor]: He is in the country illegally committing crimes.
The Court: Mr. Davidovich, do you want to say anything in your behalf? You don’t have to.
The Defendant: I feel really bad about what I did, but I don’t think I’m illegally in this country . . .
The Court: I don’t want to get into that. It is not within my Jurisdiction. There may be an immigration question, but somebody will address that question at some point, but I won’t.
The court then imposed a one-year term of probation, with various conditions.
Two months after sentencing, the defendant filed a “motion for new trial,” in which he reported that he had been “placed under arrest immediately after sentencing, by the U.S. of Immigration and Naturalization Service.” He alleged that his “absence of knowledge *449as to the immigration consequences of his plea left his plea unimowing and involuntary.” Further, he alleged that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel, when his attorney failed to explain “the immigration consequences of a guilty plea.”
After hearing argument on the defendant’s motion, the circuit court ruled:
I think that equity will dictate that I allow this gentleman to withdraw his plea.
Asked whether it was finding ineffective assistance of counsel, the court added:
I won’t make a finding that he is ineffective. I won’t get into that point.
On those bases, the court granted the defendant’s motion, and set aside the plea.
The Court of Appeals granted the prosecuting attorney’s application for leave to appeal3 and reversed the circuit court order. 238 Mich App 422; 606 NW2d 387 (1999).4
The defendant has applied to this Court for leave to appeal.
ii
In reversing the order of the circuit court, the Court of Appeals distinguished between the “direct” and “collateral” consequences of a plea-based conviction, characterizing immigration consequences as col*450lateral. 238 Mich App 427-431. It said that “[a] defendant’s ignorance of the collateral consequences of a plea does not render the plea involuntary” and that “[c]ounsel’s failure to properly advise of collateral consequences of a plea does not bear on whether a defendant properly understood the decision to plead guilty to the charges in question.” 238 Mich App 428.
Thus, continued the Court of Appeals, “We have found no authority that holds collateral consequences should be considered in allowing a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea after having been sentenced.” 238 Mich App 430. The Court further explained:
We realize deportation is a much more severe sanction than the defendant anticipated receiving, and defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea carries a certain intuitive appeal. One might argue that defendant should only face such a severe sanction after the prosecution has been forced to prove all the elements of the offense. This argument is likely what the trial court had in mind when it claimed that “equity” required that defendant be allowed to withdraw his plea. We disagree. We find it noteworthy that defendant has not asserted his innocence. The immigration consequences of the charged offense are irrelevant to defendant’s guilt. Here, defendant simply hopes that by withdrawing his plea he might somehow escape conviction of a crime to which he has already confessed. However, defendant cannot withdraw his plea simply because he would now rather risk the uncertainties of a trial, hopeful that he can stall or eventually avoid deportation.
To the extent that the trial court might be trying to save defendant from deportation, its efforts are misguided. The Congress, through its legislation, decides which crimes merit deportation. As we discussed above, deportation is a collateral consequence of defendant’s conviction. It is the fulfillment of a federal immigration policy, and it is unrelated to the trial court’s inquiry. The trial court’s only concern is whether defendant committed the charged crime *451and whether the plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. Trial courts should not attempt to aid defendants in circumventing the deportation process because they believe deportation is too harsh a consequence for the crime committed. Those sorts of considerations belong to the Immigration and Naturalization Service, its administrative courts, and the federal court system. [238 Mich App 430-431.]
The Court of Appeals also discussed prior appellate decisions, including People v Kadadu, 169 Mich App 278; 425 NW2d 784 (1988) and People v Osaghae (On Reconsideration), 460 Mich 529; 596 NW2d 911 (1999). Each involved deportation as a consequence of a guilty plea. In Kadadu, the Court of Appeals allowed the circuit court to follow the path that appeared “more equitable” to it:
As indicated earlier, a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Applying this standard, we feel that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. The court listened to both parties’ arguments and decided that it would be more equitable to allow defendant to go to trial before suffering the extreme consequences of deportation. Having presided at defendant’s guilty plea hearing, the trial judge was in a better position to know the circumstances of the crime to which defendant pled guilty than we are. We are hard pressed to find an abuse of discretion where a trial court has opted to grant to a criminal defendant an opportunity to proceed to trial and there is no showing that the prosecution is prejudiced by defendant’s decision to proceed to trial. The court recognized and exercised its discretion in deciding whether defendant should be able to withdraw his guilty plea, and we find no abuse of discretion. [169 Mich App 285.]
In Osaghae, the defendant pleaded guilty in 1992, four years before Congress amended the immigration laws to provide that he was subject to deportation. *452Distinguishing Kadadu on the ground that “the federal law placing Mr. Kadadu at risk of deportation was already on the books at the time of his plea,” this Court explained that “defense counsel had no duty in 1992 to predict the future when he rendered legal advice regarding defendant’s plea.” 460 Mich 533.
