(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I believe the trial court was right in entering summary judgment for defendants.
I. If we assume, in the first instance, the trial court erred in refusing to allow plaintiffs to take discovery of defendants, summary judgment was nevertheless proper. Ground 1 — C of defendants’ motion for summary judgment was:
“The relief sought was not within the power of the court to grant and the prayer of the petition is not sufficiently specific to authorize the court to grant any meaningful relief in any event, in that plaintiffs are asking the court to grant an injunction generally against the commission of criminal acts and controlling discretionary powers.”
I believe the trial court was right in entering summary judgment on that ground. Plaintiffs’ petition (paragraph 6) alleged resources of the Iowa Commission for the Blind were used for purposes not authorized in chapter 93, The Code, in two respects. It was claimed the resources were used to promote the activities of the National Federation of the Blind (NFB). It was also alleged such resources were converted to the private interests of officers and employees of the Iowa Commission for the Blind. Permanent injunction, the only relief sought, will not lie for either purpose.
Injunction will not lie to control discretionary matters of a governmental agency. Board of Directors Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Green, 259 Iowa 1260, 147 N.W.2d 854 and citations. A determination to cooperate with the efforts of the NFB and joining to seek its goals would fall within the ambit of § 601B.6, The Code. That section accords the Iowa Commission for the Blind extraordinarily broad discretion in such matters. It is no bar to the exercise of such discretion that public funds may be involved.
“A strict formula to determine public purposes for all time cannot be formulated, since the concept expands with the popula*137tion, economy, scientific knowledge, and changing conditions. As people are brought closer together in congested areas, the public welfare requires governmental operation of facilities which were once considered exclusively private enterprises, and necessitates expenditure of tax funds for purposes which, in an earlier day, were not classified as public. What is a public purpose for which public funds may be expended is not a matter of exact definition, and the line of demarcation is not immutable or incapable of adjustment to changing social and economic conditions that are properly of public and governmental concern.
“ * * * [A] constitutional prohibition against lending, pledging, or granting the funds, credit, property, or things of value of the state, or of any political corporation thereof, is not intended to prevent the granting or lending where necessary in the reasonable exercise of the police power. It is the essential character of the direct object of the expenditure which must determine its validity, and not the magnitude of the interests to be affected, or the degree to which the general advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their promotion. * * 63 Am.Jur.2d., Public Funds, § 59, pages 447-448.
The only other allegation against defendants asserts the commission of crimes. Injunction is inappropriate for such a purpose in the instant case.
It seems universally agreed injunction is inappropriate when sought only to restrain criminal acts. The theory of the rule is sanctions imposed by criminal courts and the remedies supplied by indictment and prosecution are deemed adequate. 4 Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence, § 1347, pages 949-950; Modern Equity by H. G. Hanbury, pages 597-601; 27 Am.Jur.2d, Equity, § 57, pages 578-580. A recognized exception under these authorities arises where the criminal acts constitute a nuisance. The State sometimes, after proving repeated violations, may obtain an injunction against further violations. State ex rel. Turner v. United-Buckingham F.L., Inc., 211 N.W.2d 288 (Iowa 1973). See also State ex rel. Turner v. Younker Brothers, Inc., 210 N.W.2d 550 (Iowa 1973).
The exception on a nuisance theory after repeated violations has been granted in favor of law enforcing agencies where it became an unfair burden to the public to be required to prosecute numerous individual violations. We have never granted such an injunction to individual private claimants. See 59 Am.Jur.2d, Parties, § 30, pages 382— 386. In the instant case the attorney general resists the granting of an injunction and appears in this appeal in behalf of all defendants.
II. I believe there was ample basis under the foregoing authorities to support entry of summary judgment. An examination of defendants’ discovery depositions adds great support to the trial court’s ruling. However the majority seems to conclude we should wholly ignore, as I have in the preceding division, all discovery depositions taken by defendants. It is complained reciprocal rights to discover defendants were denied. But the discovery sought by plaintiffs was unrelated to the discovery undertaken by defendants. I believe the trial court acted within its proper discretion in denying plaintiffs’ request to take discovery of defendants.
