concurring in the result:
I concur in the in the Court’s disposition of the second issue in which it concludes that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Denison and Reiser in their individual capacities on the basis that plaintiff has presented no evidence to rebut the presumption that Denison and Reiser were acting within the course and scope of their employment with Boise State University.
As to the first issue, I concur in the Court’s conclusion that Pounds did not comply with I.C. § 6-905. Ante at 984. However, the Court’s “embrace” of the decision of a panel of the Court of appeals in Sysco Intermountain Food Serv. v. City of Twin Falls, 109 Idaho 88, 705 P.2d 548 (Ct.App.1985), in which the panel stated that notice to an city’s insurance carrier is substantial compliance with I.C. § 6-905 is both dicta and contrary to prior decisions of this Court.
In Independent School Dist. of Boise City v. Callister, 97 Idaho 59, 539 P.2d 987 (1975), this Court rejected the “substantial compliance” rule of an earlier case, Jorstad v. City of Lewiston, 93 Idaho 122, 456 P.2d 766 (1969), and held that compliance with the provisions of I.C. §§ 6-905 and 6-906 was necessary in order to have a valid tort claim. The Court in the Callister case specifically rejected the appellant’s claim that there was substantial compliance based in part upon the fact that there was notice to the school district’s insurance carrier. As the dissenting opinion of Justice Donaldson pointed out, the “damages claimed by the respondent had been fully ascertained by an insurance adjuster representing the insurance carrier for the School District well within the 120 day notice of claim period.” 97 Idaho at 65, 539 P.2d at 993. In addition to that notice to the insurance carrier, in the Callister case there were additional documents filed with the school district, at the request of the school district, regarding the accident involved in that case. Those documents were described in detail in Justice Donaldson’s dissenting opinion as follows:
On the very date of the accident, numerous affidavits were filed with the school by students who observed the conduct in question. These affidavits contained circumstances of the accident and notice of probable injury. In addition, documents were later prepared at the request of officials and agents of Capital High School and the Independent School District of Boise City. One of these documents entitled “State Department of Education Accident Report Form” is directed to the “Independent School Dis*429trict of Boise City” and bears the date of November 24, 1971. Therein, the date of the accident is set forth as November 24, 1971. Thus, it is obvious that the district had actual knowledge, through a report made on its own form and signed and subscribed by a person bearing the title “District Supervisor of Safety Education” of the injury to Scott Patterson on the date of the injury itself. Looking at the requirements of I.C. § 6-907, relating to “contents of claims” and comparing the same to the accident report form and other documents, the district had actual written notice of “the conduct and circumstances which brought about the injury or damage,” “the injury or damage,” “the time and place the injury or damage occurred,” “together with a statement of the actual residence of the claimant.” Further written information was supplied on December 15, 1971, only some three weeks thereafter. The only information the district did not have as a result of the above documents was “the amount of damages claimed” and information regarding the residence of the claimant “for a period of six (6) months immediately prior to the time the claim arose.” Since Scott Patterson was a student at Capital High at the time, the very records of said school would reveal his residence for the six month period prior to the accident. Further, damages claimed by the respondent had been fully ascertained by an insurance adjuster representing the insurance carrier for the School District well within the 120 day notice of claim period.
97 Idaho at 64-65, 539 P.2d at 992-993. Nevertheless, the Court in the Callister case held, contrary to the panel of the Court of Appeals in the Sysco case, that there was no compliance with the notice provisions of I.C. § 6-905, even though there was notice to the school district’s insurance carrier.
The cases of Smith v. City of Preston, 99 Idaho 618, 586 P.2d 1062 (1978), and Stevens v. Fleming, 116 Idaho 523, 777 P.2d 1196 (1989), are distinguishable. In those cases, notice was given by an insurance company to the government agency. In Smith v. City of Preston, we held that the notice by the insurance company to the government agency was sufficiently specific to satisfy the requirements of I.C. § 6-907. In Stevens v. Fleming, we held that the letter sent to the city on behalf of the insurance company was not sufficiently specific to satisfy the requirements of 6-907. However, in both of those cases we were dealing with a letter sent by an insurance company to the government agency. In the Independent School Dist. of Boise City v. Callister case, and in the present case, we are dealing with a letter sent by the claimant to the insurance company.
In this case there was no letter or written notice sent by the claimant or an insurance company to the governmental entity. Thus, under the Callister case there has been no compliance with I.C. § 6-905, which requires that a claim be filed with the governmental entity.
Accordingly, I concur with the result reached by the majority opinion that Pounds did not comply with I.C. § 6-905. However, this Court has rejected the notion that notice by the claimant to the insurance carrier satisfies the provisions of I.C. § 6-906, Independent School Dist. of Boise City v. Callister, 97 Idaho 59, 539 P.2d 987 (1975), and the panel decision of the Court of Appeals in the Sysco case is not the law.