concurring and dissenting, with whom MOON, Chief Justice, joins.
I concur in the majority opinion except as to part III.A.1. Because I believe we should overrule Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Company (Hawaii) Ltd., 72 Haw. 350, 816 P.2d 302, reconsideration denied, 72 Haw. 616, 841 P.2d 1074 (1991) (Ross I), I would affirm the trial court’s judgment as to Count I. Accordingly, as to part III.A.1, I dissent.
I.
In his dissent to Ross I, Justice Wakatsuki asserted that “[rjather than focusing on interpreting Hawai[‘]i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 378-2, the majority [in Ross I ] ... over-stepfped] judicial bounds by legislating an important policy issue affecting business management-labor relations that should better be left to the legislature to decide.” Ross I, 72 Haw. at 355, 816 P.2d at 304-05 (Wakatsuki, J., dissenting, joined by Moon, J.). I agree with the Ross I dissent and take this opportunity to elaborate on the reasons that Ross I was wrongly decided and amounted to judicial legislation.
A.
“When construing a statute, our foremost obligation is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself.” Pacific Int’l Servs. Carp. v. Hurip, 76 Hawai'i 209, 216, 873 P.2d 88, 95 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). Of course, the “[statutory language must be read in the context of the entire statute and construed in a manner consistent with the purpose of the statutes,” Methven-Abreu v. Hawaiian Ins. & Guar. Co., 73 Haw. 385, 392, 834 P.2d 279, 284 (internal quotation marks omitted), reconsideration denied, 73 Haw. 625, 838 P.2d 860 (1992), and when determining the purpose of the statute, “we are not limited to the words of the statute to discern the underlying policy which the legislature seeks to promulgate ... [but may] look to relevant legislative history[.]” Sol v. AIG Hawaii Ins. Co., 76 Hawai'i 304, 307, 875 P.2d 921, 924 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), reconsideration denied, 76 Hawai'i 353, 877 P.2d 890 (1994).
Conversely, we are not at liberty to interpret a statutory provision to further a policy that is not articulated in either the language of the statute or the relevant legislative history, even if we believe that such an interpretation would produce a more beneficent result, for “[t]he Court’s function in the application and interpretation of such laws must be carefully limited to avoid encroaching on the power of [the legislature] to determine policies and make laws to carry them out.” Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 256-57, 90 S.Ct. 1583, 1595, 26 L.Ed.2d 199 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting). When a court goes beyond the articulated purposes underlying statutory or constitutional provisions and imposes its own view of appropriate public policy, that court improperly engages in judicial legislation.
B.
By enacting HRS § 378-2 (1985), the legislature prohibited employment discrimination based on, among other things, “marital status.” See Majority at 456, 879 P.2d at 1039, n. 2. The legislature, in addition, expressly limited the scope of marital status discrimination to that based on “the state of being married or being single.” HRS § 378-1 (1985). There are absolutely no indications in the legislative record that, despite the statutory definition, the legislature intended to also prohibit discrimination based on the identity and occupation of a person’s spouse. Accordingly, a proper judicial construction of marital status discrimination must be limited to discrimination based on “the state of being married or being single.” See Moore v. Honeywell Information Sys., 558 F.Supp. 1229, 1231 (D.Haw.1983) (rejecting claim of *468marital status discrimination under HRS § 378-2 where plaintiff was terminated, not because she was a married person, but because of her spouse’s interest in a competing business).
The Ross I majority overstepped the bounds of its judicial role by disregarding the definition of “marital status” contained in HRS § 378-1 and expanding the scope of marital status discrimination to suit its view of appropriate public policy. See Ross I, 72 Haw. at 354, 816 P.2d at 304 (“The public policy argument behind encouraging marital relationships, enunciated in those opinions and comments[,] seems to us persuasive as applied to the facts of this case.”). The Ross I majority undoubtedly had good intentions and sought to implement what it viewed as the wiser policy. The role of the court, however, is not to set policy, but to interpret the statutes as enacted by the legislature. See supra, dissent at 467, 879 P.2d at 1050. By expanding the scope of marital status discrimination to further a policy that was not articulated by the legislature, the Ross I majority improperly abdicated its judicial role for a legislative one.
