concurring.
I concur in the result reached in the lead opinion. If an exigency were required to search an automobile where there exists probable cause beyond (1) the inherent exigency presented by the mobility of the vehicle (the traditional exigency that permits a warrantless vehicle search under the Fourth Amendment), and (2) the lack of an opportunity for police to secure a search warrant before probable cause to search the vehicle arose unexpectedly (an additional exigency uniquely required by Pennsylvania caselaw), then I would certainly agree with Mr. Justice Cappy’s lead opinion that the danger to police here justified this particular search. However, I write separately because I do not believe that this Court’s existing jurisprudence requires, nor do I think that our jurisprudence should require, any exigency beyond the mobility of a vehicle and the unexpected development of probable cause. Accordingly, I respectfully disagree with the analytical approach employed by the lead opinion. I also write separately because I believe our jurisprudence in this important area has lacked precision and I hope that an exploration of that jurisprudence might provide some guidance in future cases involving automobile searches.
I am on record elsewhere as indicating my belief that the parameters of the automobile exception should be the same under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution as under the Fourth Amendment. See Commonwealth v. Luv, 557 Pa. 570, 735 A.2d 87, 95 (1999) (Castille, J., concurring); Commonwealth v. White, 543 Pa. 45, 669 A.2d 896, 909-10 (1995) (Castille, J., dissenting). Although that remains my considered belief, I do not advocate that co-extensive rule in the case sub judice. I recognize that our jurisprudence has taken a different turn in the past decade. Specifically, I accept that, unlike the Pennsylvania automobile exception cases that preceded and accompanied it, White contains a holding that was rendered under Article I, Section 8. Since the *516case sub judice involves no challenge to the propriety of this Court’s Article I, Section 8 jurisprudence in this area, I fully recognize the force of stare decisis. Yet, recognizing stare decisis is only the beginning of the analysis. My disagreement with the lead opinion concerns what in fact is commanded by stare decisis in the area of automobile searches. To be more precise, in my view the actual holdings in our previous cases, including White, do not command the construct the lead opinion has extrapolated from mere dicta in White. In addition, I write separately to explain why I believe that dicta is unpersuasive and should not become the law.
Since my disagreement with the lead opinion concerns the precedential value of White, it is perhaps best to begin with a discussion of stare decisis. “The rulé of stare decisis declares that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should. be applied to those which follow,, if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different.” Commonwealth v. Tilghman, 543 Pa. 578, 673 A.2d 898, 903 n. 9 (1996), citing Burke v. Pittsburgh Limestone Corp., 375 Pa. 390, 100 A.2d 595 (1953). Like most jurisprudential principles, stare decisis is not an absolute:
The doctrine of stare decisis was never intended to be used as a principle to perpetuate erroneous principles of law. While we fully ascribe to Lord Coke’s evaluation of the importance of certainty in the law, this end obviously cannot outweigh the necessity of maintaining the purity of the law. The court’s function is to interpret legislative enactments and not to promulgate them. Where, as here, by our decisions ..., the Court distorted the clear intention of the legislative enactment and by that erroneous interpretation permitted the policy of that legislation to be effectively frustrated, we now have no alternative but to rectify our earlier pronouncements and may not blindly adhere to the past rulings out of a deference to antiquity.
Mayhugh v. Coon, 460 Pa. 128, 331 A.2d 452, 456 (1975);1 see also Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Public Ed., 453 Pa. 584, 305 *517A.2d 877, 888 (1973) (“[T]he doctrine of stare decisis is not a vehicle for perpetuating error, but rather a legal concept which responds to the demands of justice and, thus, permits the orderly growth processes of the law to flourish”). Accord Allen v. Mellinger, 567 Pa. 1, 784 A.2d 762, 767 (2001) (overruling Woods v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Transp., 531 Pa. 295, 612 A.2d 970 (1992) because reasoning of that decision “was fundamentally flawed”). The doctrine only applies to issues actually raised, argued and adjudicated, and only where the decision was necessary to the determination of the case. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1406 (6th ed.1990). “The doctrine is limited to actual determinations in respect to litigated and necessarily decided questions, and is not applicable to dicta or obiter dicta.” Id.
After carefully reviewing this Court’s jurisprudence in this area, and giving due respect to stare decisis, it is my considered view that this Court’s state constitutional precedent is not nearly so hostile to reasonable searches of automobiles as suggested by the lead opinion’s approach, which is adopted from language in White that is, in my view, both dicta and constitutionally suspect. The warrantless search of the vehicle in this case was proper under Article I, Section 8 because probable cause arose unexpectedly, before police had a chance to secure a search warrant. That probable cause arose unexpectedly is all the exigency I would require under Article I, Section 8 — since that is all that is required by the actual holdings of this Court’s cases explicating the automobile exception, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Luv, 557 Pa. 570, 735 A.2d 87 (1999); Commonwealth v. White, 543 Pa. 45, 669 A.2d 896 (1995); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 526 Pa. 268, 585 A.2d 988 (1991); Commonwealth v. Baker, 518 Pa. 145, 541 A.2d 1381 (1988), and since any other rule is unjustifiably hostile to perfectly reasonable police conduct.
