(concurring). I concur in my colleagues’ disposition of this case. However, I would hold that knowledge is an essential element of delivery, MCL 335.341(1)(a); MSA 18.1070(41)(1)(a).
I find several reasons for holding that knowledge is an element of delivery.
First, this Court has, in the context of addressing a different issue,1 approved instructions requiring that the defendant know the character of the *20substance delivered. The clearest expression of this is found in People v Dyson, 56 Mich App 59, 63-64; 223 NW2d 364 (1974):
"In Jones, supra, the approved instruction stated that in order to be guilty the defendant had to have knowledge that he was dealing with heroin and the intent to deal therewith. In the present case the trial court instructed the jury that the defendant had been charged with knowingly delivering a controlled substance. It said:
" '[I]n order to convict the defendant of this crime, the prosecutor must have proven beyond a reasonable doubt each and all of the following elements:
" T. That the crime occurred on or about the 12th day of December, 1972, in Benton Township, Berrien County, Michigan.
" '2. That this defendant intended to and did deliver a substance which, in fact, was heroin.
" '3. That at the time and place the defendant knew the substance was, in fact, heroin. ’
"Thus, it is readily apparent that the proper instructions were given.” (Emphasis added.)
Accord, People v Gaffney, 51 Mich App 526; 215 NW2d 587 (1974), People v Jones, 38 Mich App 512; 196 NW2d 817 (1972).
Second, CJI 12:2:03 includes an instruction that knowledge of the substance delivered is essential for conviction.2 The commentary indicates that this requirement was included "after much debate”. While the committee’s standard instructions do not establish precedent, we give some weight to their interpretation of the elements of criminal offenses. See, generally, People v Till, 80 Mich App 16; 263 NW2d 586 (1977).
Third, delivery of heroin is a most serious crime carrying a correspondingly significant maximum *21penalty, 20 years’ imprisonment and a $25,000 fine. It is true, as noted by the majority, that the statutory definition of "delivery” contains no knowledge requirement. See MCL 335.304(1); MSA 18.1070(4)(1). However, to interpret the crime of delivery as one of, strict liability would be contrary to the accepted view that strict liability should not apply to serious crimes. See LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law (1972), at 218-223.3
Finally, I believe that People v Martin, 398 Mich 303; 247 NW2d 303 (1976), mandates the result I would reach on this issue. In Martin, the defendant was convicted of delivery and possession of heroin. The Court reversed the delivery conviction on the basis of double jeopardy. In doing so, the Court found that, in convicting defendant of delivery of heroin, "they necessarily found him in possession of it”. People v Martin, supra, at 307. To convict the defendant of possession, the jury would had to have found that the defendant knew the substance he possessed was heroin. MCL 335.341(4)(a); MSA 18.1070(41)(4)(a). Implying such a finding from a delivery conviction means that to convict of delivery, a jury has to find that the defendant knew that the delivered substance was heroin. Otherwise, the jury would not necessarily find possession in convicting for delivery. Therefore, Martin holds that knowledge is an essential element of delivery.
For these reasons, I believe the instruction given in the case at bar was erroneous, but concur in the majority’s disposition. I find no manifest injustice *22requiring reversal;4 defendant did not object to the instruction given and did not raise any issue concerning his knowledge of the nature of the substance allegedly delivered.
I.e., the "usable remnant” issue. See People v Harrington, 396 Mich 33; 238 NW2d 20 (1976).
These instructions were not available at the time the instant case was tried.
There is some debate as to the effect of reading a knowledge requirement into a statutory crime. It is unclear whether knowledge becomes an element of the offense or whether it is a defense. The burden of proof in either case is likewise uncertain. As CJI 12:2:03 and People v Martin, 398 Mich 303; 247 NW2d 303 (1976), indicate that knowledge is an essential element of the offense of delivery of a controlled substance, I would so hold. See the discussion of Martin, infra.
It is true that a trial court is obligated to instruct on all essential elements of a crime, even absent a request or objection. People v Townes, 391 Mich 578; 218 NW2d 136 (1974). However, in the absence of any issue at all concerning defendant’s knowledge of the substance allegedly delivered, I would not require reversal.