concurring in •part and dissenting in part:
Two issues are presented by this original action: 1) whether a placement decision of the Department of Human Services (DHS) made pursuant to 10 O.S.Supp.1996 § 7003-7.1(B)(1)1 is subject to judicial review; 2) whether, once a child is removed from DHS custody, the agency remains liable for the child’s medical and living expenses. Although I agree with the majority that DHS must follow federal requirements in continuing to provide support to the minor child,2 under the facts presented, I would find that the decision by DHS on placement is not subject to judicial review.
FACTS
In August of 1995, DHS placed J.U., a deprived child in a foster home. In Deeem-ber of the following year, DHS placed J.U. and his newborn brother in a adoptive-foster home some one-hundred miles from the mother’s location. In a dispositional hearing held on April 16, 1997, the district court ordered that J.U. be removed from the adoptive-foster home to a foster home located either in McClain or Cleveland County. After DHS filed an original proceeding questioning the court’s authority to review it’s placement decision, the trial court removed J.U. from DHS custody and placed the child with custodians it designated. Once DHS custody was revoked, the agency: canceled J.U.’s medical card, terminated payments for foster care; and refused to issue clothing vouchers. On May 29, 1997, the district court ordered DHS to provide foster care payments and clothing vouchers for the child.
UNDER THE FACTS PRESENTED, THE PLACEMENT DECISION MADE BY THE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES IS NOT SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER 70 O.S.Supp.1996
§ 7003-7.1(B)(l).
It is presumed that the Legislature has expressed its intent in a statute and that it intended what it so expressed.3 The determination of legislative intent controls judicial statutory interpretation;4 however, it is unnecessary to apply rules of construction to discern legislative intent if the will is clearly expressed.5
*831The statutory language leaves no doubt that the Legislature intended that unless DHS determines that a child should be returned to a parent who contributed to the child’s deprived status because of abuse or neglect, its placement decision is not subject to court approval. Section 7003 — 7.1(B)(1) provides in clear and mandatory language that, when a child is placed in its custody, “the Department shall determine the appropriate placement of the child.” The use of “shall” by the Legislature is normally considered as a legislative mandate equivalent to the term “must”, requiring interpretation as a command.6 Here, DHS did not order J.U. returned to his mother and the exception requiring court approval in § 7003-7.1(B)(l) is inapplicable. Therefore, under the facts presented, the placement decision made by DHS is not subject to judicial review under 70 O.S.Supp.1996 § 7003 — 7.1(B)(1).7
. Tide 10 O.S.Supp.1996 § 7003-7.1(B)(l) provides:
"If the child is placed in the custody of the Department of Human Services, whether in emergency, temporary or permanent custody, the Department shall determine the appropriate placement of the child. However, under no circumstances may the Department of Human Services return a child to a parent that contributed to the child being deprived due to abuse or neglect, without prior approval of the court. Any change in the placement of a child adjudicated to be deprived shall be in accord with the provisions of subsection F of Section 7003-5.6 of this tide.”
. In his dissent, Justice Simms’ relies on two unpublished orders of this Court for the proposition that the trial court was without authority to require DHS to provide the minor child with a medical card, foster-care expenses, and a cloth-xng voucher. I dissented to the orders in No. 74,516, State of Oklahoma, ex rel., Dept. of Human Serv. v. Wilson and in No. 79.497, State of Oklahoma ex rel. Dept. of Human Serv. v. Hall. Unpublished orders and opinions have no prece-dential value. Rule 1.200(5), 12 O.S.Supp.1997, Ch. 15, App. 2.
. Fuller v. Odom, 1987 OK 64, 741 P.2d 449, 453; Darnell v. Chrysler Corp., 1984 OK 57, 687 P.2d 132, 134; Independent School Dist. No. 89 v. Oklahoma Fed'n of Teachers, 1980 OK 89, 612 P.2d 719, 723.
. Copeland v. Stone, 1992 OK 154, 842 P.2d 754, 756; Fuller v. Odom, see note 3, supra; Matter of Phillips Petroleum Co., 1982 OK 112, 652 P.2d 283, 285.
. Copeland v. Stone, see note 4, supra; Fuller v. Odom, see note 3, supra.
. State ex rel. Macy v. Freeman, 1991 OK 59, 814 P.2d 147, 153; Forest Oil Corp. v. Corporation Comm'n, 1990 OK 58, 807 P.2d 774, 787.
. This finding comports with State of Oklahoma, ex rel., Dept. of Inst., Social & Rehabilitative Serv. v. LeVally, 1977 OK 54, 562 P.2d 519, in which we held that where a juvenile judge placed a child in need of supervision in the custody of DHS, the judge did not have the authority to then order DHS to transport the minor to a specific facility, detain him there, and then return him on a date certain.