(dissenting). I respectfully dissent.
Petitioner is accused of violating subsection 44(1) of the Michigan Campaign Finance Act (mofa), MCL 169.244(1); MSA 4.1703(44)(1), which prohibits making a “contribution” to “another person with the agreement or arrangement that the person receiving the contribution will then transfer that contribution to a particular candidate committee.” MCL 169.204(1); MSA 4.1703(4)(1) defines the term “contribution” as, among other things, a “donation of money . . . made for the purpose of influencing the nomination or election of a candidate.” The term “election” is defined in MCL 169.205(2); MSA 4.1703(5)(2). I disagree with the majority’s interpretation of MCL 169.205(2); MSA 4.1703(5)(2).
*447The purpose of judicial interpretation of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. DiBenedetto v West Shore Hosp, 461 Mich 394, 402; 605 NW2d 300 (2000); Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co v Marlette Homes, Inc, 456 Mich 511, 515; 573 NW2d 611 (1998). The starting point for determining the Legislature’s intent is the specific language of the statute. DiBenedetto, supra at 402; House Speaker v State Administrative Bd, 441 Mich 547, 567; 495 NW2d 539 (1993) . It is well established that where statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the Legislature is presumed to have intended the meaning it plainly expressed, judicial construction is neither required nor permitted, and the statute must be enforced as written. DiBenedetto, supra at 402; Rowell v Security Steel Processing Co, 445 Mich 347, 353; 518 NW2d 409 (1994).
The statute at issue in this case provides:
“Election” means a primary, general, special, or millage election held in this state or a convention or caucus of a political party held in this state to nominate a candidate. Election includes a recall vote. [MCL 169.205(2); MSA 4.1703(5)(2).]
I believe that the statute is clear, does not require judicial interpretation, and must be enforced as written. DiBenedetto, supra at 402. The Legislature did not include the term “recount” in its specific and detailed definition of election. Therefore, under the plain language of the statute, a recount is not an “election.” Because a recount is not an election, monetary donations associated with recounts cannot be considered “contributions” under the mcfa. Moreover, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that money *448donated to facilitate a recount directly influences the election of a candidate. I am not persuaded by the reasoning of the Attorney General opinion cited by the majority. A recount merely ensures an accurate count of votes previously cast. While it may change the outcome of the election where an inaccuracy is corrected during the recount process, a recount does not influence any individual vote.
I would affirm the trial court’s decision.