(concurring). In Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567, 633; 363 NW2d 641 (1984), this Court apparently held that the highest elected officials of all levels of government are absolutely immune when they are acting within their authority. In fact, however, no high level elected official was a party in Ross.
Building upon Ross, Smith v Dep’t of Public Health, 428 Mich 540, 611; 410 NW2d 749 (1987), apparently held that intentional torts are immune if committed within the scope of a governmental function, but that the intentional misuse of a badge of governmental authority for a purpose unauthorized by law is not the exercise of a governmental function and therefore not immune. However, in Smith, there were no individual defendants, elected or appointed.
*712Our order granting leave to appeal in this case assumed the precedential value of the Ross standard and therefore limited the issue to the application of Ross to these facts. Unfortunately, the majority opinion appears to assume the precedential value of Ross and Smith in reasoning that the tortious nature of these defendants’ acts may carry them outside of the authority of these officials and thereby outside of the scope of their immunity.
Our continuing responsibility for policy formulation in the area of officer and employee immunity is set forth in 1986 PA 175, MCL 691.1407(3); MSA 3.996(107)(3), which provides that the new, statutory "gross negligence” standard shall not be construed as altering the law of intentional torts as it existed prior to the effective date of the amendment. See McCann v Michigan, 398 Mich 65; 247 NW2d 521 (1976); Lockaby v Wayne Co, 406 Mich 65; 276 NW2d 1 (1979).
I would prefer that common law in the area of governmental immunity be developed in a systematic case law fashion on the bases of actual records in specific cases. Instead, I perceive a process in which dictum is balanced upon dictum, and when the issue is actually presented, there is scarcely a record in which to explore the ramifications of the ruling. The law of governmental authority is too important to both plaintiffs and governmental defendants to be developed in this fashion.
Nevertheless, recognizing the limitations of our order granting leave to appeal in this case, I would concur in the result of the majority, remanding this matter to the circuit court. In my view, at least insofar as the mayor is alleged to have sought to have the plaintiff fired from the Macomb County Prosecutor’s office, it is questionable whether there is immunity under the Ross stan*713dard. However, in so concluding, I do not wish to be understood as discouraging arguments as to whether we should delimit or affirm the dictum in Ross regarding absolute immunity or as to the wisdom or lack thereof of reintroducing concepts that define governmental function by reference to an actor’s intent. I am assuming that the nature of our order granting leave in this matter renders the case sui generis.
Cavanagh, J., concurred with Boyle, J.