The lead opinion’s principal focus is upon White.2 The lead opinion extrapolates from White a quasi-legislative construct *518governing automobile searches that sets forth various multipart tests depending upon the type of exigency that is perceived. In so doing, the lead opinion construes exigencies that were not the basis for the holding in White, but instead were additional exigencies that the White Court merely “spoke to,” “touched upon,” or “addressed.” Op. at 701. White, however, is not binding precedent for the proposition that this Court follows an Article I, Section 8 approach to automobile searches that was consciously distinct and different from the approach commanded by the Fourth Amendment, much less commanded by anything unique to the Pennsylvania constitutional experience. By characterizing White as súch precedent, the lead opinion perpetuates an unfortunate misapprehension of White that began with the non-precedential plurality opinion in Commonwealth v. Labron, 547 Pa. 344, 690 A.2d 228 (1997) (Labron II). Moreover, even if White’s holding constituted such a forthright, distinct and acknowledged state constitutional precedent, the lead opinion relies upon portions of White that were dicta.
The lead opinion states that Pennsylvania constitutional law requires “both a showing of probable cause and exigent circumstances” to conduct a warrantless search of an automobile, while the Fourth Amendment, of course, has long required only a showing of probable cause. Op. at 700 & n. 4. See Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 119 S.Ct. 2013, 144 L.Ed.2d 442 (1999); Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 116 S.Ct. 2485, 135 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1996); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970). The requirement of an exigency beyond the mobility of the vehicle indeed found its way into this Court’s jurisprudence concerning the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Baker, 518 Pa. 145, 541 A.2d 1381, 1383 (1988); Commonwealth v. Cockfield, 431 Pa. *519639, 246 A.2d 381, 384 (1968). However, that jurisprudence never stated that this was a requirement of Article I, Section 8, distinct from the parameters of the Fourth Amendment, and dictated by something unique to the Pennsylvania constitutional experience. To the contrary, the cases reflecting this exigency requirement relied primarily, and often exclusively, upon cases from the U.S. Supreme Court or cases from this Court construing the Fourth Amendment. See Commonwealth v. Kilgore, 544 Pa. 439, 677 A.2d 311 (1995) (Kilgore I) (Fourth Amendment decision citing Pennsylvania cases, including Labron I and Fourth Amendment decision in Cockfield, for proposition that exigency beyond mobility of vehicle is required for automobile search); Commonwealth v. Labron, 543 Pa. 86, 669 A.2d 917 (1995) (Labron I) (citing federal and state cases interchangeably, with no distinction drawn between Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8); White, 669 A.2d at 899 (quoting extensively from federal law set forth in Chambers v. Maroney; no distinction drawn or articulated); 3 Commonwealth v. Ionata, 518 Pa. 472, 544 A.2d 917 (1988) (Opinion Announcing Judgment of Court) (relying upon Pennsylvania cases construing Fourth Amendment or Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8 coterminously; no distinction drawn); Baker, 541 A.2d at 1383 (no distinction drawn). Accord Commonwealth v. Milyak, 508 Pa. 2, 493 A.2d 1346 (1985); Commonwealth v. Holzer, 480 Pa. 93, 389 A.2d 101 (1978). The most that can be said about this Court’s automobile exception jurisprudence as reflected in the contemporaneous decisions in White, Kilgore I, and Labron I is that the Court treated the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8 as coterminous on the question of whether some exigency must be shown to justify a probable cause — based, warrantless search of an automobile.
This Court’s requirement of an exigency beyond the mobility of the vehicle proved to be erroneous as a Fourth Amendment matter. The U.S. Supreme Court made this abundantly *520clear by summarily reversing Kilgore I and Labron I. See Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 116 S.Ct. 2485, 135 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1996).4 (The Commonwealth did not seek certiorari in White.)
The case which first purported to convert what had been this Court’s coterminous approach to the automobile exception into a separate and more exacting state constitutional command under Article I, Section 8 was the very brief Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court in Commonwealth v. Labron, 547 Pa. 344, 690 A.2d 228 (1997) (Labron II) which issued upon remand following the U.S. Supreme Court’s reversal. The plurality opinion in Labron II, of course, is not binding precedent. E.g., Hoy v. Angelone, 554 Pa. 134, 720 A.2d 745, 750 (1998); see also Interest of O.A., 552 Pa. 666, 717 A.2d 490, 496 n. 4 (1998) (Opinion Announcing Judgment of Court by Cappy, J.) (“While the ultimate order of a plurality opinion, i.e. an affirmance or reversal, is binding on the parties in that particular case, legal conclusions and/or reasoning employed by a plurality certainly do not constitute binding authority”). The Labron II plurality would have “reaffirmfed]” the holding in Labron I and “explicitly note[d]” that Labron I was “in fact” decided upon independent state grounds, i.e., Article I, Section 8. Labron II, 690 A.2d at 228. The plurality found independent state constitutional underpinnings in Labron I because it had relied upon White. Id. According to the plurality, White:
[had] discussed the automobile exception and noted that, “this [C]ourt, when considering the relative importance of privacy as against securing criminal convictions, has struck *521a different balance than has the United States Supreme Court, and under the Pennsylvania balance, an individual’s privacy interests are given greater deference than under federal law.”
