dissenting:
I dissent. The majority holds that the officers acted properly when they detained Chapman and his companion to run a warrants check on them, conduct a brief pat-down search of Chapman, and search the automobile for a weapon. The majority holds, however, that once the weapon was found, “the officers impermissibly expanded the scope of their detention of Chapman when they additionally ran an NCIC cheek on the serial number of the gun Chapman carried.” I disagree. The trial court’s findings of fact, well supported by the record, clarify that the officers placed Chapman under arrest for violation of the loitering ordinance before running the stolen weapons check. That being so, there is no question as to the legality of his further detention while the check was conducted.
*456The trial court’s chronological findings of facts are as follows:
8. Officer Rasmussen had probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed a public offense of “Unlawful Acts About Schools” when he arrested the defendant.
9. Officer Rasmussen also had legitimate safety concerns which justified physical detention of the defendant, when he found an automatic pistol, a loaded clip[,] and several other rounds of ammunition inside the vehicle, within a few feet of the defendant.
10. An NCIC records cheek provided information that the gun was reported stolen and justified the officer to also arrest defendant for possession of a stolen gun.
(Emphasis added.) Thus, the trial court found that when Officer Rasmussen arrested Chapman, he did so properly under the loitering ordinance. When the officer later determined the gun to be stolen, that served as additional grounds for the arrest.
This interpretation of the court’s findings is supported by the record. At the suppression hearing, Officer Ellertson, the back-up officer, and Megan Borg, Chapman’s companion, both testified that Chapman had already been handcuffed (and presumably arrested) before the gun was found. Although Officer Rasmussen, the arresting officer, initially testified that he handcuffed Chapman after the stolen weapons check, he later clarified that, to “the best of [his] recollection,” he arrested Chapman for violation of the loitering ordinance right after the weapon was found. When asked what the gun had to do with the loitering ordinance, Rasmussen said he felt he needed to investigate the gun further. This need for additional investigation implies that the officer had not yet conducted the stolen weapons check. Later, Rasmussen stated that he had placed Chapman under arrest even though the search of the car had not turned up “any other information of illegal activity.” Clearly the officer had not yet conducted the weapons check. Thus, the two officers and Chapman’s companion all testified that Chapman had been placed under arrest for violation of the loitering ordinance before the officers conducted the stolen weapons cheek. This version of the facts is consistent with footnote two of the majority opinion.
The court of appeals’ chronological recitation of the facts also supports this conclusion:
The officers asked permission to search the vehicle for the weapon. The owner of the car consented to the search. When the officers located the fanny pack, they held it up and Chapman nodded. The officers opened the fanny pack and removed a weapon....
Chapman was then arrested, handcuffed, and given his Miranda warnings. Officer Rasmussen testified that he arrested Chapman for violation of the trespass ordinance. The officers ran a computer check on the weapon and received notice that it had been stolen.
State v. Chapman, 841 P.2d 725, 726 (Utah Ct.App.1992).
Because Chapman had already been placed under arrest before the officers ran the weapons check, the officers’ further detention of Chapman was permissible. I would affirm the court of appeals.
RUSSON, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion of HOWE, J.