The Ross I majority apparently felt that it could impose its policy preference because opinions from courts of other jurisdictions had reached opposing results when interpreting their respective states’ prohibitions on marital status discrimination. 72 Haw. at 353-54, 816 P.2d at 303-04. Not one of those states’ statutes, however, contained definitions of “marital status.” Those statutes were, therefore, arguably susceptible to broader interpretations.1 Consequently, the differing interpretations given to marital status discrimination for purposes of those statutes in no way gave this court the authority to disregard the express statutory definition of “marital status” contained in HRS § 378-1.
Moreover, an examination of subsequent legislative and judicial activity in states whose courts had adopted a broad interpretation of marital status discrimination under their statutes demonstrates that the lack of an express definition of “marital status” in their statutes was a crucial factor in allowing them to do so. In Minnesota, for example, subsequent to the decision in Kraft, Inc. v. State, 284 N.W.2d 386 (Minn.1979), the state legislature added a statutory definition of “marital status” as follows:
“Marital status” means whether a person is single, married, remarried, divorced, separated, or a surviving spouse and, in employment cases, includes protection against discrimination on the basis of the identity, situation, actions, or beliefs of a spouse or former spouse.
Minn.Stat. § 363.01.40 (1988). Although the statutory definition upheld the result reached in Kraft, the definition clearly indicated that discrimination based on a spouse’s identity is fundamentally different from discrimination based on whether a person is single, married, etc. In State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990), the Supreme Court of Minnesota expressly recognized that distinction, stating:
The plain language of this new definition shows that, in non-employment cases, the legislature intended to address only the status of an individual, not an individual’s relationship with a spouse, fiancé, fi-ancée, or other domestic partner. The extremely broad language following the *469phrase “and, in employment cases” constitutes legislative recognition that employment cases are fundamentally different from housing cases such as the case at bar.
460 N.W.2d at 6 (emphasis added).2 The Minnesota definition of “marital status” applicable in non-employment cases that does not include “an individual’s relationship with a spouse” is essentially the same as the definition of “marital status” found in HRS § 378-1. By clear analogy, “marital status” under HRS § 378-1 should not include “an individual’s relationship with a spouse.”
The Washington legislature added a definition of marital status to its statute that is even more similar to HRS § 378-1 than Minnesota’s definition. That definition provides:
“Marital status” means the legal status of being married, single, separated, divorced, or widowed.
Wash.Rev.Code § 49.60.040 (Supp.1993). In Kastanis v. Educational Employees Credit Union, 122 Wash.2d 483, 869 P.2d 26, opinion amended by — Wash.2d —, 865 P.2d 507 (1993), the Supreme Court of Washington, although following the broad interpretation of marital status discrimination adopted in Washington Water Power Co. v. State Human Bights Comm’n, 91 Wash.2d 62, 586 P.2d 1149 (1978) and its progeny, implied that it was able to do so because the 1993 definition of “marital status” was not before the court. 122 Wash.2d at 488 & n. 3, 859 P.2d at 29 & n. 2. The juxtaposition of the judicial interpretation that was adopted in the absence of a statutory definition and the definition enacted by the legislature3 clearly demonstrates that the statutory definition limits the scope of “marital status” and does not encompass the additional factor of the identity of an employee’s or applicant’s spouse.
No-relatives policies such as the one that led to Ross’s discharge are based on the identity of an employee’s or applicant’s spouse and do not discriminate based on “the state of being married or being single.” Thus, the enforcement of a no-relatives policy does not constitute “marital status” discrimination under HRS § 378-2.
Furthermore, there is nothing in the legislative history to suggest that, in spite of the plain language, the statute was intended to outlaw no-relatives policies. As noted in the Ross I dissent, “[a] prohibition of discrimination on the basis of identification of one’s spouse covers a wide array of personnel policies, including antinepotism policies, policies against hiring the spouse of a major business competitor, and policies against having spouses in supervisor-supervisee capacities.” 72 Haw. at 357, 816 P.2d at 305.