Trial courts are accorded broad but not unlimited discretion to control, limit, or prevent discovery in order to promote the administration of justice. Jones v. Swanger, 167 N.W.2d 702, 703 (Iowa 1969) and citations. See also 4 Moore Federal Practice, § 1601, page 18.
Defendants’ discovery was directed not so much toward what plaintiffs could prove as it was toward what they claimed in their petition. Plaintiffs’ requested discovery, on the other hand, was sought in the hope of finding whether they had a lawsuit. I would adopt and apply the following rule:
“The right to require a disclosure is generally limited to instances where there is a real cause of action pending or imminent, *138and the court is entitled to the information in aid of proper judicial proceedings. The applicant must show an existing cause of action or defense in aid of which discovery is sought, and disclosure cannot be required if the action or the defense itself cannot be maintained. That is, a party is not entitled to a discovery to enable him to ascertain whether he has a cause of action.
a * * *
“ * * * While the precise line of differentiating the cases in which an examination will be allowed from those in which it will be denied because of their being merely ‘fishing expeditions’ is rather elusive, it may be said in general that to entitle a party to an examination, he should be able to convince the court that prima facie he has a cause of action or that there is a reasonable basis for a belief that a cause of action exists in his favor. Discovery does not sanction impertinent intrusion, and there must be a showing of good faith and probable cause. However, the claim that a party seeking discovery is engaged upon a ‘fishing expedition’ is not, and under no circumstances can be, a valid objection to an otherwise proper attempt to utilize the discovery statutes, * * (Emphasis added). 23 Am.Jur.2d, Depositions and Discovery, § 150, pages 484-486.
In Wiles v. Myerly, 210 N.W.2d 619, 625— 626 (Iowa 1973) we pointed out companion rules for perpetuating testimony do “ * * not provide a method of discovery to determine whether cause of action exists, and, if so, against whom action should be instituted.” (Emphasis added). I believe a trial court has a corresponding right, under the above rule, to deny plaintiffs use of discovery to determine whether a cause of action exists merely by filing a petition unless there is a reasonable basis to believe there is such a cause of action.
Accordingly I differ with the majority in its holding: “ * * * But here plaintiffs had to combat the motion with one hand tied behind their back.” I believe the trial court acted within its proper discretion in allowing defendants to discover plaintiffs as to the nature and basis for their claim. Under the circumstances shown it does not offend the propriety of this ruling that the trial court at the same time denied plaintiffs the right to dredge for a lawsuit by way of their own depositions.
The trial court characterized plaintiffs’ application for discovery as a “fishing expedition.” Such characterization is apt to fall on deaf judicial ears for the reason this characterization was for decades used by persons who opposed all discovery. It is only a coincidence the characterization is now used to describe situations where one is not actually seeking to gather evidence but only endeavoring to find out whether they have a lawsuit.
III. We should entirely ignore all evidence which is hearsay and incompetent. Sherwood v. Nissen, 179 N.W.2d 336 (Iowa 1970). With such evidence ignored my reading of the record reveals no remaining substantial factual dispute.
Anything remaining is so insubstantial and trifling as to fall under the rule demanding it should be ignored under the maxim de minimis non curat lex. Rosendahl Levy v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 171 N.W.2d 530 (Iowa 1969); State v. Hinshaw, 197 Iowa 1265, 198 N.W. 634.
The case presents a graphic example of why trial courts should be accorded discretion to control, limit or prevent discovery under the rule announced in Jones v. Swan-ger, supra. Defendants’ depositions of plaintiffs disclose plaintiffs’ action to be a mere dispute as to which of two philosophies should govern the Iowa Commission for the Blind. We should not furnish our courts as the forum for any such dispute. Neither should we allow our discovery procedures to be employed for such a purpose when no cause of action exists. I would affirm.