(dissenting).
Conceding that a trial court may not act arbitrarily and without limitations in the matter of granting or denying injunctions,11 *253it is nevertheless well settled that the allowance or disallowance of injunctive relief rests largely within judicial discretion.12 “If upon the facts the trial court could reasonably have found either way, * * * [this court is] not at liberty to interfere.”13 When this case came before the trial court it was first called upon to determine whether or not, from a procedural standpoint, an injunction was the appropriate remedy. It decided this issue in the negative and denied the injunction. In my opinion, its decision should be sustained.
Two requirements must be satisfied in order to justify the issuance of an injunction: (1) The injury threatened must be real, substantial, and irreparable14 and (2) the remedy at law must be inadequate.15 It appears to me that on neither ground has the state made out its case.
There has been no showing of any injury, past, present, or future; real, substantial, or irreparable. The majority opinion admits that the state failed to present a single instance in which the use of any item enumerated in the complaint, purchased in a grocery store or supermarket, injured the safety, health, comfort, or welfare of anyone. The state’s only attempt to prove the dangerous qualities of this merchandise was its reference to the precautionary instructions on some of the labels. These are no different from the directions which accompany numerous other products which are sold every day and which no one would seriously contend are injurious to health and safety.
Nor has there been any showing that the state’s legal remedy is inadequate. The statute itself sets forth a simple and direct method for handling violations. They are made misdemeanors by M. S. A. 151.29, and § 151.30 imposes a duty upon county attorneys to prosecute offenders. I agree with the trial court that a single criminal prosecution, with the right of appeal to this court for final determination, would adequately dispose of the matter. This was the manner in which the state always proceeded in this type of case,16 and it would have afforded *254defendants an opportunity to have a trial by jury.17 Surely, the adequacy of the legal remedy is not to be tested by the state’s inability, real or imagined, to prevail in a criminal prosecution.18
An injunction will not issue to enjoin purely criminal acts.19 It is only where criminal prosecutions have been wholly ineffective, and where repeated convictions have failed to deter violaters, that equity will interpose its jurisdiction.20 Upon this principle the injunction proceedings herein were premature. There has never been a criminal prosecution. Nor is there any showing at all that defendants would persist in violating the statute if they were convicted and the state’s assertion to that effect is mere speculation. Moreover, defendants’ decision to continue marketing these items does not indicate any disregard of the law. Until it is definitely determined by the courts that these sales violate the statute, they are within their rights to sell them. Their further decision to provide legal assistance to any of their outlets *255which might be prosecuted is consonant with the theory that a party is entitled to present the best possible case to the court and to advance the soundest arguments available in its support.
The cases cited in the majority opinion are inapplicable. They fall into two categories which are clearly distinguishable from the instant case: (1) Instances where the statutes specifically provided for injunctive relief in lieu of a criminal prosecution21 and (2) cases upholding injunctions because no specific statutory prohibition was applicable other than the public nuisance provisions of §§ 616.01 and 616.02 and prior statutes or provisions similar to § 613.78.22 In the instant case, however, there are both a declared criminal violation and a declared method of enforcement which should be exhausted before attempting to proceed by injunction.
Nor do I agree with the state’s contention that only by securing injunctive relief can a multiplicity of actions be avoided. Only parties to the action may be bound by an injunction.23 There are other wholesalers and supermarkets besides the defendants. It seems equally clear that it might be necessary to institute proceedings against each and every one of them in order to reach the result desired by the state. Since in my opinion there was no showing of a real, substantial, and irreparable injury or that an adequate legal remedy was unavailable, and since there was no danger of a multiplicity of actions if an injunction did not issue, I think the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying the injunction.