Id., quoting Commonwealth v. White, 543 Pa. 45, 669 A.2d 896, 902 (1995). It was only “[fjollowing this citation to White,” the plurality stated, that Labron I “concluded ... that ‘this Commonwealth’s jurisprudence of the automobile exception has long required both the existence of probable cause and the presence of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search.’ ” Labron II, 690 A.2d at 228, quoting Commonwealth v. Labron, 543 Pa. 86, 669 A.2d 917, 924 (1995) (Labron I).
The Labron II plurality’s non-binding characterization of both Labron I and White, however, was erroneous. First, there is no indication in the opinion in Labron I that the constitutional approach followed there (“this Commonwealth’s jurisprudence”) was any different under the Pennsylvania Constitution than under the Fourth Amendment. Labron I never cited, quoted, or relied upon the “different [state constitutional] balance” language in the White opinion in explicating the automobile exception. Indeed, Labron I embraced the same coterminous approach, reliant exclusively upon Fourth Amendment cases for substantive precedent, that all of our cases had employed to that point. Second, in point of fact, Labron I could not have accurately cited White for the proposition attributed to White by the Labron II plurality opinion, i.e., that this Court “has struck a different balance” under Article I, Section 8 with respect to the automobile exception. The White Court never said any such thing.
The “different [state constitutional] balance” discussion in White, which was quoted by the Labron II plurality, did not involve the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, but rather the search incident to arrest exception. See also Commonwealth v. Luv, 557 Pa. 570, 735 A.2d 87, 92 (1999) (opinion by author of White recognizing twin holdings). This analysis occurred after White had already disposed of the automobile exception claim there. In striking its different state constitutional balance on the search incident to arrest *522question, the White Court rejected the Fourth Amendment holding in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981) (under Fourth Amendment, police officer may, as contemporaneous incident to arrest of occupant of automobile, search passenger compartment of vehicle) and stated that “there is no justifiable search incident to arrest under the Pennsylvania Constitution save for the search of .the person and the immediate area which the person occupies during his custody....” White, 669 A.2d at 902.
In short, although the automobile exception claim in White was raised only under Article I, Section 8 and therefore resulted' in an Article I, Section 8 holding, nothing in White remotely suggested that the Pennsylvania Constitution commanded a fundamentally different approach to the automobile exception than is employed under the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, given how explicit the White Court was in rejecting Belton and setting forth distinct Pennsylvania constitutional doctrine on the search incident to arrest question, the absence of a similar approach in the discussion of the automobile exception ineluctably suggests that the Court simply perceived no such distinction. Instead, White decided the automobile exception question by employing the same coterminous, Fourth Amendment — based construct this Court had developed and followed for years, before the reversal in Pennsylvania v. Labron, 543 Pa. 86, 669 A.2d 917 (1995) (Labron 1). Although the lead opinion today is careful not to cite to the flawed Labron II plurality, its identical conclusion that White deliberately and consciously established a separate and distinct state constitutional construct is no less erroneous. The very language and structure of the White decision, as well as the cases which preceded and shaped the analysis in White, inform against the lead opinion’s characterization of the decision.
The reliance upon White in the instant matter is even more dubious because the lead opinion relies upon parts of White that were not necessary to the decision. To compound matters, this dicta is extremely problematic in its own right. The White opinion sets forth what the lead opinion here describes *523as the state constitutional test for the “first” exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement as follows:
In sum, the general rule is that a search warrant is required before police may conduct any search. As an exception to this rule, police may search a vehicle without a warrant where: (1) there is probable cause to believe that an automobile contains evidence of criminal activity; (2) unless the car is searched or impounded, the occupants of the automobile are likely to drive away and [the] contents of the automobile may never again be located by police; and (3) police have obtained this information in such a way that they could not have secured a warrant for the search, ie., there are exigent circumstances.
669 A.2d at 900 (emphasis in original). It is the “occupants of the automobile are likely to drive away” element of this tripartite formulation that causes the lead opinion to reject application of this exception to the search here and to . focus exclusively upon the separate exigency of a potential danger to the police. See op. at 702 (since there was no danger of automobile leaving, exigent circumstances did not exist under that theory). But this “occupants ... likely to drive away” language from White is not, and should not become, a state constitutional requirement in cases involving automobile searches.