[A]nti-nepotism rules are standard practice and date back to the turn of the Century. Today many private companies have anti-nepotism policies that restrict spouses from working under the same chain of command. A 1981 survey of 374 companies reported that of the 82 percent who would employ both husbands and wives, 74 percent restrict spouses from working in the same department or in the same function. A 1985 survey of 115 companies reported that 46 percent prohibit supervision by a relative. U. Sekaran, Dual-Career Families (1986) 120.
Townshend, 183 W.Va. at 421, 396 S.E.2d at 188. Against this backdrop, “[i]t is implausible ‘that the Legislature would have struck a blow at [such] policies with nary a word, in or out of the statute, to express or explain its intention.’ ” Ross I, 72 Haw. at 357, 816 P.2d at 305 (Wakatsuki, J., dissenting) (quoting Manhattan Pizza Hut, 51 N.Y.2d at 513, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 964, 415 N.E.2d at 953). See also Whirlpool Corp. v. Michigan Civil *470Bights Comm’n, 425 Mich. 527, 531, 390 N.W.2d 625, 627 (1986) (“The question here is one of legislative intent, and we do not believe the Legislature intended to so severely regulate employers’ personnel policies so as to prohibit no-spouse rules. If the lawmakers did intend such a change, then their intent must be manifested more clearly.”).
Moreover, the public policy of “encouraging marital relationships,” Ross I, 72 Haw. at 354, 816 P.2d at 304, on which the Ross I majority avowedly relied, finds no support in the language of HRS § 378-2 or its legislative history. On the contrary, HRS § 378-2 provides the same protection against discrimination to persons who are single as to those who are married. Thus, Ross I was incorrectly decided and amounted to judicial legislation.
II.
The majority opinion dismisses Stouffer’s plea to overrule Ross I on the grounds that (1) a factual error regarding the date of Ross’s marriage “was immaterial to the [Ross I] majority’s analysis and holding,” and (2) “the legislature’s failure to overrule Ross I ... vindicates the [Ross I ] majority’s construction of HRS § 378-2.” Majority at 458, 879 P.2d at 1041. I agree that whether Ross’s marriage occurred two months or fourteen months before he was terminated is immaterial to the issue of marital status discrimination. See Ross I, 72 Haw. at 358, 816 P.2d at 305-06 (Wakatsuki, J., dissenting) (noting that the fact that Stouffer may have waited over a year after Ross’s marriage before discharging him was “immaterial and irrelevant to the issue before us”). I cannot, however, agree that mere legislative inaction precludes us from reconsidering Ross I.
A.
As a general rule, “[w]e do not lightly disregard precedent; we subscribe to the view that great consideration should always be accorded precedent, especially one of long standing and general acceptance.” Espaniola v. Cawdrey Mars Joint Venture, 68 Haw. 171, 182, 707 P.2d 365, 373 (1985) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). See also Briones v. State, 74 Haw. 442, 453 n. 5, 848 P.2d 966, 972 n. 5 (1993) (“This court will not create a precedential quagmire by reexamining via a [Hawaii Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP)] rule 40 petition its own opinions on the basis that the first appeal was incorrectly decided.”).
Yet, it doesn’t necessarily follow that a rule established by precedent is infallible. If unintended injury would result by following the previous decision, corrective action is in order; for we cannot be unmindful of the lessons furnished by our own consciousness, as well as by judicial history, of the liability to error [sic] and the advantages of review.
Espaniola, 68 Haw. at 182, 707 P.2d at 373 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, “[w]e not only have the right but are entrusted with a duty to examine the former decisions of this court and when reconciliation is impossible, to discard our former errors.” Koike v. Board of Water Supply, 44 Haw. 100, 117-18, 352 P.2d 835, 845, reh’g denied, 44 Haw. 146, 352 P.2d 835 (1960); see also Parke v. Parke, 25 Haw. 397, 401 (1920) (“It is generally better to establish a new rule than to follow a bad precedent.”).
B.
