DISSENTING OPINION OF
WAKATSUKI, J.,WITH WHOM MOON, J., JOINS
I respectfully dissent.
Rather than focusing on interpreting Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 378-2, the majority, in my view, oversteps judicial bounds by legislating an important policy issue affecting business management-labor relations that should better be left to the legislature to decide.
HRS § 378-2(1) provides:
Discriminatory practices made unlawful; offenses defined. It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice:
*356(1) For any employer to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or discharge from employment, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual in compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of race, sex, age, religion, color, ancestry, handicapped status, marital status, or arrest and court record[.]
“Marital status” is defined as “the state of being married or being single.” HRS § 378-1.
This court’s primary duty in interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the legislature. Villagonza v. Hawaiian Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 70 Haw. 406, 408, 772 P.2d 1193, 1194-95 (1989). As a starting point, we look to the language of the statute itself. Kam v. Noh, 70 Haw. 321, 325, 770 P.2d 414, 416 (1989). Insofar as they comport with legislative intent, words of a statute should be read in their ordinary and popular sense. Hawaiian Beaches, Inc. v. Rondo, 52 Haw. 279, 281, 474 P.2d 538, 540 (1970).
[T]he plain and ordinary meaning of “marital status” is the social condition enjoyed by an individual by reason of his or her having participated or failed to participate in marriage. Illuminated another way, when one is queried about one’s “marital status,” the usual and complete answer would be expected to be a choice among “married,” “single,” etc., but would not be expected to include an identification of one’s present or former spouse and certainly not the spouse’s occupation.
Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 51 N.Y.2d 506, 511-12, 415 N.E.2d 950, 953 (1980).
It is also significant that the legislative history of HRS § 378-2 omits any mention of the issue before us. A prohibition of discrimination on the basis of identification of one’s spouse covers *357a wide array of personnel policies, including antinepotism policies, policies against hiring the spouse of a major business competitor, and policies against having spouses in supervisor-supervisee capacities. Such policies are widespread and backed by valid reasons. It is implausible “that the Legislature would have struck a blow at [such] policies with nary a word, in or out of the statute, to express or explain its intention[.]” Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc., 51 N.Y.2d at 513, 415 N.E.2d at 953.
Act 109, Session Laws of Hawaii 1975, which enacted the marital status discrimination prohibition was passed by both houses of the legislature without discussion. See 1975 House Journal, at 456, 491; 1975 Senate Journal, at 639, 709. Committee reports adopted by the House and Senate are terse and void of any mention of the issue before us. Hse. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 576, reprinted in 1975 House Journal, at 1224-25; Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 1014, reprinted in 1975 Senate Journal, at 1217. The importance of this issue to business management and labor makes it unlikely that the prohibition which the majority reads into the statute could have been enacted unanimously1 and without discussion.
The majority notes that the no-spouse policy as applied in this case is illogical because the policy would not have applied had Harvey Ross and Viviana Treffry merely cohabited (which they had done for two years) without getting married, even though the rationale underlying a no-spouse policy (to avoid favoritism or at the least a perception of favoritism) would be equally applicable to cohabiting couples. The majority further points to the fact that the employer chose not to enforce this policy until a year after the *358Rosses were married, therefore, there is an indication that the no-spouse rule is not vital to the management of the employer’s business. But these facts are immaterial and irrelevant to the issue before us. An employer is not precluded from adopting personnel policies which may be irrational and without logical business justification unless clearly prohibited by some statute or the constitution.
Miller v. C.A. Muer Corp., 420 Mich. 355, 362 N.W.2d 650 (1984), involved two cases in which plaintiffs had married their co-workers, and pursuant to company policy, one spouse was required to transfer or be discharged. In interpreting a Michigan statute substantially similar to HRS § 378-2, the Michigan Supreme Court noted that the statute implemented civil rights laws in the employment arena. That court stated: “Civil rights acts seek to prevent discrimination against a person because of stereotyped impressions about the characteristics of a class to which the person belongs.” Id. at 362, 362 N.W.2d at 653 (footnote omitted). The company policy preventing the spouses from working together did “not appear to reflect offensive or demeaning stereotypes, prejudices, or biases” which civil rights laws meant to prohibit. Id. at 364, 362 N.W.2d at 654.
The majority expresses concern that unless no-spouse policies are prohibited, employees will be discouraged from marrying. The policy of not discouraging marital relationships, while it may be in the public interest, is not a motivating factor behind civil rights laws such as HRS § 378-2.
Furthermore, as stated by the New York Court of Appeals:
[The] fear that antinepotism rules will discourage marriage and encourage divorce, and thus undermine the freedom of persons to marry, seems, to say the least, farfetched. Indeed, some with a practical bent might think that the pressures of employment supervision by one *359spouse or other close relative over another, if anything, would add rather than detract from the normal tensions of an already close and somewhat consuming relationship. In any event, given the societal, religious, romantic and practical support arrayed behind the marriage institution, it is inconceivable that it would not withstand the fact that some employers believe close relatives are not the preferred choice for supervisors of one another.
Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc., 51 N.Y.2d at 513-14, 415 N.E.2d at 954.
It is clear that no-spouse policies do not reflect the type of discrimination civil rights acts are generally meant to remedy. And our legislature has remained silent in regard to prohibiting the type of personnel policy at issue here.
I would, therefore, hold that HRS § 378-2 does not prohibit the employer’s action in this case. Accord Whirlpool Corp. v. Michigan Civil Rights Comm’n, 425 Mich. 527, 390 N.W.2d 625 (1986); Miller v. C.A. Muer Corp., supra; Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., supra; Thomson v. Sanborn’s Motor Express, Inc., 154 N.J. Super. 555, 382 A.2d 53 (1977).
I would affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
The bill passed in the House with 50 ayes and one excused, 1975 House Journal, at 491, and in the Senate with 24 ayes and one excused, 1975 Senate Journal, at 709.