I dissent from the majority opinion in this case. I have come to the conclusion that judges are among the few people in our society who can say with a straight face that mandatory words such as “shall” and “must” do not mean what we all think they mean. We are able to conclude that words like “shall” and “must” actually mean “might,” “should,” “can if one wants to,” etc. I am unable to make this statement with a straight face, and I cannot ignore what the dictionary tells me these words mean.
In this case, we have a statute which requires that a hearing “shall be held within 60 days after service of a petition unless continued for cause.” This appears to me to be a clear and unambiguous statement of legislative intent. Despite what may be obvious, the majority tells us that the legislature, when it used the word “shall,” really meant to say “should,” “ought to,” or “can if you *264like.” My question is what version of “shall” did the legislature intend? Why did it not employ directory words such as “should be held,” “ought to be held,” or “can be held” if it wanted to create a directory requirement? Instead, the legislature used the word “shall.” I presume that the members of the Kansas Legislature are well acquainted with the meaning of the word “shall” and are able to use it properly in a coherent sentence. The majority view apparently does not agree with this proposition and simply abandons the clear, unambiguous meaning of the word shall to conclude that it means something other than shall.
This court recently filed In re Care & Treatment of Brown, 26 Kan. App. 2d 117, 978 P.2d 300 (1999). In that case, we dealt with K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 59-29a06, which said: “Within 60 days after the completion of any hearing held pursuant to K.S.A. 59-29a05 and amendments thereto, the court shall conduct a trial to determine whether the person is a sexually violent predator.” (Emphasis added.)
In Brown, the panel saw fit to define the word “shall” as the dictionary does and as most of us use it. In explaining our position, we said:
“The language of K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 59-20a06 is clear. The use of the term ‘shall’ indicates the legislature mandated that the commitment trial be held within 60 days after the probable cause hearing. The inclusion of the language ‘[t]he trial may be continued’ does not render the term ‘shall’ discretionaiy. Additionally, continuance is conditional. A continuance (1) must be considered upon a motion; (2) must be granted for the purpose of due administration; and (3) cannot substantially prejudice the defendant. Neither the court nor the parties in this case filed a motion for continuance of trial. We hold that the 60-day requirement specified in K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 59-29a06 is mandatory and jurisdictional.” 26 Kan. App. 2d at 120.
I agree with the reasoning set forth in Brown and incorporate it as a part of my dissent.
The statute in this case says: “[T]he hearing on the claim shall be held within 60 days after service of the petition unless continued for good cause.” (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 60-4113(g). I point out that neither side in this case filed a motion for a continuance. I conclude that shall means what I was always taught that it means *265and that the failure to either hold the trial within 60 days after service of the petition or to grant a continuance beyond that period of time requires dismissal of the case.
This is one of those actions in which the State of Kansas is attempting to take property away from one of its citizens on the premise that the property was used in an illicit manner. It seems to me that given the nature of the statutes, a strict construction is necessary, and a construction which states that “shall” means “maybe” or “ought to” is certainly not a strict construction. I would affirm the decision of the trial court.