Owsichek v. State, Guide Licensing & Control Board

*623RABINOWITZ, Chief Justice,

concurring.

I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the superior court abused its discretion in refusing to relax, under former Appellate Rule 46,1 the time limits imposed on administrative appeals by former Appellate Rule 45.2

In light of that conclusion, I would not reach the issue of whether the time limits of former Rule 45 apply to an action for declaratory judgment. Our finding that the superior court should have allowed the action to go forward under former Rule 46 renders consideration of this point unnecessary. Were we forced to address it, I would dissent from that aspect of the majority opinion; the case law seems uniformly contrary to the majority’s conclusion on this issue.3

I think it inconsistent to preclude a litigant from utilizing a request for injunctive relief to circumvent the time strictures for administrative appeals (supra, 627 P.2d at 620) while allowing the same litigant to accomplish this same circumvention by framing his request as one for declaratory relief. I do not accept the reasoning that declaratory relief requires review solely of the statutes and regulations, whereas in-junctive relief and damages require review of the actual administrative decision. If for no other reason than to establish standing,4 I think that an action for declaratory relief will necessarily involve some consideration of the agency’s actual decision.

In all other respects I agree with the majority.

. Currently the parallel provision is found at Alaska R.App.P. 521.

. The current parallel provision is in Alaska R.App.P. 602(a)(2).

. See, e. g., Howle v. Alabama State Milk Control Bd. 265 Ala. 189, 90 So.2d 752 (1956); Rich Mfg. Co. v. Petty, 241 Iowa 840, 42 N.W.2d 80 (1950); Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co., Inc. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 176 Kan. 561, 271 P.2d 1091 (1954); State v. Zinn, 72 N.M. 29, 380 P.2d 182 (1963); In re 1632 South Broad St., Philadelphia, 372 Pa. 557, 94 A.2d 772 (1953); Wallace v. Neal, 191 Tenn. 240, 232 S.W.2d 49 (1950); City of Superior v. Committee on Water Pollution, 263 Wis. 23, 56 N.W.2d 501 (1953). These cases all hold that the procedures established for appealing administrative decisions are exclusive, and not to be circumvented by an action for declaratory relief.

.“While the injury-in-fact requirement has been relaxed, it has not been abandoned, as it is necessary to assure the adversity which is fundamental to judicial proceedings.” Wagstaff v. Superior Ct., Family Ct. Div., 535 P.2d 1220, 1225 (Alaska 1975).