concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree with part III(C) of the majority opinion, holding that “the trial court abused its discretion in requiring husband to designate wife as the one hundred percent beneficiary of lump-sum credit under the [Civil Service Retirement System] in the event of his death.” See maj. op. at 551. I also agree, in principle, with the proposition stated in part III(B) of the majority opinion: namely, that “[p]ensions of radically different proportion relative to one another” may warrant different methods of distribution. See id. at 551. However, because I disagree with part 111(A) of the majority opinion, I cannot agree with part 111(B) in practice.
In part 111(A) of the majority opinion, the majority applies the holding of In re Marriage of Hunt, 909 P.2d 525 (Colo.1995) (addressing unvested, unmatured pensions) to the situation presented here of vested, but unmatured pensions. I continue to disagree with the holding of Hunt that:
an increase in pension benefits attributable to post-dissolution ... increases is marital property when the nonemployee spouse bears a portion of the risk that the pension will not vest, as with the deferred distribution and reserve jurisdiction methods, but is not marital property when the risk is borne entirely by the employee spouse under the net present value method.
Id. at 550 (Erickson, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); see id. at 536.
The holding of Hunt is particularly inequitable when, as here, the above-stated disparity occurs within the disbanding marital unit. In this case, the dissolution court used the net present value method of distribution for the wife’s pension and a variant of the deferred distribution method of distribution for the husband’s pension. When the holding of Hunt is coupled in this manner with the majority’s holding in part 111(B) here, the post-dissolution pension increases of one spouse will be deemed marital property subject to division, while the post-dissolution pension increases of the other spouse will not be marital property and, thus, not subject to *553division. I cannot agree with this inequitable result.
Accordingly, I dissent to Parts 111(A) and III(B) of the majority opinion.