Since the White Court’s articulation of this “required element” was not even a part of the actual holding of the case, much less essential to the holding, it was dicta under any rational approach to precedent. See Hunsberger v. Bender, 407 Pa. 185, 180 A.2d 4, 6 (1962) (statement in prior opinion, which clearly was not decisional but merely dicta, “is not binding upon us”); In re Estate of Cassell, 334 Pa. 381, 6 A.2d 60, 61 (1939) (comments not necessary to decision of case are dicta and, therefore, are not binding authority); Valles v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 758 A.2d 1238, 1246 (Pa.Super.2000) (same). The Court in White did not even discuss the “occupants ... likely to drive away” requirement in explaining why it disapproved that warrantless search. Instead, the Court disapproved of the search on the ground that police “knew in *524advance what automobiles might be involved [in a drug transaction] anjd could have requested warrants for the search of the automobiles.” White, 669 A.2d at 901. Accordingly, it was the advance knowledge of the police, and not the likelihood that “unless the car is searched or impounded, the occupants of the automobile are likely to drive away and [the] contents of the automobile may never again be located by police,” which defeated the claim of “unforeseen” or exigent circumstances in White. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Luv, 557 Pa. 570, 735 A.2d 87, 92-93 (1999) (opinion by author of White interpreting its holding); Commonwealth v. Labron, 543 Pa. 86, 669 A.2d 917, 923-24 (1995) (Labron I) (same). In order to make clear just how indisputable this point is, the entirety of White’s actual automobile exception holding is set forth below:
The present case, with respect to the “automobile exception,” is analytically identical to Ionata. In both cases the police had ample advance information concerning the fact that a search of an automobile would likely be involved in apprehending the suspect. When that is true, a warrant is required before the automobile may be searched. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Chambers v. Maroney:
Neither Carroll, supra, nor other cases in this Court require or suggest that in every conceivable circumstance the search of an auto even with probable cause may be made without extra protection for privacy that a warrant affords. But the circumstances that jumish probable cause to search a particular auto for particular articles are most often unforeseeable....
399 U.S. at 51, 90 S.Ct. at 1980-81, 26 L.Ed.2d at 428. (Emphasis added.) In other words, although the Fourth Amendment generally requires probable cause to be determined and a warrant to be issued by a magistrate before a search may be conducted, unforeseen circumstances involving the search of an automobile coupled with the presence of probable cause, may excuse the requirement for a search warrant. In Ionata and in this case, there were no unfore*525seen circumstances. Police knew in advance what automobiles might be involved and could have requested warrants for the search of the automobiles, just as they did for persons and dwellings. Superior Court was in error, therefore in determining that the search was permissible under the “automobile exception” and that exigent circumstances existed to justify the search.
669 A.2d at 900-01 (footnote omitted). Thus, irrespective of what White said in dicta, the actual automobile exception decision and holding followed from the fact that probable cause did not arise unexpectedly. In this regard, the holding was perfectly consistent with previous cases such as Baker and Ionata, and reflected this Court’s understanding (which ultimately proved mistaken) of the Fourth Amendment automobile exception. In addition to revealing the very narrow holding in White, the passage above is also significant because it cites to cases from the U.S. Supreme Court and adverts to the Fourth Amendment without a hint of disapproval or disagreement. The passage thus demonstrates just how dependent the holding in White was upon the Court’s ongoing perception of Fourth Amendment law, and how obvious it is that there was no separate and distinct state constitutional analysis at work.
The lead opinion dismisses this reading of White as representing a “[cjasual and convenient application of the dicta label.” Op. at 704, n. 9. This is not so. The lead opinion’s interpretation does not draw any distinction between mere “discussions” in opinions and constitutional “holdings.” It is steadfast in this regard even when the “discussion” is distressingly problematical. Virtually the entirety of the lead opinion’s criticism of this concurrence, including its mischaracterization of the dissent in White, id. at 14, derives from its rejection of such a distinction. This concurrence does not employ dicta as a mere “label” but as an accurate description of the non-essential and erroneous discussion in White. The fact of the matter is that the automobile exception holding in White, which I have been careful to quote above so that it not be misunderstood, does not involve an application of the *526“discussion” the lead opinion would promulgate as settled and binding state constitutional doctrine.5
The lead opinion’s reliance upon the White dicta is problematic for a further reason. Far from establishing a separate state constitutional search and seizure construct, the White dicta setting forth the lead opinion’s so-called “first” exigent circumstances exception, like the White holding, was “summarizing” the White Court’s understanding of Fourth Amendment law. White, 669 A.2d at 900. Specifically, in setting forth this would — be exception, the White Court stated that it was merely summarizing an immediately preceding quotation from Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970), which in turn characterized the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). It is from Chambers characterization of Ca'rroll that the White Court extrapolated from Fourth Amendment authority the would — be required element of: “unless the car is searched or impounded, the occupants of the automobile are likely to drive away and [the] contents of the automobile may never again be located by police.” White, 669 A.2d at 900.
