(dissenting) — I respectfully dissent. The court gave as its reasons for the exceptional sentence (1) vulnerability and (2) abuse of a position of trust. The record supports these reasons, and they justify a sentence outside the standard range, which is 31 to 41 months in this case. The court rejected the prosecutor's recommendation of 36 months and the presentence investigator's recommendation of 41 months and imposed the maximum punishment of 10 *691years. No reasons were given for the length of the exceptional sentence; the sentencing judge stated only "the Court finds that ten years is a fair exceptional sentence."
As the majority points out, the sentencing court's decision regarding length of an exceptional sentence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Oxborrow, 106 Wn.2d 525, 530, 723 P.2d 1123 (1986); State v. Armstrong, 106 Wn.2d 547, 551-52, 723 P.2d 1111 (1986). This court has held, however, some discretion must be used and reasons for imposing the maximum term must be stated: '"[T]he length of an exceptional sentence cannot come out of thin air.'" State v. Pryor, 56 Wn. App. 107, 123, 782 P.2d 1076 (1989) (quoting State v. Wood, 42 Wn. App. 78, 84, 709 P.2d 1209 (1985), review denied, 105 Wn.2d 1010 (1986)), aff'd, 115 Wn.2d 445, 799 P.2d 244 (1990).
When we decided Pryor, we were troubled by a "possible new trend developing in the trial courts to impose the maximum sentence for an offense once an aggravating circumstance is supported by the record, and the standard range can be set aside." Pryor, 56 Wn. App. at 119. The concern in that case related to sex offenses. Pryor, 56 Wn. App. at 118-19. The same concern applies to drug offenses.
Reviewing our decision in Pryor, the Supreme Court again emphasized that courts should be concerned with the stated purpose of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA) that discretion in sentencing be structured: "The sentence imposed here, over 3.5 times greater than the maximum presumptive sentence, points to the need for sufficient information to allow the sentence to be structured rather than the product solely of judicial discretion." Pryor, 115 Wn.2d at 454. Although stated in the context of determining an aggravating factor of future dangerousness, the principle is clearly applicable to determining the structured length of an exceptional sentence.
We should not simply put our rubber stamp of approval on any exceptional sentence up to the maximum term. See Pryor, 56 Wn. App. at 120. If we do not require articulated *692justification for the particular length of an exceptional sentence, we renounce meaningful appellate review. Abandoning our task returns to the trial courts the very discretion the SRA was intended to abolish.
The concurring opinion of Forrest, J., in State v. Creekmore, 55 Wn. App. 852, 876-77, 783 P.2d 1068 (1989), review denied, 114 Wn.2d 1020 (1990), reflects this same concern:
The purpose of the SRA was to provide structure to the trial court's exercise of discretion, to promote uniformity in sentencing and, ultimately, to build a common law of sentencing. . . . Under the current policy, once the threshold of an acceptable reason justifying an exceptional sentence is passed, the trial court is permitted "unbridled discretion" as to the duration of the sentence. This is not the purpose of the SRA.
He summarized our duty very well:
[I]t is the responsibility of the appellate court to decide whether a sentence is "clearly excessive" by exercising its own judgment as to the relationship between the reasons given and the duration imposed; not by reference to what some hypothetical reasonable judge would not do.
Creekmore, at 877. Here, we are given no reason for the sentence imposed and have no basis for examining the relation between it and the duration of the sentence imposed. Without some explanation of the trial court’s reasons for sentencing Mrs. Dyer to 10 years, rather than 5 years or 7 years or any other term, we cannot judge whether the sentence is "fair".
A maximum sentence is to be imposed for only the "worst case" scenario when the '"circumstances of the crime distinguish it from other crimes of the same statutory category.'" Pryor, 56 Wn. App. at 119 (quoting State v. Woody, 48 Wn. App. 772, 778, 742 P.2d 133 (1987), review denied, 110 Wn.2d 1006 (1988)); see also Armstrong, at 555 (Goodloe, J., dissenting). Here, Mrs. Dyer would have had to commit the most heinous act of controlled substances homicide imaginable. The majority, at 689 (quoting Oxbor-row, at 533) compares the circumstances of this case to those in Oxborrow, stating: "'[sjurely this is the quintessential crime for which the Legislature contemplated a *693maximum sentence'". I disagree; but more importantly, I am concerned that my colleagues are filling the void in the record with their own justification for the sentence imposed.