What has been said heretofore applies solely to the procedural aspects of the case. There are other considerations which justify comment upon *256the merits. If it is true that it is inherently dangerous for the public to be able to purchase drugs in a self-service fashion, then it is apparent that curing the alleged evil which now occurs in supermarkets and grocery stores solves only part of the problem. We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that almost any item which does not require a prescription may be purchased in the same manner in a drug store without any restriction at all upon its quantity. Moreover, it is a matter of common knowledge that in many instances it is not a pharmacist who dispenses the merchandise but rather an inexperienced employee or the customer himself in a self-service manner. If this be the case then what we said in State v. Zotalis, 172 Minn. 132, 133, 214 N. W. 766, applies here with equal vigor:
“The statute should be sustained if enacted with reasonable reference to public health or welfare. If intended merely to give a monopoly to pharmacists or druggists by restricting sales to them it is not sustainable. It is only sustainable as a police measure.”24
Since the decisions in the Zotalis case and in State v. F. W. Woolworth Co. 184 Minn. 51, 237 N. W. 817, 76 A. L. R. 1202, much new light has been shed upon drugs by medical science. Many of them are in common use in nearly every household without consulting a physician or pharmacist before using them. The underlying policy which motivated the conclusions reached in the cited case, therefore, might well be reexamined. A criminal prosecution appears to me to be the proper place to do so. Accordingly I dissent.
Mr. Justice Thomas Gallagher took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.Currie v. Silvernale, 142 Minn. 254, 171 N. W. 782.
9 Dunnell, Dig. (3 ed.) § 4490, and notes 7 and 8 thereto.
Standard Oil Co. v. Bertelsen, 186 Minn. 483, 487, 243 N. W. 701, 703.
9 Dunnell, Dig. (3 ed.) § 4470, and cases cited under note 23.
9 Dunnell, Dig. (3 ed.) § 4472.
State v. S. S. Kresge Co. 184 Minn. 59, 237 N. W. 820; State v. F. W. Woolworth Co. 184 Minn. 51, 237 N. W. 817, 76 A. L. R. 1202; State v. *254Zotalis, 172 Minn. 132, 214 N. W. 766; State v. Hovorka, 100 Minn. 249, 110 N. W. 870, 8 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1272; State v. Donaldson, 41 Minn. 74, 42 N. W. 781.
See, Bankers Reserve Life Co. v. Omberson, 123 Minn. 285, 143 N. W. 735, 48 L.R.A. (N.S.) 265; Higgins v. Lacroix, 119 Minn. 145, 137 N. W. 417, 41 L.R.A. (N.S.) 737.
See, Higgins v. Lacroix, 119 Minn. 145, 137 N. W. 417, 41 L.R.A. (N.S.) 737.
Miller v. Minneapolis Underwriters Assn. Inc. 226 Minn. 367, 33 N. W. (2d) 48; Higgins v. Lacroix, 119 Minn. 145, 137 N. W. 417, 41 L.R.A. (N.S.) 737.
In State v. Sportsmen’s Country Club, 214 Minn. 151, 157, 7 N. W. (2d) 495, 498, we said: “* * * where there have been continuous and persistent violations of * * statutes, and repeated convictions under the criminal laws have faded to abate them, the equitable power of injunctive relief is properly granted.” The injunction issued because seven convictions had done no good. And see, State v. Preuss, 217 Minn. 100, 13 N. W. (2d) 774 (injunction allowed after 19 convictions were of no avail); State v. Luross, Dist. Ct. 14th Jud. Dist., April 9, 1942, Oscar R. Knutson, district judge (after one conviction failed to deter defendant from practicing medicine without a license, he was again arrested, but could not be brought to trial because on the dates set therefor he was in a hospital although at other times he continued to violate the statute).
Fitchette v. Taylor, 191 Minn. 582, 254 N. W. 910, 94 A. L. R. 356 (see, L. 1931, c. 114, § 1[e]).
State v. Nelson, 189 Minn. 87, 248 N. W. 751; State ex rel. Goff v. O’Neil, 205 Minn. 366, 286 N. W. 316 (no statutory penalty or fine for usury); Town of Linden v. Fischer, 154 Minn. 354, 191 N. W. 901 (no statutory penalty for violating town bylaws; M. S. A. 617.54, making the unlawful operation of a dance hall a misdemeanor, was enacted after the decision).
Chamblin v. Schlichter, 12 Minn. 181 (276); Kean v. Hurley (8 Cir.) 179 F. (2d) 888.
And see, State v. Donaldson, 41 Minn. 74, 82, 42 N. W. 781, 783.