More importantly, White’s characterization of Chambers/Carroll was mistaken. The White characterization overlooked the very next paragraph in the Chambers opinion, which reads as follows:
Arguably, because of the preference for a magistrate’s judgment, only the immobilization of the car should be permitted until a search warrant is obtained; arguably, only *527the “lesser” intrusion is permissible until the magistrate authorizes the “greater.” But which is the “greater” and which the “lesser” intrusion is itself a debatable question and the answer may depend on a variety of circumstances. For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other-hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. Given probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
399 U.S. at 51-52, 90 S.Ct. 1975 (emphasis added). Thus, to the extent the White dicta embraced by the lead opinion would require the “occupants ... likely to drive away” element, it was an erroneous characterization of the very Fourth Amendment authority it was “summarizing.” We should acknowledge the mistake, not perpetuate it.
Furthermore, White’s misapprehension of federal law in this regard stands in contrast to this Court’s prior decisions in Baker and Milyak. In both of those cases, this Court recognized Chambers instruction that an alternative to an immediate car search is to immobilize the vehicle until a warrant is secured but that, since immobilization is not necessarily less intrusive than an immediate search, an immediate search, rather than immobilization, is constitutionally proper. Commonwealth v. Baker, 518 Pa. 145, 541 A.2d 1381, 1383-84 (1988); Commonwealth v. Milyak, 508 Pa. 2, 493 A.2d 1346, 1349 (1985). I simply cannot join the lead opinion in converting a mistaken summary of Fourth Amendment law in the White dicta into a “binding,” novel state constitutional search and seizure construct. Pennsylvania constitutional jurisprudence should be made of sterner stuff.6
*528The lead opinion suggests that this concurrence is contrary to a “declaration by our court [in White] affording our citizens broader protections under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution than under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” The lead opinion asserts that this “declaration” is “binding precedent.” Op. at 703-04. In point of fact, as demonstrated above, White contains no such declaration with respect to the automobile exception. Moreover, the fact that this Court has held that Article I, Section 8 affords broader protections than the Fourth Amendment in some contexts does not mean that it automatically requires different and greater protections in all contexts. As this Court noted in Commonwealth v. Glass, 562 Pa. 187, 754 A.2d 655, 660 (2000):
the fact that this Court has “accorded greater protections to the citizens of this state under Article I, § 8 of our constitution, under certain circumstances,” [Commonwealth v.] Cleckley, ... 738 A.2d [427,] 431 [ (Pa.1999) ], does not command a reflexive finding in favor of any new right or interpretation asserted. To the contrary, we should apply the prevailing standard “where our own independent state analysis does not suggest a distinct standard.” Id., 738 A.2d at 431-32 (collecting cases); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, ... 586 A.2d 887, 894 ([Pa.] 1991).
Accord In re D.M., 566 Pa. 445, 781 A.2d 1161, 1163 (2001) (refusing to afford broader protection under Article I, Section 8 in context of “Terry ” stops). Thus, the fact that the White Court explicitly found greater protections under the Pennsylvania Constitution in the context of a search incident to arrest does not mean that it automatically made, the same finding, sub silentio, with respect to the automobile exception. Indeed, the presumption is to the contrary and that presumption is fully borne out by the other circumstances attending the *529White opinion, i.e., the fact that the Court articulated no distinction between the state and federal charters in the context of the automobile exception, the fact that it cited and quoted Fourth Amendment cases, and the fact that it did not purport to establish distinct state constitutional doctrine.
More fundamentally, White only “binds” this Court with respect to propositions which were actually at issue, and actually decided, in the case. Broad but non-essential “declarations” are not precedent; ultimately, their inherent wisdom and persuasiveness determine whether they will play any role in future decisions. See Commonwealth v. Blouse, 531 Pa. 167, 611 A.2d 1177, 1182 (1992) (Flaherty, J., joined by Zappa-la and Cappy, JJ., dissenting) (although dicta may be instructive in predicting direction of court, it is not precedential authority). Dicta is not converted into binding constitutional precedent through repetition. Cf Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 112 S.Ct. 2482, 120 L.Ed.2d 225 (1992) (plurality opinion).
Notwithstanding the inescapable constitutional and jurisprudential difficulties inherent in the approach in the White dicta, the lead opinion proffers what it calls a “comfortable” reading of White that would accord its dicta constitutional status as a “construct” “created ... to interpret” Article I, Section 8, which did not misinterpret or disregard federal law, but instead “merely ... attempted] to reconcile Pennsylvania law with certain aspects of federal law, but to nevertheless establish independent state law regarding automobile searches.” Op. at 704. This view might be plausible if there were some indication in the White opinion that the Court there perceived a difference between federal and state law with respect to the automobile exception and applied the distinction to resolve the matter. But there is no such indication — at all. Viewing White in this fashion requires the doctor to kill the patient to save him.