The majority relies on State v. Dannenberg, 74 Haw. 75, 83, 837 P.2d 776, 780, reconsideration denied, — Haw. —, 843 P.2d 144 (1992), and the cases cited therein, to support the proposition that we should not reconsider Ross I because the legislature has not overruled that decision. Majority at 458, 879 P.2d at 1041. Each of those cases was applying the doctrine of stare decisis. “Stare decisis relates to the effect of legal propositions announced in prior adjudications upon subsequent actions which involve similar questions between strangers to the proceedings in which the adjudications were made.” State v. Magoon, 75 Haw. 164, 186, 858 P.2d 712, 723 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted), reconsideration denied, — Haw. —, 861 P.2d 735 (1993). The appeal before us now is part of the same action as Ross I and involves the identical parties. Thus, the doctrine of stare decisis *471does not apply, and the cases regarding legislative inaction are not directly applicable,
On the other hand, under the “law of the case” doctrine, “a determination of a question of law made by an appellate court in the course of an action becomes ‘the law of the case’ and may not be disputed by a reopening of the question at a later stage of litigation.” Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 65 Haw. 641, 652 n. 9, 658 P.2d 287, 297 n. 9 (1982) (quoting Glover v. Fong, 42 Haw. 560, 578 (1958)), reconsideration denied, 66 Haw. 528, 726 P.2d 1183 (1983). The doctrine, however, is merely “a rule of practice based on considerations of efficiency, courtesy, and comity,” Amfac v. Waikiki Beachcomber Inv. Co., 74 Haw. 85, 121, 839 P.2d 10, 29 (quoting State v. Goodwin, 7 Haw.App. 261, 263 n. 2, 752 P.2d 598, 600 n. 2 (1988)), reconsideration denied, 74 Haw. 650, 843 P.2d 144 (1992), and “where justice requires, exceptions to the doctrine of law of the case are made and we may reexamine our holdings on the second appeal in the same case.” Cain v. Cain, 59 Haw. 32, 37, 575 P.2d 468, 473 (1978).
The “law of the case” doctrine does not present as formidable an obstacle to reconsideration as the doetime of stare decisis or the related doctrine of res judicata.4 This court has explicitly recognized that the “law of the case” doctrine “is akin to res judicata ... but is not subject to the inflexibility of res judicata.” Robinson, 65 Haw. at 652 n. 9, 658 P.2d at 297 n. 9 (quoting Glover, 42 Haw. at 578). Similarly, because the “law of the case” doctrine implicates fewer policy considerations than the stare decisis doctrine,5 we should have less reservations regarding reconsidering a decision when the “law of the case” doctrine is the only deterrent to doing so.
Furthermore, Ross I was decided by the slimmest of majorities (3-2 decision). It would only require one member of the Ross I majority to recognize that the original appeal was wrongly decided and amounted to judicial legislation in order for that decision to be overruled.6 Under these circumstances, any argument that the principles of the “law of the case” doctrine should prevent us from reconsidering Ross I is particularly unavailing.
C.
Because the original appeal resulted in a published opinion, an argument can be made that legislative inaction should be given the same weight as if the issue had arisen in a case where stare decisis applied. Even assuming that legislative inaction may be entitled to some weight,
conclusive weight should [not] be accorded to the failure of [the legislature] to respond to [a prior decision of this court] on the theory that [legislative] silence should be interpreted as acceptance of the decision. The [United States Supreme] Court has cautioned that ‘[i]t is at best treacherous to *472find in congressional silence alone the adoption, of a controlling rule of law.’ Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 [66 S.Ct. 826, 880, 90 L.Ed. 1084] (1946). Therefore, in the absence of any persuasive circumstances evidencing a clear design that [legislative] inaction be taken as acceptance of [the prior decision], the mere silence of [the legislature] is not a sufficient reason for refusing to reconsider the decision.
Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 241-42, 90 S.Ct. at 1687-88. Thus, the mere failure of the legislature to amend HRS § 378-2 after Ross I was decided, without more, is unpersuasive. Cf. Monell v. Department of Social Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 668, 696-700, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2038-41, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (Congress’s failure to amend the definition of “persons” as used in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 during seventeen years following Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), did not amount to an “indication[ ] of congressional acceptance of th[e] Court’s earlier interpretation.”).
