The issue presented is another and, as yet, unexplored facet of the obligation of a municipal corporation, existing under and by virtue of the laws of the state of Washington, to comply with the laws of that state.
The city of Seattle has applied for and received a license *240from the Federal Power Commission for the development of a hydroelectric project on the Pend Oreille River (referred to herein as the Boundary project), and involving the construction of a dam on a site presently owned by Public Utility District No. 1 of Pend Oreille County. (It is conceded that the city intends to condemn this and other property of the P.U.D.)
In 1930, the people of this state adopted, by the initiative, the public-utility-district law,
“ . . . to conserve the water and power resources of the State of Washington for the benefit of the people thereof, and to supply public utility service, including water and electricity for all uses.” Laws of 1931, chapter 1, § 1, p. 3.
As adopted, it contained, and still does, a provision forbidding a district created thereunder from condemning any public utility owned by a city or town (RCW 54.16.020).
In 1933, the legislature made the prohibition work both ways by forbidding any city or town from acquiring by condemnation,
“. . . the electric power and light plant or electric system, or any part thereof, belonging to or owned or operated ... by a public utility district.” RCW 35.84.0301
This is a declaratory judgment action predicated on the proposition that the city of Seattle, faced with this express prohibition, cannot acquire by condemnation the property of Public Utility District No. 1 of Pend Oreille County; and, consequently, should be enjoined from the expenditure of *241money in the furtherance of a project which it cannot complete.
The trial court entered a summary judgment dismissing the action, apparently believing that the issue had been determined in the prior litigation involving the right of the city of Tacoma to build dams on the Cowlitz River.2
We do not regard anything actually decided in the Cowlitz litigation as decisive of the present case. In the first place, it was conceded that when the city of Tacoma received its license to proceed with the Cowlitz project and construct the necessary dams, there was nothing limiting its authority so to do. Here,' the city of Seattle, at the time it applied for its license to proceed with the Boundary project, had a known and express limitation on its power, i.e., it could not condemn
“ . . . the electric power and light plant or electric system, or any part thereof, belonging to or owned or operated . . . by a public utility district.”
This was not necessarily a disqualification as a licensee, because it was entirely possible, and for a time appeared probable, that the city would acquire by mutual agreement with the P.U.D. the property it required.
In the second place, it has been, and is, our view that the Supreme Court of the United States in Tacoma v. Taxpayers (1958), 357 U. S. 320, 2 L. Ed. (2d) 1345, 78 S. Ct. 1209, did not pass upon the proposition which we deemed decisive in our second Cowlitz case (Tacoma v. Taxpayers (1957), 49 Wn. (2d) 781, 307 P. (2d) 567), i.e., that the federal government may not confer powers upon local units of government created by the state beyond the capacity given them by their creator. The Supreme Court of *242the United States reversed our decision in that case on the basis of res judicata, stating that the state of Washington and its citizens were foreclosed by the judgment in the Court of Appeals (State of Washington Department of Game v. Federal Power Comm. (1953), 207 F. (2d) 391 (C. A. 9th)), from litigating further the power and authority of the city of Tacoma to proceed under its Federal Power Commission license to build dams. (In the present case, it is urged that the federal government, through the Federal Power Commission, may confer upon the city of Seattle, through its license, powers which the city was expressly prohibited by state statute from exercising at the time it made its application for a license to proceed with the Boundary project.)
The city of Seattle’s power of eminent domain has been at all times, since the effective date of RCW 35.84.030, i.e., 1933, subject to the prohibition set forth in that act (heretofore quoted in note 1). This is clearly a declaration of the public policy of the state, dating back thirty years, and is in no sense an attempt to exercise a veto over said project.
Whether the Federal Power Commission can confer powers of condemnation on cities, which the state legislature has, as a matter of policy, expressly prohibited, the federal courts must determine. If the city of Seattle could accept such a license only subject to an existing express statutory prohibition, which precluded its condemnation of P.U.D. property of the character described in RCW 35-.84.030, then it is indisputable that a controversy exists which must be determined in accordance with the law of the state of Washington; and neither the Federal Power Commission nor the federal courts can make a conclusive determination on that point. That controversy is whether the property of the P.U.D., which the city of Seattle concedes it intends to condemn, is within the statutory prohibition, i.e., is an “electric power and light plant or electric system, or any part thereof.” We are here concerned with the interpretation and application of state law, and our courts should not hesitate to proceed with that interpretation and application.
*243We, therefore, set aside the summary judgment of dismissal, and direct the trial court to proceed with the determination of whether the property of the P.U.D., which the city of Seattle now takes the position it must condemn, is an “electric power and light plant or electric system, or any part thereof.” If it is not, the action should be dismissed and the city left free to proceed to exercise its power of condemnation. If it is, we do not presume to suggest to the trial court what its action should be, because, as we have indicated, the city may find that if it has no power of condemnation, it may still be possible to acquire the property by negotiation and proceed under its license; and it should not be precluded from so doing.
Weaver, Rosellini, Ott, Foster, and Hunter, JJ., concur.
“Every city or town owning its own electric power and light plant may exercise the power of eminent domain as provided by law for •.the condemnation of private property for any of the corporate uses ■ or purposes of the city or town: Provided, That no city or town shall .acquire, by purchase or condemnation, any publicly or privately ■owned electric power and light plant or electric system located in .any other city or town except with the approval of a majority of the qualified electors of the city or town in which the property to be acquired is situated; nor shall any city or town acquire by condemnation the electric power and light plant or electric system, or any part thereof, belonging to or owned or operated by any municipal corporation, mutual, nonprofit, or cooperative association or organization, or by a public utility district.” RCW 35.84.030
In chronological reverse order the decisions are: Tacoma v. Taxpayers (1962), ante p. 66, 371 P. (2d) 938 (our third Cowlitz case); Tacoma v. Taxpayers (1958), 357 U. S. 320, 2 L. Ed. (2d) 1345, 78 S. Ct. 1209; Tacoma v. Taxpayers (1957), 49 Wn. (2d) 781, 307 P. (2d) 567 (our second Cowlitz case); Tacoma v. Taxpayers (1953), 43 Wn. (2d) 468, 262 P. (2d) 214 (our first Cowlitz case); State of Washington Department of Game v. Federal Power Comm. (1953), 207 F. (2d) 391 (C. A. 9th).