More importantly, such a revisionist interpretation of White as an explicit and harmonious expression of Pennsylvania constitutional principle, consciously offered up as a different approach to what then prevailed under the Fourth Amendment, is implausible in the extreme in light of this Court’s *530decisions in Kilgore I and Labron I. White was decided on the very same day as Labron I, i.e., December 29,1995. Labron I discussed White at great length, quoted from it, and explicitly applied it. Kilgore I was decided three days earlier, on December 26, 1995, although it appears much later in the Atlantic Second Reporter (volume 677, as opposed to volume 669), and it makes reference to, and quotes from, the subsequently — decided Labron I. After Kilgore I and Labron I were reversed and remanded by the U.S. Supreme Court, this Court, in separate plurality opinions, “reaffirmed” Labron I on state constitutional grounds, Labron II, 690 A.2d at 228, but vacated the prior order in Kilgore I because no state constitutional claim was at issue there. Commonwealth v. Kilgore, 547 Pa. 346, 690 A.2d 229, 230 (1997) (Kilgore II) (Opinion Announcing Judgment of Court).
Thus, these three contemporaneous decisions covered the spectrum of available automobile exception constitutional challenges: White sounded under the Pennsylvania Constitution alone; Kilgore involved a federal constitutional claim only; and Labron was a case where the claim apparently was raised under both charters. What is notable for present purposes is that there is no suggestion in the inter-related 1995 decisions themselves that the constitutional approach differed depending upon whether the claim was state — only, federal — only, 'or mixed. The notion that this Court in White was forging some conscious, harmonious, state constitutional path which was distinct from federal law simply 'does not withstand scrutiny in light of its companion cases.
Significantly, the U.S. Supreme Court, which had occasion to review this Court’s automobile exception jurisprudence immediately after the three cases were decided, certainly did hot share the lead opinion’s interpretation of White’s approach as a “reconciliation” of a recognized divergence in state and federal law. In its per curiam decision reversing Kilgore I and Labron I, the high Court addressed an argument, made by Labron, that this Court’s opinions were decided on adequate and independent state grounds — i.e., Article I, Section *5318. The Court rejected that claim with the following observations, which include a recognition of White:
Respondent Labron claims we have no jurisdiction to review the judgment in his case because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion rests on an adequate and independent state ground, viz., “this Commonwealth’s jurisprudence of the automobile exception.” [Labron /,] ... 669 A.2d, at 924. We disagree. The language we have quoted is not a “plain statement” sufficient to tell us “the federal cases [were] being used only for the purpose of guidance, and did not themselves compel the result that the court ha[d] reached.” Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 ... (1983). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did discuss several of its own decisions; as it noted, however, some of those cases relied on an analysis of our cases on the automobile exception, see, e.g., [Labron I,] ... 669 A.2d, at 921 (observing Commonwealth v. Holzer, ... 480 Pa. 93, 389 A.2d 101, 106 ([Pa.] 1978), cited Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 ... (1971)); [Labron I,] ... 669 A.2d, at 924 (stating Commonwealth v. White, supra, rested in part upon the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s analysis of Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 ... (1970)). The law of the Commonwealth thus appears to us “interwoven with the federal law, and ... the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion.” Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S., at 1040 1041, 103 S.Ct. 3469----Our jurisdiction in Labron’s case is secure. Ibid. The opinion in respondent Kilgore’s case, meanwhile, rests on an explicit conclusion that the officers’ conduct violated the Fourth Amendment; we have jurisdiction to review this judgment as well.
518 U.S. at 940-41, 116 S.Ct. 2485.
Apparently, then, I am not alone in the view that “this Commonwealth’s jurisprudence of the automobile exception” at the time White, Labron, and Kilgore were decided-jurisprudence which held that an exigency beyond the mobility of a vehicle must be present to excuse the warrant requirement— *532was not independently based in distinct state constitutional principles. No doubt the lead opinion would deem the U.S. Supreme Court’s view of our jurisprudence, including White, as no less “incredible” than my own. I respectfully submit, however, that it does not require “reticular argument” or “mental gymnastics,” op. at 703, 704, to see the patent, severe flaws in the White dicta, and the lack of any foundation in state constitutional principle. It merely requires judicial rig- or: i.e., a willingness to confront openly the fatal flaws in the “authority” at issue.
The dicta in White upon which the lead opinion relies is multiply and fundamentally flawed. In addition to being unmoored in Pennsylvania or federal precedent, it is also unworkable. The multiple potential exigent circumstances, each with multiple governing “tests,” outlined in White is impractical in the extreme. Police on the street, which is where all of these searches occur, cannot hope to correctly anticipate how a court might later split these new — grown hairs. If it were precedent having stare decisis effect, it would warrant overruling or, at a minimum, reconsideration. See Allen v. Mellinger, 567 Pa. 1, 784 A.2d 762 (2001) (overruling case because reasoning “was fundamentally flawed”). But, since it is not binding precedent, there is no principled reason whatsoever to adopt it.