That legislative inaction, in and of itself, is entitled to little weight is evident from a review of several decisions of this court in which we have overruled our own earlier statutory interpretations despite legislative inaction. See, e.g., Magoon, 75 Haw. at 185-86, 858 P.2d at 722-23 (explicitly overruling In re Application of Kaimuki Land Co., 35 Haw. 254 (1939), because it failed to correctly review and analyze the statutory estoppel language of Revised Laws of Hawai'i (RLH) 1935 § 5032); State v. Dow, 72 Haw. 56, 59-61, 806 P.2d 402, 404-05 (1991) (overruling in part State v. Wacker, 70 Haw. 332, 770 P.2d 420 (1989), because “the statutory analysis employed in Wacker [was] no longer applicable”); State v. Batangan, 71 Haw. 552, 559-63, 799 P.2d 48, 52-54 (1990) (holding that Rules 702 and 704 of the Hawaii Rules of Evidence do not allow expert witnesses to opine as to the credibility of alleged child sex abuse victims and overruling State v. Kim, 64 Haw. 598, 645 P.2d 1330 (1982), to the extent that it held otherwise); Association of Owners of Kukui Plaza v. Swinerton & Walberg Co., 68 Haw. 98, 106-07, 705 P.2d 28, 34-35 (1985) (holding that orders granting stays of proceedings and compelling arbitration are final orders under HRS § 641-l(a) and overruling holding to the contrary in Pfaeltzer v. Patterson, 49 Haw. 59, 410 P.2d 974 (1966)).7 See also Briones, 74 Haw. at 470, 848 P.2d at 979 (Levinson, J., concurring) (“[T]he holding of [State v. Briones ] Briones I [, 71 Haw. 86, 784 P.2d 860 (1989), was] tantamount to appellate ‘plain error’ and we should [have] simply ‘fess[ed] up’ to it.”)..
State v. Dannenberg, 74 Haw. 75, 837 P.2d 776 (1992), and the cases cited therein, on which the majority opinion relies for the proposition that we should uphold prior decisions of statutory interpretation in the face of legislative inaction are all distinguishable. In each of those cases, the statutory scheme was ambiguous and the court had resolved the ambiguity by applying applicable rules of statutory construction. In Dannenberg, we declined to overrule the holding of State v. Rice, 66 Haw. 101, 657 P.2d 1026 (1983), that HRS § 712-1200(4) precluded trial courts from granting motions for deferred acceptance of guilty pleas in prostitution cases. In that case, we agreed that “HRS § 712-1200 [was] ambiguous,” 74 Haw. at 80, 837 P.2d at 778, and we resolved the ambiguity by seeking to ascertain the legislative intent. In Gorospe v. Matsui, 72 Haw. 377, 380-81, 819 P.2d 80, 81-82 (1991), we reaffirmed our analysis in Zator v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 69 Haw. 594, 752 P.2d 1073 (1988), where we held that the tolling provisions of HRS § 657-13 applied to toll the two year statute of limitations set forth in HRS § 294-36 for bringing a suit for *473no-fault benefits. In that case, “the two statutes obviously create[d] an ambiguity,” 72 Haw. at 381, 819 P.2d at 82 (quoting Zator, 69 Haw. at 597, 752 P.2d at 1075), and we resolved the ambiguity by seeking to ascertain the legislative intent. In In re Tax Appeal of Pacific Marine & Supply Co., 55 Haw. 572, 576-79, 524 P.2d 890, 893-96 (1974), this court refused to overrule the interpretation of the term “structures,” as used in HRS § 273-6 and its predecessor statutes, which was followed by the Tax Appeal Court in Taxes, Hawaiian Dredging Company, Ltd., Cases No. 631, 632 (June 8, 1955). The court reasoned that ships and vessels were not “structures” within the ordinary meaning of that word, and even assuming an ambiguity in the statute, established rules of statutory construction supported that interpretation. Finally, in Honolulu Star Bulletin v. Burns, 50 Haw. 603, 604-06, 446 P.2d 171, 172-73 (1968), the appellant urged this court to overrule Advertiser Publishing Co. v. Fase, 43 Haw. 154 (1959), aff'd, 279 F.2d 636 (9th Cir.1960), arguing that the court had misinterpreted the definition of “manufacturer” for purposes of RLH 1945 § 5455(A). The court found that there was “sufficient ambiguity in the language [of the statute] to compel us to invoke such appropriate rules of statutory construction as will aid us in ascertaining the legislative intent in this matter.” 50 Haw. at 604, 446 P.2d at 172. The court then applied the said rules of construction and concluded that the interpretation of “manufacturer” in Advertiser Publishing was the correct interpretation.
