(concurring in the result) — For the reasons which I have set forth at some length in my dissent to the earlier decision of this court in this case, State ex rel. Cosmopolis Consol. School Dist. No. 99 v. Bruno, 59 Wn. (2d) 366, 367 P. (2d) 995, I am convinced that the action should not be entertained. The decision of the state board of education was not a judicial decision, but an administrative decision, and the difficulty which the court has experienced in attempting to evaluate the action of the board demon*474strates most graphically why the court should not arrogate to itself jurisdiction over a question of this kind.
Be that as it may, the court has previously declared that it does have jurisdiction. The questions before the court, then, are (1) whether the board acted arbitrarily or capriciously when it refused to approve a plan submitted by the county committee and required the submission of a plan which met its standards, and (2) whether the county committee acted arbitrarily when it acceded to the demands of the state board.
As the majority have pointed out, the plan for participation is to be prepared in the first instance by the county committee, exercising its discretion but taking into account certain factors enumerated in the statute (as well as other factors which it might find significant), and this plan is subject to review by the state board. The state board has the right and duty to reject such a plan and require the submission of a new plan which will meet with its approval.2 The facts set forth in the majority opinion show that this procedure was followed precisely in this instance. When the plan submitted by the county committee was found inadequate by the state board, suggestions were made for revisions. Those revisions were accordingly made. The plan was resubmitted and was approved by the state board. This procedure conformed to the requirements of the statute.
The point wherein I differ with the majority concerns the theory on which it is determined that the action of the county committee was not arbitrary or capricious. The majority say that the committee had alternative actions which it might take when the plan was sent back to it for revision, and that it exercised its discretion when it decided to submit a plan which it knew would be approved. In realty, it had no alternative, other than inaction, for it *475had been told that the board would only approve a plan which met with its principles and policies.
It is my interpretation of the statute that the county committee has discretion in drawing up a proposed plan but that the plan is always subject to review and rejection by the state board, which may then make suggestions for revisions and may require that these revisions be made. In other words, the plan submitted must conform to the standards set by the board, in the exercise of its judgment and discretion. If there is only one plan which will meet those standards, that is the plan which must be submitted in order to have the question presented to the voters. If that plan itself is not arbitrary or capricious, it cannot be held invalid. Such a plan was submitted and approved in this instance. The statutory procedure was followed. The result has not been shown to be arbitrary or capricious.
It is for these reasons that I would affirm the judgment.
Donworth and Finley, JJ., concur with Rosellini, J.
“ . . . If any such plan submitted by a county committee is not approved by the state board, the county committee shall be so notified, which notification shall contain a statement of reasons therefor and suggestions for revision. ...” RCW 28.56.040.