Rather than attempt to squeeze this case into the analytical construct set forth in the White dicta, I would proceed to decide it in light of our actual experience with the automobile exception. For purposes of disposing of this appeal, I shall assume that, if this Court ever actually examined the issue as a state constitutional matter, a majority of Justices would hold that the exigency requirement that characterized our coextensive Fourth Amendment/Article I, Section 8 automobile exception jurisprudence until the reversal in Pennsylvania v. Labron, 543 Pa. 86, 669 A.2d 917 (1995) (Labron T), should be embraced as a state constitutional command. Consideration of the cases we have decided under that construct confirms that the search here was reasonable.
*533This Court has approved warrantless vehicle searches so long as: (1) police had probable cause, and (2) the probable cause arose unexpectedly, ie., in circumstances that prevented police from securing a warrant before probable cause to search the vehicle arose. There was never any separate and additional requirement that the vehicle was unlikely ever to be found again for the exigency to exist. The actual holding in White obviously fits this construct — as do numerous cases decided before or contemporaneously with White.
For example, in Baker, the police received a tip from a reliable informant that the defendant had waved a gun at an unknown individual in an alley. The informant stated that the defendant was driving an old, dilapidated red convertible with the top down. Police soon located the car with the defendant in it and set up surveillance. After approximately twenty to thirty minutes, the police approached, the defendant exited the car and, subsequently, the police searched the vehicle. In a unanimous opinion, this Court upheld the warrantless vehicle search, reasoning as follows:
[C]ertain exigencies may render the obtaining of a warrant not reasonably practicable under the circumstances of a given case, and, when that occurs, vehicle searches conducted without warrants have been deemed proper where probable cause was present.... This is not a case where police knew hours in advance that a particular vehicle carrying evidence of crime would be parked in a particular locale, such that it would have been reasonably practicable to obtain a search warrant before encountering the vehicle to be searched. Rather the instant search was conducted when police stopped a moving vehicle just thirty minutes after a reported crime. Inasmuch as the requirement of probable cause was satisfied, the exigencies of the mobility of the vehicle and of there having been inadequate time and opportunity to obtain a warrant rendered the search proper.
Commonwealth v. Baker, 518 Pa. 145, 541 A.2d 1381, 1383 (1988) (emphasis supplied).
*534Baker was recently cited approvingly in Commonwealth v. Luv, 557 Pa. 570, 735 A.2d 87, 93 (1999) (applying Baker’s twofold “determining factors” of “the existence of probable cause and the presence of exigent circumstances” and noting that the exigency in Baker involved fact that “police did not know well in advance where the criminal evidence would be located and could not have reasonably obtained a search warrant”). In Luv, this Court found that exigent circumstances existed because, inter alia, “[tjhere was no time to secure a ... warrant” once probable cause unexpectedly arose to search his cai'. Id. at 94.7
Moreover, Baker’s approach has been embraced in numerous other cases decided by this Court. In those cases, whether the police had previous information that a particular vehicle would be involved in the commission of a crime has been the decisive factor in determining whether exigent circumstances justified a warrantless automobile search. See Commonwealth v. Labron, 543 Pa. 86, 669 A.2d 917 (1995) {Labron 1) (no exigent circumstances where, prior to arranging surveillance of defendant, officer had specific information that defendant used his Lincoln automobile to transport drugs); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 526 Pa. 268, 585 A.2d 988 (1991) (exigent circumstances exist where police did not have ad*535vanee notice that defendant and her husband would be traveling in York County in particular automobile); Commonwealth v. Ionata, 518 Pa. 472, 544 A.2d 917 (1988) (plurality) (no exigent circumstances where police had four hours’ advance notice that defendant would be transporting drugs in particular automobile and had obtained search warrant for defendant’s person and premises).8
In the case sub judice, there unquestionably was probable cause to search the white Lexus for the firearms that appellants had fired from that very car at the victims only a short time before. The probable cause arose on the street, in the middle of the night, unexpectedly, and only after a shooting,. about which police could not, and did not, have prior knowledge. Since the police had probable cause, and there was no prior opportunity to secure a warrant, the warrantless search here plainly was justified by exigent circumstances and was proper under our prior case law. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, that is enough to decide this case.
I realize that there is some discomfort in confronting and acknowledging flaws in prior cases, even when the mistake may be inadvertent and occurred in mere dicta. But a reasoned and responsible jurisprudence cannot simply turn a blind eye to the mistake. See The Birth Center v. St. Paul Companies, Inc., 567 Pa. 386, 787 A.2d 376, 391 (2001) (Zappala, J., joined by Castille, J., dissenting) (discussing Gray v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 422 Pa. 500, 223 A.2d 8 (1966)). Cf Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 112 S.Ct. 2482, 120 L.Ed.2d 225 (1992) (plurality opinion). It may be that if this Court were to be presented with a case squarely raising the material question of whether police immobilization of the automobile driver renders the exigency recognized in Baker and White inapplicable under Article I, Section 8, it would conclude that a *536view approximating that which was set forth and rejected in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970), is commanded by the unique Pennsylvania experience. We should not, however, announce that this has already happened, when it most demonstrably has not.