Furthermore, in addition to involving the proper resolution of ambiguous statutory provision, in most of the cases that relied on legislative inaction, a significant length of time had passed since the original decision. See, e.g., Dannenberg (decided nearly ten years after Rice); Pacific Marine & Supply Co. (decided nineteen years after Taxes, Hawaiian Dredging Company, Ltd.); Honolulu Star Bulletin (decided nine years after Advertiser Publishing).
In the instant case, the meaning of marital status discrimination under HRS § 378-2 was not ambiguous and the analysis in Ross I was judicially unsound. See supra, dissent at 467-470, 879 P.2d at 1050-1053. Moreover, it has been only three years since Ross I was decided.8 For these reasons, the majority’s reliance on Dannenberg and the cases cited therein is misplaced.
D.
Legislative inaction is a particularly unconvincing basis to decline to reconsider a decision when the original decision was tanta-"1 mount to judicial legislation. Our duty to correct erroneous decisions is at its greatest in such circumstances, for “while unconstitutional exercise of power by the executive and legislative branches of government is subject to judicial restraint, the only check upon our own exercise of power is our own sense of self-restraint.” Koike v. Board of Water Supply, 44 Haw. 100, 103, 352 P.2d 835, 838 (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78-79, 56 S.Ct. 312, 324-25, 80 L.Ed. 477 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting)), reh’g denied, 44 Haw. 146, 352 P.2d 835 (1960). Because of the complexities of passing legislation, it is not fair to place the burden on the legislature to enact corrective legislation. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 695, 98 S.Ct. at 2038 (overruling interpretation of the term “persons,” as used in 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that was adopted in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), reasoning that the case was not one “where [the Court] should ‘place on the shoulders of Congress the burden of the Court’s own error’ ” (quoting Girouard, 328 U.S. at 70, 66 S.Ct. at 830)). Thus, because Ross I was wrongly decided and *474amounted to judicial legislation, we have a duty to reconsider and overrule that decision.
III.
In this appeal, we have the opportunity to rectify one instance where this court “overstep[ped] judicial bounds by legislating an important policy issue ... that should [have been] left to the legislature to decide,” Ross I, 72 Haw. at 355, 816 P.2d at 304-05 (Wakat-suki, J., dissenting, joined by Moon, J.), and reestablish our commitment to act within the constraints of our judicial role. We should therefore reconsider Ross I, overrule that decision, and limit claims of marital status discrimination under HRS § 378-2 to situations involving discrimination based on “the state of being married or being single.”
. Even in the absence of an express statutory definition of "marital status,” several courts in other jurisdictions have recognized that the plain meaning of "marital status” does not encompass the identity or occupation of a person's spouse. See, e.g., Miller v. C.A. Muer Corp., 420 Mich. 355, 361-63, 362 N.W.2d 650, 653-54 (1984) (no definition of "marital status” in Michigan act; by placing prohibition against "marital status” discrimination in Michigan civil rights act, "the Legislature manifested its intent to prohibit discrimination based on whether a person is married” (emphasis in original); not that based on "the identity, occupation, and place of employment of one’s spouse”); Manhattan Pizza Hut v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 51 N.Y.2d 506, 511, 434 N.Y.S.2d 961, 964, 415 N.E.2d 950, 953 (1980) (“the plain and ordinary meaning of ‘marital status' is the social condition enjoyed by an individual by reason of his or her having participated or failed to participate in a marriage”); see also Commission on Human Relations v. Greenbelt Homes, Inc., 300 Md. 75, 86, 475 A.2d 1192, 1198 (1984) (quoting Manhattan Pizza Hut with approval). The decisions that reached the opposite conclusion and influenced the Ross I majority have consequently been described as "eccentric”. See Townshend v. Board of Educ., 183 W.Va. 418, 423 n. 4, 396 S.E.2d 185, 190 n. 4 (1990).
