dissenting: I disagree with the majority because I am of the opinion that K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 8-1001 mandates the giving of oral and written notice as therein provided. The statute expressly states as follows:
“At the time a test or tests are requested under this section, the person shall be given oral and written notice that: (A) There is no right to consult with an attorney regarding whether to submit to testing; (B) refusal to submit to testing will result in six months’ suspension of the person’s driver’s license; (C) refusal to submit to testing may be used against the person at any trial on a charge involving driving while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or both; (D) the results of the testing may be used against the person at any trial on a charge involving driving while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or both; and (E) *253after the completion of the testing, the person has the right to consult with an attorney and may secure additional testing, which, if desired, should be done as soon as possible and is customarily available from hospitals, medical laboratories and physicians. After giving the foregoing information a law enforcement officer shall again request the person to submit to the test or tests. The selection of the test or tests shall be made by the officer. If the person refuses to take and complete a test as requested, additional testing shall not be given and the person’s driver’s license shall be subject to suspension as provided in K.S.A. 8-1002 and amendments thereto. The person’s refusal shall be admissible in evidence against the person at any trial arising out of the alleged operation or attempted operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or both.” K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 8-1001(f)(l). (Emphasis added.)
The majority has concluded that the provisions of the foregoing statute are directory only. I do not agree. First, I call attention to the fact that the statute is replete with “shalls.” For example, it begins by stating that “the person shall be given oral and written notice”. Then, after stating the various information that the officer must give the person involved, it is directed that the officer “shall again request the person to submit to the tests or tests”. The statute states that the tests shall be made by the officer. Furthermore, if a person refuses to take and complete a test as requested, additional testing “shall not be given and the person’s driver’s license shall be subject to suspension.” Further, the statute provides that the person’s refusal shall be admissible in evidence against the person. All these mandatory “shalls” are specific.
Next, the majority apparently concludes that Paul v. City of Manhattan, 212 Kan. 381, 511 P.2d 244 (1973), is authority to the effect that the word “shall” does not in fact mean shall. K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 8-1001 is a criminal statute, and the law is most clear that such a statute must be liberally construed in favor of an accused and strictly construed against the State. State v. Zimmerman & Schmidt, 233 Kan. 151, 155, 660 P.2d 960 (1983); State ex rel. Stephan v. Pepsi-Cola Geni Bottlers, Inc., 232 Kan. 843, 846, 659 P.2d 213 (1983). The majority then applies the following rule from Paul, which is summarized in Syl. ¶ 2 of the court’s opinion: *254The majority contends that because K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 8-1001 does not contain a penalty for noncompliance, the word “shall” is merely directory and not mandatory. True, there is no express penalty outlined in 8-1001 for the failure of the law enforcement officer to give the information; however, I fail to see how the absence of this factor alters an otherwise unambiguous statute. The majority’s disregard of the express language and intent of the legislative act renders it virtually nugatory.
*253“Factors which would indicate that a statute or ordinance is mandatory are: (1) the presence of negative words requiring that an act shall be done in no other manner or at no other time than that designated, or (2) a provision for a penalty or other consequence of noncompliance.”
*254In addition to this problem that I find with the majority’s position, I take special note of the valuable rights that are outlined under subdivisions A, B, C, D, and E of K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 8-1001, as hereinabove set out. With these rights in mind, I refer the reader to Syl. ¶ 1 of Paul, which states:
“In determining whether a legislative provision is mandatory or directory, it is a general rule that where strict compliance with the provision is essential to the preservation of the rights of parties affected and to the validity of the proceeding, the provision is mandatory, but where the provision fixes a mode of proceeding and a time within which an official act is to be done, and is intended to secure order, system and dispatch of the public business, the provision is directory.”
Certainly compliance with the statute is important in preserving the rights outlined in K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 8-1001(f).
But there is yet another reason why I differ, specifically, with the majority. In a careful study of K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 8-1001,1 can reach no conclusion but that that statute is ultimately clear and not ambiguous. The statute thus means what it says and must be interpreted according to the Legislature’s language. The majority has undertaken to define and explain what they feel the Legislature means by this statute but, again the law is most clear that we do not have the prerogative of looking behind the legislative scenes to interpret what the Legislature meant in enacting a statute which is itself clear and unambiguous on its face. “Where a statute is plain and unambiguous, this court must give effect to the intention of the legislature as expressed rather than determine what the law should or should not be.” State v. Sleeth, 8 Kan. App. 2d 652, 655, 664 P.2d 883 (1983) (quoting Arduser v. Daniel International Corp., 7 Kan. App. 2d 225, Syl. ¶ 1, 640 P.2d 329, rev. denied 231 Kan. 799 [1982]). We are not called upon to address the wisdom, or lack thereof, of enacting the statute before us.
I would affirm the learned trial judge.