In Osaghae, this Court also emphasized that “[o]ur system of criminal justice has a substantial interest in finality . . . .” 460 Mich 534. We noted such statements in People v Ward, 459 Mich 602, 611-612; 594 NW2d 47 (1999), and People v Carpentier, 446 Mich 19, 29, 35-37; 521 NW2d 195 (1994), and we quoted the following passage from McMann v Richardson, 397 US 759, 773-774; 90 S Ct 1441; 25 L Ed 2d 763 (1970):
“What is at stake in this phase of the case is not the integrity of the state convictions obtained on guilty pleas, but whether, years later, defendants must be permitted to withdraw their pleas, which were perfectly valid when made, and be given another choice between admitting then-guilt and putting the State to its proof. . . . It is no denigration of the right to trial to hold that when the defendant waives his state court remedies and admits his guilt, he does so under the law then existing .... Although he might have pleaded differently had later decided cases then been the law, he is bound by his plea and his conviction unless he can allege and prove serious derelictions on the part of counsel sufficient to show that his plea was not, after all, a knowing and intelligent act.” [460 Mich 534.]
In the present case, the Court of Appeals noted that Osaghae is distinguishable from both Kadadu and this case. Nevertheless, the Court properly “conclude [d] that Osaghae informs our decision here, insofar as it holds that the trial court’s discretion must be tempered by a proper respect for the finality *453of the plea process.” 238 Mich App 427. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reached this conclusion:
Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In doing so, we hold that People v Kadadu, supra, was wrongly decided and therefore should not be followed[5] and that a defendant cannot withdraw his guilty plea after sentencing merely because his trial counsel faded to properly inform him of the immigration consequences of his plea. [238 Mich App 431-432.]
The Court of Appeals correctly decided this case. As it well explained, immigration consequences of a plea are collateral matters that do not bear on whether the defendant’s plea was knowing and voluntary.6 For the same reason, a failure by counsel to give immigration advice does not render the lawyer’s representation constitutionally ineffective.7
Other jurisdictions have repeatedly come to that conclusion,8 as evidenced by the recent decision in *454United States v Gonzalez, 202 F3d 20 (CA 1, 2000). In Gonzalez, the First Circuit rejected a claim of ineffective assistance, emphasizing the collateral nature of immigration proceedings. Quoting George,9 the court offered a reminder that “ ‘[a] deportation proceeding is a civil proceeding which may result from a criminal prosecution, but is not a part of or enmeshed in the criminal proceeding.’ ” 202 F3d 25.
Here, the record reflects that the defendant was ably represented, understood his rights, freely chose to plead guilty, and, by his own account, had committed the elements of the offense of which he was pleading guilty.
For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. MCR 7.302(F)(1).
Weaver, C.J., and Taylor, Corrigan, Young, and Markman, JJ., concurred.MCL 333.7401(2)(d)(iii); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(d)(üi).
MCL 750.92; MSA 28.287.
Unpublished order, entered June 11, 1998 (Docket No. 211144).
Opinion amended by unpublished order, entered February 3, 2000 (Docket No. 211144). The published opinion reflects the modification ordered by the Court of Appeals.
In Osaghae, this Court said, “To the extent that it conflicts with today’s decision, Kadadu is overruled.” 460 Mich 533.
Osaghae arguably left open the possibility that defense counsel may have a duty to advise his client of Immigration laws in effect at the time of the plea. We hold today that defense counsel’s failure to advise his client of even existing deportation laws does not render a plea unknowing or involuntary.
The phrase “ineffective assistance of counsel” does not refer merely to lawyering that is not optimal. Rather it refers to representation that has sunk to a level at which it is a problem of constitutional dimension. Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 687; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984), People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298; 521 NW2d 797 (1994). Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly found no ineffective assistance of counsel. 238 Mich App 428.
In the present case, the Court of Appeals noted:
Other courts declining to find ineffective assistance of counsel where a defendant was not informed of the immigration consequences of a guilty plea include Cordero v United States, 533 F2d 723 (CA 1, 1976), United States v Santelises, 509 F2d 703 (CA 2, *4541975), United States v Yearwood, 863 F2d 6 (CA 4, 1988), United States v Gavilan, 761 F2d 226 (CA 5, 1985), United States v Nagaro-Garbin, 653 F Supp 586 (ED Mich, 1987), aff’d 831 F2d 296 (CA 6, 1987), United States v George, 869 F2d 333 (CA 7, 1989), Torrey v Estelle, 842 F2d 234 (CA 9, 1988), Varela v Kaiser, 976 F2d 1357 (CA 10, 1992), United States v Campbell, 778 F2d 764 (CA 11, 1985), Government of the Virgin Islands v Pamphile, 604 F Supp 753 (DC VI, 1985), Tafoya v State, 500 P2d 247 (Alas, 1972), State v Chung, 210 NJ Super 427; 510 A2d 72 (1986), and State v Malik, 37 Wash App 414; 680 P2d 770 (1984). But see Williams v State, 641 NE2d 44 (Ind App, 1995), and People v Pozo, 746 P2d 523 (Colo, 1987). [238 Mich 428, n 5.]
See footnote 8.