. The court in French held that the statutory prohibition against marital status discrimination in housing did not prevent the owner of property from refusing to rent to a person who planned to live together in a sexual relationship with another person to whom she was not legally married.
. Under the judicially adopted interpretation, “[t]he meaning of marital status ... is not limited to conditions such as being married, single, or divorced, but also applies to antinepotism policies based on the identity of an employee's or applicant’s spouse.” Kastanis, 122 Wash.2d at 488, 859 P.2d at 29 (footnote omitted). The legislatively enacted definition, on the other hand, expressly limits “marital status” to "the legal status of being married, single, separated, divorced, or widowed.” Wash.Rev.Code § 49.-60.040.
. We defined the scope and effect of the doctrine of res judicata in Kauhane v. Acutron Co., 71 Haw. 458, 795 P.2d 276 (1990) as follows:
According to the doctrine of res judicata, the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction is a bar to a new action in any court between the same parties or their privies concerning the same subject matter, and precludes the relitigation, not only of the claims which were actually litigated in the first action, but also of all grounds of claim which may have been properly litigated in the first action but were not litigated or decided.
71 Haw. at 463, 795 P.2d at 278 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Because the instant appeal does not arise out of a "new action" the doctrine of res judicata does not apply. See Robinson, 65 Haw. at 652, 658 P.2d at 296-97; Cain, 59 Haw. at 35-36, 575 P.2d at 472-73.
. The factors favoring adherence to principles of stare decisis include "considerations of certainty and the equal treatment of similarly situated litigants.” Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 257, 90 S.Ct. 1583, 1596, 26 L.Ed.2d 199 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting). When addressing a second appeal in the same case, overruling the decision reached in the first appeal will not result in disparate treatment of similarly situated litigants.
.The fact that the composition of the court has changed since Ross I was decided, although in and of itself not a sound reason to reconsider that decision, is not a bar to reconsideration •under the "law of the case” doctrine. Cf. Yoshizaki v. Hilo Hosp., 50 Haw. 40, 429 P.2d 829 (holding that change in composition of the court was not a bar to a grant of rehearing, particularly when there was a three to two division on the original opinion), granting petition for reh'g of 50 Haw. 1, 427 P.2d 845 (1967).
. Similarly, we have occasionally overruled our analyses of certain rules of court although the language of the rules has remained unchanged. See, e.g., State v. Young, 73 Haw. 217, 220-22, 830 P.2d 512, 514-15 (1992) (holding that pursuant to HRPP Rule 5 the waiver of the right to jury trial must be either in writing signed by the defendant or in open court from the mouth of the defendant, and overruling State v. Olivera, 53 Haw. 551, 497 P.2d 1360 (1972) to the extent that it countenanced waiver by trial counsel); State v. Balauro, 73 Haw. 70, 71, 828 P.2d 267, 268 (1992) (overruling State v. Stone, 65 Haw. 308, 651 P.2d 485 (1982) to the extent that its holding regarding excludable time periods under HRPP Rule 48 was inconsistent with subsection (c)(6) of that rule).
. Although Ross points to the fact that bills were introduced during both the 1992 and 1993 legislative sessions seeking to add language to HRS § 378-3 that would explicitly address the validity of company policies prohibiting spouses from working together, those bills were among 2,158 House Bills and 1,928 Senate Bills introduced in 1993 and 1,684 House Bills and 1,287 Senate Bills introduced in 1992. In light of the fact that all of these bills resulted in the enactment of only 365 Acts in 1993 and 323 Acts in 1992, the legislature’s failure to overrule Ross I is entitled to little weight. Furthermore, no committee reports were generated concerning the bills that were introduced, and no other indications as to whether the legislature approved or disapproved of the decision reached in Ross I have been brought to our attention.