specially concurring in part and dissenting in part:
While I concur in the majority’s conclusion the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Terry’s Rule 137 motion (No. 4 — 07— 0079), I respectfully dissent from its affirmation of the trial court’s order of protection against Jeremy (No. 4 — 07—0080).
I fully appreciate the majority’s desire to uphold one of the Domestic Violence Act’s stated purposes “to prevent escalating intra[ ]family violence.” Nonetheless, there must be some set parameters to determine when and if people are related by marriage.
As defendants note, “related by marriage” is commonly understood to mean one’s “in-laws,” such as father-in-law, mother-in-law, sister-in-law, brother-in-law, son-in-law, and daughter-in-law. See Gary-Wheaton Bank, 130 Ill. App. 3d at 93, 473 N.E.2d at 553 (noting the defendant was “related by marriage” to his mother-in-law). The term “in-law” is defined as “a relative by marriage.” Black’s Law Dictionary 802 (8th ed. 2004); Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 644 (11th ed. 2003). Thus, the language of the statute is almost identical to the definition of “in-law.” Clearly, Jeremy is Lucas’s former brother-in-law, but none of the aforementioned “in-law” terms would apply to Lonna’s relationship to Jeremy. Similarly, Terry is Lucas’s former father-in-law, but again none of the aforementioned terms would apply to Lonna’s relationship to Terry. I agree with defendants, no commonly understood term describes the relationship between a parent and his or her child’s in-laws. Additionally, a parent’s child’s in-laws are not commonly understood to be the parent’s relations by marriage, just the child’s. Thus, I conclude Lonna’s relationship to Jeremy and Terry does not fall under the plain and ordinary meaning of “related by *** prior marriage.” 750 ILCS 60/103(6) (West 2006).
The majority reaches the opposite result, finding Jeremy and Terry were Lonna’s “relatives by collateral affinity.” The majority’s analysis is flawed for several reasons. First, the statute does not use the term “relatives by collateral affinity,” and it is not this court’s function to insert terminology into the statute the legislature did not see fit to include. See In re Minor Child Alexis Stella, 353 Ill. App. 3d 415, 417, 818 N.E.2d 824, 826 (2004) (“We cannot read words into a statute that are not there”). The crux of this case is the plain and ordinary meaning of “related by *** prior marriage.” 750 ILCS 60/103(6) (West 2006).
Second, although I question the majority’s conclusion “ ‘related by affinity’ ” is synonymous with “ ‘related by marriage,’ ” even if it is true, “affinity” is usually described as the relationship that the majority refers to as “direct affinity” (see 379 Ill. App. 3d at 1021). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “affinity” as “[t]he relation that one spouse has to the blood relatives of the other spouse; relationship by marriage.” Black’s Law Dictionary 63 (8th ed. 2004). Moreover, Black’s Law Dictionary provides the following definition for “relative by affinity”: “A person is a relative by affinity (1) to any blood or adopted relative of his or her spouse, and (2) to any spouse of his or her blood and adopted relatives.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1315 (8th ed. 2004). While Lucas’s prior relationship to Terry and Jeremy would fall under the aforementioned definitions of affinity and direct affinity, Lonna’s relationship to defendants as Lucas’s mother clearly does not.
Third, even if we look to degrees of affinity, the majority fails to expressly note the term “secondary affinity.” “Secondary affinity” is “[t]he relationship of a spouse to the other spouse’s marital relatives,” such as “a wife and her husband’s sister-in-law.” Black’s Law Dictionary 63-64 (8th ed. 2004). Contrary to the majority’s suggestion (see 379 Ill. App. 3d at 1021-22), “secondary affinity” is its own term separate from the term “collateral affinity.” Moreover, on the facts of this case, secondary affinity would describe Lucas’s relationship to the spouses of Tara’s siblings and Tara’s relationship to the spouses of Lucas’s siblings, not the relationship between Lucas’s siblings and Tara’s blood relatives as implied by the majority (see 379 Ill. App. 3d at 1022).
Last, I disagree the Pratt case supports the majority’s interpretation of the statute. While the Pratt court noted the parties in that case were related by secondary affinity, it mentioned that term in rejecting the defendant’s assertion “related by marriage” should be limited to relatives by blood or direct affinity based on the definition of the term “of kin.” See Pratt, 213 S.W.3d at 160, 160 n.2. In actually interpreting the statute, the Pratt court looked to the plain and ordinary meaning of “related by marriage” and found that term included one’s brother-in-law. Pratt, 213 S.W.3d at 160. Then citing the definition of “brother-in-law,” the Pratt court found the defendant and the plaintiff, who were married to sisters, were brothers-in-law and therefore their relationship fell under the order-of-protection statute. Pratt, 213 S.W.3d at 160, citing Black’s Law Dictionary 194 (6th ed. 1990); Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 284 (1993). Thus, the Pratt court did not look to such terms as direct, secondary, and collateral affinity in interpreting “related by marriage,” but rather looked to the commonly understood meaning of the term. Moreover, even if it is proper to consider degrees of affinity in interpreting “related by marriage,” the Pratt case still does not support the majority’s conclusion because it involved secondary affinity, not the more distant collateral affinity at issue in this case.
As previously indicated, I agree with the majority’s conclusion the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Terry’s Rule 137 motion. While I agree with Terry that he and Lonna were not family members related by a prior marriage since they were not “in-laws,” Lonna’s argument was a good-faith interpretation of the Domestic Violence Act as demonstrated by the trial court’s ruling and by the majority position taken today.