The super-exigent circumstances construct that the lead opinion poses as settled state constitutional law is taken from fundamentally flawed dicta in a case that construed Fourth Amendment law, dicta which did not purport to be discovering and announcing some distinct requirement of Article I, Section 8. Although I concur in the ultimate judgment, for the reasons I have set forth above, I respectfully disagree with the lead opinion’s analytical approach.
Justice NEWMAN joins this concurring opinion.. While * Mayhugh spoke of legislative enactments, the principle it restates is, of course, no less applicable to constitutional provisions.
. The lead opinion explains its focus upon White by stating that White is the case the parties "have focused on,” each claiming that it compels a favorable ruling. In point of fact, the Commonwealth’s primary argu*518ment is that this case is controlled by Baker, Rodriguez, and Luv. See Brief for Appellee at 16-18, 20-22. The Commonwealth then argues— correctly as my analysis below will make clear — that the holding in White (as opposed to the dicta the lead opinion elevates) is consistent with Baker. See id. at 18-19.
. Although the appellant in White apparently invoked only Article I, Section 8, the Court’s automobile exception analysis nevertheless endorsed and followed the same coterminous approach followed in all of our cases, relying heavily upon Fourth Amendment authority.
. It is not unusual for a higher court to ultimately disapprove of a line of authority that a lower court has developed in the daily task of construing the higher court’s governing precedent. See, e.g., Sphere Drake Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 566 Pa. 541, 782 A.2d 510 (2001) (disapproving Modern Shoppers World-Mt. Airy Corp. v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 164 Pa.Cmwlth. 257, 643 A.2d 136 (1994) (en banc), allocatur denied, 539 Pa. 683, 652 A.2d 1327 (1994)); Commonwealth v. Devers, 519 Pa. 88, 546 A.2d 12 (1988) (disapproving Superior Court line of authority interpreting landmark sentencing decisions in Commonwealth v. Riggins, 474 Pa. 115, 377 A.2d 140 (1977), and Commonwealth v. Martin, 466 Pa. 118, 351 A.2d 650 (1976)).
. My dissenting opinion in White responded to the White majority's actual holding on the question of the automobile exception — a holding that never even purported to be promulgating a view of Article I, Section 8 that was different and distinct from the Fourth Amendment. The White dissent then argued for a rule that would not require even the added exigency of probable cause arising unexpectedly which had crept largely unnoticed (or certainly unacknowledged) into this Court’s automobile exception cases such as Baker and Rodriguez. That rule, of course, is the rule that the U.S. Supreme Court subsequently applied when it reversed Kilgore I and Labron I. The issue is entirely different in this case because the lead opinion now seeks to promulgate the suspect White dicta as state constitutional doctrine, and its decision in this regard is essential to its analysis.
. I also would not adopt the erroneous dicta in White because this radical, novel construct was not arrived at through an actual state constitutional analysis. In Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374, 586 A.2d 887 (1991), this Court stated that it is “essential” that a court undertaking an independent analysis of Article I, Section 8 consider "at least.” four specific areas: the text of the Pennsylvania constitutional provision; the history of the provision, including Pennsylvania case law; related case law from other states; and policy considerations unique to Pennsylvania. Id. at 895. The construct set forth in the *528White dicta was not supported by an Edmunds analysis, nor by any concerns that could be deemed unique to Pennsylvania constitutional jurisprudence. Quite to the contrary, the source for the White dicta was an incomplete quotation from Chambers, a Fourth Amendment case from the U.S. Supreme Court, which changed the central message of the quotation.
. The lead opinion relies upon Luv as corroboration of its view that White deliberately set forth a distinct Pennsylvania constitutional test governing automobile exception cases. The decision in Luv never mentions Article I, Section 8 or the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, although the decision indeed cites and follows White, it also cites and follows Baker — which pre-dated the alleged state constitutional "declaration” in White and was not decided under Article I, Section 8— without ever suggesting that different tests were at issue in the two cases. The most that can be said about Luv is that the basis for the decision is unclear; it certainly adds little to the validity of the dicta in White. The lead opinion also deems Luv significant because police in that case were faced with a circumstance where, if they did not immediately stop and search the vehicle, Luv would have continued on his way, which may have resulted in the disappearance of the evidence. Luv, 735 A.2d at 94. This certainly was an exigent fact that was present and considered in Luv, but the presence of that fact hardly stands as a pronouncement that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires the existence of that particular fact for an exigency to be deemed present. The state constitutional silence in Luv, in short, does nothing to resurrect the dicta in White.
. The basis for the preference in our piior cases that there has been no previous opportunity to obtain a warrant is understandable: i.e., it guards against pretextual automobile stops. But I see no value, constitutional or otherwise, that is served by an ad hoc requirement that there also be a showing that "unless the car is searched or impounded, the occupants of the automobile are likely to drive away and contents of the automobile may never again be located by police.”