In exercising its discretion, the trial court must determine whether the offender's conduct truly distinguishes the instant case from all others of the same category. The dissenting opinion of Goodloe, J., in Armstrong, at 555-56, effectively describes the court's task:
Once the trial court has determined that the legislatively imposed maximum sentence does not apply, then the trial court should determine, exercising its sound discretion, how severe the aggravating factors were which justified an exceptional sentence, and the presence of any mitigating factors. Typically, two types of cases will result. There will be cases in which aggravating factors exist which do justify an exceptional sentence, but the crime does not call for a huge disparity between the presumptive range and the actual sentence imposed. Other cases will exist which, because of their outrageous and heinous nature, cry out for a sentence closer to the statutory maximum. No firm rule can exist to distinguish these types of offenses, but the distinction should be based on the nature of the offense committed versus the typical offense contemplated by the particular statute.
See also State v. Delarosa-Flores, 59 Wn. App. 514, 520, 799 P.2d 736 (1990), review denied, 116 Wn.2d 1010 (1991).
Here, in determining an exceptional sentence was warranted, the trial court found it significant to its determination of vulnerability that the victim did not know she was being given controlled substances, when the usual case of controlled substances homicide involves delivery of a controlled substance to a knowing user whose death results. It is true this is not that ordinary case of controlled substances homicide; however, the majority elevates that factor of vulnerability to a tenable reason for imposing the maximum term. It is the articulated reasoning of the trial court for the length of sentence which is missing.
In this case, Mrs. Dyer gave the pills to the child to make her sleepy, not with any intent to harm her. As soon as she noticed the child had stopped breathing, she tried to resuscitate her. When her efforts were unsuccessful, she took the *694child immediately to a hospital emergency room. While such factors are not relevant to an initial determination of guilt in this case, they are relevant to the punishment to be imposed. An appropriate sentence should reflect the uniformity and proportionality which the SRA seeks to inspire.
To put this case in perspective, it is useful to note that Mrs. Dyer's sentence, with an offender score of 0 for this level 9 offense, is placed on a par with the standard range for an offender with an offender score of 8. In State v. Norman, 61 Wn. App. 16, 808 P.2d 1159 (1991), a father who refused to seek medical aid for his obviously ill son, and who beat the child repeatedly until a few hours before the boy's death, was convicted of first degree manslaughter, also a level 9 offense, had an offender score of 0, and was given an exceptional sentence of 4 years. That sentence is on a par with the standard range for an offender with an offender score between 1 and 2. Such disparate terms of punishment between that case and this case offend the letter and the spirit of the SRA. Furthermore, such a comparison calls into serious question whether the purpose set forth in RCW 9.94A.010(1), to "[e]nsure that the punishment for a criminal offense is proportionate to the seriousness of the offense and the offender's criminal history", has been carried out here. (Italics mine.) See State v. Brown, 60 Wn. App. 60, 78, 802 P.2d 803 (1990), review denied, 116 Wn.2d 1025 (1991). Although the appropriateness of the length of Mr. Norman's sentence was not an issue on appeal, there should be some similarity between exceptional sentences imposed on level 9 offenders with an offender score of 0.
Comparing Mrs. Dyer's sentence with the only two sentences for controlled substances homicide listed in Washington Sentencing Guidelines Comm'n, A Statistical Summary of Adult Felony Sentencing Fiscal Year 1990 (1991) further emphasizes its disproportionality. Both sentences were above the standard range, Summary, at 27, but together they averaged only 67 months, Summary, at 3. Interestingly, of the 24 sentences imposed for first degree *695manslaughter during fiscal year 1990, only 4 were outside the standard range, Summary, at 29, and the average sentence for that offense was 55.8 months, Summary, at 5. Similarly, of the 198 sentences imposed for first degree robbery, also a level 9 offense, only 17 were outside the standard range (4 were above, 13 were below), Summary, at 30, and the average length of the 123 sentences not involving attempts or weapon usage was 57.4 months, Summary, at 8. While statistics cannot and should not replace reasoned application of the underlying principles of the SRA, they highlight just how far Mrs. Dyer's sentence falls short of the goal of punishment commensurate with that imposed on others committing similar offenses. See RCW 9.94A-.010(3).
Just as in Pryor, " [i]t is difficult to determine from this record any reason for the sentencing court imposing the maximum term. In the absence of reasons, the present record gives the appearance the trial court failed to exercise any discretion at all." Pryor, 56 Wn. App. at 123. The length of the exceptional sentence imposed was unjustified by any articulated reason and is thereby clearly excessive. I would remand for resentencing, consistent with the legislative policy of the SRA.